MILITARY MEMOIRS

OF

FIELD MARSHAL

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

BY

CAPTAIN MOYLE SHERER.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

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CHAP. I.

PROCEEDINGS AT CADIZ.—THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT ACCEPTS THE AID OF BRITISH TROOPS.—STATE OF THE WAR IN THE PROVINCES.—THE ASSEMBLY OF THE CORTEZ.—THEIR ACTS.—PROGRESS OF THE FRENCH ARMS.—DEATH OF ROMANA.

CADIZ, the last asylum of the Spanish government, was saved from the sword of the intruder by the wise and prompt decision of the duke of Albuquerque.

Marshal Victor followed the Spanish general by rapid marches, and appeared before Cadiz upon the 5th of February. He was six-and-thirty hours too late. The soldiers of Albuquerque were already upon the walls of Cadiz, and were manning the defensive works upon the Isla de Leon, by which that important fortress and the noble harbor are covered.

The troops of Albuquerque were in a miserable condition. The citizens were in confusion and alarm; the streets were crowded with fugitives; and the defences both of Cadiz and the Isla de Leon had been indolently neglected. Had the exact state of things been known to Victor, he would probably have attempted to possess himself of the Isla de Leon by a sudden assault; for the line of defence was so extended, and the garrison so weak in numbers, and so disheartened by past reverses, that such an enterprise might have been crowned by success. But the zeal, the energy, and the talent of Albuquerque, to whom the command of the forces was immediately intrusted, were so far blessed in their exertion, that the French marshal, deceived as to the strength of his preparations, disposed his divisions around the bay, and established a regular blockade.

His line of contravallation extended twenty-five miles. His three main positions were Chiclana, Puerto Real, and Santa Maria; and these were fortified with care, and connected by intrenched camps. Cadiz, for so long a period the seat of a government, which had to deliberate for the interests of a kingdom, and to rule wide provinces, under the sound of hostile cannon, it is necessary to describe.

At the mouth of the river G[illegible]ere is an insulated tract of land, triangular in fo[illegible] two sides of this island are washed by the sea, and it is separated from the main land by the river Santi Petri. This is the Isla de Leon; its left shore is on the open sea; its right looks on the harbor; and these two sides meet at a point, from which a narrow tongue of land, five miles in length, connects the island with Cadiz.

The Santi Petri is a natural channel separating the upper harbor of Cadiz from the open sea; it traverses a marsh that is crossed by many small water-courses, and varies in breadth from one to three miles. The Isla de Leon can only be approached by the bridge of Zuazo, and by a firm causeway which crosses the marsh. Upon this island is one large town and a smaller where public buidings and barracks are erected for the use and service of Cadiz, the great arsenal of Spain, and the principal rendezvous of the Spanish navy.

Cadiz is built upon naked rocks: its highest point is about 200 feet above the level of the sea; and it is washed on all sides by the ocean, with the exception of one narrow isthmus, which connects it with the isla. It is a beautiful city, and its harbor one of the noblest in the world, being a vast calm basin from ten to twelve leagues in circumference.

Here the seat of the regency, which had been appointed by the junta before it submitted to resign its authority, was happily fixed, and here the cortez, which they had convoked, were instructed to assemble. Thus, while the French were nominally masters of Spain, a secret and sacred spirit of resistance was everywhere cherished, by the knowledge that a government still existed which defied the intruder.

The vast importance of maintaining Cadiz reconciled the Spaniards to the admission of British troops. A division of 6000 men, including a strong Portuguese regiment, soon arrived, and were landed to assist in its defence. This auxiliary force was commanded by Sir Thomas Graham. By his indefatigable exertions, the line upon the Isla de Leon, which, extending as it did near ten miles, had, in the first instance, shown many weak points to an enterprising enemy, provided with boats or rafts for passing the Santi Petri, soon presented a strong impregnable front.

Secured by all the skilful and laborious improvement of her defences, and by the increased strength of her garrison, the city of Cadiz resumed her mirth and her music; and the orators of her deliberative assemblies harangued at length and in safety. A municipal junta had been formed in the city, composed of merchants elected by ballot; this was intended to supply her need at the moment that the central junta was deposed at Seville. Of this municipal junta, Albuquerque, on his first en-

trance into Cadiz, was elected president. But he found it a painful post, and very heartily despised the incompetent, and yet ambitious men, with whom he was associated. Nevertheless, the junta triumphed for a time, both over the heroic virtue of Albuquerque and the acknowledged regency The press was under their direction, and they were supported by the populace. Albuquerque was sent ambassador to England, and died in that country of a broken heart. The regency, though feeble, had yet influence enough to arrange for the quiet reception of the British auxiliaries. Thus, despite the intrigues, the venality, and the tyranny of this junta, elected by the popular voice, and upheld by the popular club, or knife, Cadiz was saved.

One of the first acts of the British general, Stewart, who arrived at Cadiz in the middle of February, was to recover and reoccupy a most important insulated outwork, called Fort Matagorda; which, though it seriously impeded the works of the blockading force, had been dismantled and abandoned by the Spaniards. A detachment of 150 men, composed of soldiers, seamen, and gunners of the artillery, under the command of captain M'Lean of the 94th, was sent across to this fort, in thick rough weather, and effected a secure lodgement. The cannon of the enemy played heavily upon them the whole of the next day, but they stood firm; and they held this little fort for fifty-five days, under the fire of the French, which was frequently directed against them. M'Lean could only bring seven guns to bear upon the enemy; but he was supported upon the flanks of his small fort by a Spanish man-of-war, and a flotilla of gunboats. At dawn upon the 21st of April, the French opened upon this work, from batteries which mounted forty-eight guns and mortars of the largest size Red-hot shot were fired upon the ship and the boats, and drove them away. The parapet of the fort was soon destroyed by the weight and vigor of the fire; half the little garrison fell; and, after a stout and resolute defence, boats were sent off to withdraw the survivors, and Matagorda was evacuated.

Notwithstanding the indolence and apathy of the citizens of Cadiz, and all the frivolous contentions between the local junta and the regency, by which the public service was hourly impeded, Sir Thomas Graham, looking steadily upon his duty, labored incessantly to improve the defences of Cadiz. Marshal Soult now limited his operations to fortifying and securing the French cantonments, that fewer troops might suffice for the blockade. There was only one of his batteries, which, from huge mortars, did occasionally, but at long and very uncertain ranges, cast a few shells into the town. During the spring he cleared and subjected the provinces of Murcia and Granada by his movable columns, establishing the temporary reign of the

intruder by the most unwarrantable edicts, and by the most severe and savage executions. The Spaniard was told in these edicts, that if he was not a regular soldier he might not raise his arm to defend his dwelling or his family. Death and the exposure of his body upon the highway were the penalties incurred by every patriot taken in arms. But from the blood of these unhappy victims there sprung up a sudden growth of armed men; and the guerrilla bands, which rapidly increased throughout the land, dealt out upon the enemy a full measure of revenge.

It is fair to record, that all the cruel and violent proceedings by which the French sought to establish the throne of Joseph Buonaparte did not originate with him. He was an indolent, self-indulgent, easy man, not formed for public life; disliking his position, but not at liberty to resign it. Perhaps no one felt the slavery of Napoleon's service more bitterly than this king and brother.

In May the blockading force before Cadiz received a reinforcement of near 2000 men, in a singular manner. A body of French soldiers, confined on board prison-ships in the harbor, took advantage of a heavy gale, which drove upon the French side of the bay, cut the cables, and, under a fire from the Spanish batteries and the fleet, let the hulks drift to shore. These prisoners had been taken, with Dupont, at Baylen

It was every day more apparent that nothing could be attempted against Cadiz; but in other quarters the French arms had better success. Although nothing could exceed the zeal and activity of the Spanish general, O'Donnel, in Catalonia; although many of his enterprises were rewarded by good fortune; and all his combats were fought with the most ardent valor, especially that of Vich, in February, 1810, yet fortress after fortress fell.

The garrison of Hostalrich, after patiently sustaining ten weeks' bombardment and four months' blockade, and consuming their last ration of food, made a bold sally and a resolute effort to break a way through the French force. Of 1400 many were slain; Julian Estrada, the brave governor, was wounded and taken, together with 300 men; but the larger number made good their attempt and reached Vich. The next day the islands of Las Medas, a maritime port of great importance, were surprised and captured by the French.

In Arragon, Suchet besieged Lerida, breached the walls by five days' heavy fire, and carried it by storm on the sixth day after opening his batteries. The carnage in the streets was very great; little quarter was given; and the French commander next proceeded against Mequinenza, a place of some consequence at the junction of the Segre with the Ebro. This

fort, situate on a lofty rock, was ignobly surrendered by the governor after a very faint show of resistance for five short days.

These successes, in the months of May and June, 1810, compensated to Suchet for his grievous failure in March at Valencia, against which place he had unadvisedly marched in the ill-founded presumption that he might take it by a coup-de-main. But here the very Spaniards who had fled from the field of Belchite stood up again manfully under Ventura Cora; and though the marshal penetrated to the gates of Valencia, and encamped in that celebrated and fertile spot called the Huerta, or garden of Valencia, he was soon compelled to retire without effecting his object. He had reckoned upon treason or panic, but neither served him: for the traitors were discovered; the populace rose in arms; neither intrigue nor menace availed to move them; he was too weak to force their intrenchments, and returned to the Ebro.

This event diffused great joy, and awakened a hopeful spirit in all the eastern provinces; but Suchet soon repaired his ill fortune, as has been related above, by the conquest of Arragon.

During the year 1810, the guerrillas became very numerous: and the convoys and detachments of the enemy were continually assaulted on their march. It is true that no military movement of any important bearing upon the issue of a campaign was effectually prevented by these bands; but in maintaining their communications, and procuring their supplies, the difficulties of the French were largely increased. Not a letter could be sent even a small distance without a strong escort of dragoons; and the courier to France was accompanied through certain districts on the route by two or three battalions of infantry.

Such was the state of Spain when her national Cortez were assembled. The rule by which the members were chosen was formed for the occasion by the supreme junta.

All persons of twenty-five years of age, whose incomes were not derived from place or pension under the government, who were not debtors to the state, and who were of sound body and good moral repute, were eligible to a seat in this famous assembly. All cities which had sent members to the last cortez were now to elect the same number. Every provincial junta returned one deputy, and the provinces were represented in the proportion of one member for every 50,000 inhabitants. Twenty-six members chosen from natives of Spanish America, resident in the mother-country, represented the colonies.

As of necessity in some of the provinces of old Spain now strongly occupied by the French, the elections could not have free course, and as the representatives sent from others were

many of them taken by the enemy on their way to Cadiz, sixty-eight supplementary deputies were chosen in Cadiz, and in other districts, with which the communications were yet secure; and from this list all vacancies were filled.

It had been the intention of the supreme junta to have instituted a higher chamber of the grandees and dignitaries of the church as a wholesome check upon the cortez, but this design was abandoned; however, nobles and secular priests were admitted as candidates for the great national assembly.

The eyes of Spain, of England, and of all Europe, were fixed upon the meeting of this great council. It took place on the 24th of September, 1810, with the solemn and customary forms.

Their first act was a decree, by which the style and title of majesty was conferred upon their own body, and the inferior title of highness was given to the executive. Moreover, they decreed that no member of the cortez should accept of any pension, honor, reward, or favor from the executive.

The liberal members of this assembly, though not at first the most numerous division, were by far the most wordy and vehement debaters. The freedom of the press in all matters not religious was very soon proclaimed; a great blessing to any country, but not exactly their first great want at that moment.

Spain was full of armed enemies, while the constitutional hall of the cortez rung with the loud acclamations, with which abstract principles of liberty were received, and speculative theories for enlightened government were discussed and lauded.

Meanwhile, amid the pauses of their stormy eloquence, might be heard the boom of some solitary gun from the lines of contravallation, occupied by the French; and many an elderly Frenchman in those lines had heard better speeches and fairer theories in Paris, twenty years before, and had survived the hopes and the rapture with which he listened to them.

About this time the duke of Orleans, then an exile at Palermo, who had previously offered his services to the central junta, presented himself in Spain on the invitation of the regency. He first landed at Tarragona, and thence sailed round to Cadiz, where he was received with great honor, and invited to a high command in the northern provinces by the regency. This appointment the cortez would not sanction, nor does any blame attach to them for their refusal.

However, their jealousy of the executive soon evinced itself by dissolving the regency and appointing another. Of this, Blake, the general, was president, and Pedro Agar, a naval commander, and Gabriel Cisgar, the governor of Carthagena, were members. Blake and Cisgar being absent, the cortez appointed two substitutes provisionally. The marquis del Palacio, one of these substitutes, being desirous, out of a conscientious

regard to the oath of his allegiance to Ferdinand, to qualify that which he was now called upon to take to the cortez, was immediately displaced and persecuted, and held up as an object for the popular suspicion and hatred.

Though the constitution had been most carefully worded in a republican spirit, the acts of the cortez were soon as despotic and capricious as those of the various provisional governments which had preceded them. It is true that, for a season, a new impulse was given to the nation, and "Long live the cortez!" "Long live the new constitution!" was for a time shouted by the people. But the popularity of these new senators soon declined.

The common people in Spain have strong prejudices in favor of old institutions and ancient customs. They rank themselves among the families of the earth as one of old renown and lofty fame; therefore, as soon as the work of innovation began, when they saw old establishments suppressed, old forms violated, and the clergy openly assailed, they soon became surly and discontented.

Moreover, this vain assembly, while busied with popular harangues and legislative enactments, neglected the weightier matters of organizing levies throughout the kingdom, and directing all the energies of the people to the expulsion of their enemies.

Most embarrassing propositions were entertained by them. They acknowledged, by a majority, the hereditary claim of Carlotta, princess of Brazil, to the Spanish succession, and to the immediate possession of supreme control over the country; and, if lord Wellington had not interfered, she would have been proclaimed regent.

The affairs of the Spanish colonies were administered, at this important period, with so little of wisdom, good faith, and common decency, by the government of old Spain, that the American provinces—not sorry, perhaps, to find cause and opportunity—threw off the yoke of their oppressors, and openly defended their rights in arms.

Such was the state, and such were the proceedings, of a government, whose debates were carried on in a city blockaded by the enemy.

The only expedition ventured against the French at this time from the neighborhood of Cadiz was a small one, composed of British and Spanish troops, directed against the castle of Frangirola, near Malaga. The small force employed consisted of a British battalion, a detachment of foreign deserters, and one Spanish regiment, under the command of Lord Blayney. These troops landed near Frangirola, but for want of heavy metal, they made no impression on the place; Sebastiani, commanding in

Malaga, marched against them; and an affair took place, which was so unfortunately conducted, that Lord Blayney and 200 men, with their officers, were taken prisoners; several were killed, and the remainder were compelled to retire to their ships.

We turn for a moment to consider the operations of that corps of the enemy in Spanish Estremadura, which, while the allied army was fully engaged in the defence of Lisbon, succeeded in wresting from the feeble arms of the Spaniards a very important conquest.

Towards the end of December, Soult, assembling a force of 13,000 men at Seville, advanced into Estremadura, compelling the Spanish divisions under Ballasteros and Mendizabal to retire rapidly before them. The French presented themselves before the gates of Olivença on the 11th of January. Mendizabal had left in this place seven battalions, and a brigade of field-artillery; with what object it is not easy to comprehend, the fortress being weak in all its defences, and without any stores. It surrendered to general Girard on the 22d of January, the Spanish soldiers being without food. Soult instantly made Olivença a place of arms, to facilitate his movements for the reduction of Badajos, which fortress was invested by the corps of marshal Mortier on the 26th.

Upon the 23d of this month, the marquez de la Romana, who commanded the Spanish forces acting with the army of Wellington, died at Cartaxo, the British head-quarters. These troops lord Wellington had already detached to support Mendizabal; giving minute instructions as to the very position they should occupy—a post so happily chosen that, as long as it was maintained with a prudent patience, it proved a constant source of anxiety to the besiegers, and of confidence to the besieged. It lies north of Badajos; the river Gevora protecting it in front, and fort St. Christoval sheltering the right. From this strong and secure position, which kept open the communications with the town, and covered the introduction of its supplies, Mendizabal allowed himself to be moved by the annoyance which a few shells, thrown from the opposite bank of the river, caused in his encampment. The night after the Spanish general changed his ground, Mortier crossed the Guadiana by a flying bridge above the town; and a column of 6000 men fording the Gevora at daylight, the dispositions to attack the Spanish army were completed. The morning was thick and foggy; but, when the mist cleared up, the Spaniards beheld their force exposed on every side to assault; while a French brigade was already drawn up between their ground and fort Christoval. Without support, without formation, without one directing mind, or one governing voice, the Spaniards, offering many of them, individually, a very gallant resistance, were soon and completely beaten. Three

thousand poured over the bridge into Badajos. Their cavalry fled; and the Portuguese horse, under colonel Madden, despite all his efforts to rally them, followed. About 500 were led off in some order by don Carlos de España to Elvas; the rest were taken or slaughtered. Thus, in a few hours, was a Spanish army of more than 10,000 men destroyed. Mendizabal escaped.

One pang was spared to the noble and unfortunate Romana. That upright man was already in his grave, before this shameful disaster on the Gevora occurred. "In him," said the French officers, when they learned his death,—"in him the Spaniards have lost the only general in their service worthy of his rank." —"In him," said lord Wellington, in a dispatch reporting upon his decease,—"in him the Spanish army have lost their brightest ornament—his country its most upright patriot—and the world the most strenuous and zealous defender of the cause in which we are engaged; and I shall always acknowledge with gratitude the assistance I have received from him as well by his operations as by his counsel, since he had been joined with this army."

CHAP. II.

MASSENA BREAKS UP FROM SANTAREM AND RETIRES FROM PORTUGAL.—LORD WELLINGTON PURSUES THE FRENCH ARMY CLOSELY, AND RE-ESTABLISHES HIS HEAD-QUARTERS UPON THE FRONTIER.

It has been already stated, that the corps of general Hill occupied cantonments upon the left bank of the Tagus, to observe and defend the passage of that river, to provide for the safety of Abrantes, and, in the event of Massena's retiring over the Zezere, to be early in motion on the line of his retreat. General Hill, to the deep regret of his division, went home sick in December, and marshal Beresford succeeded to his fine command.

With a view to the relief of Badajos, Wellington was already about to direct the march of this corps southward, when certain indications of a movement on the part of Massena induced him to alter this disposition. Beresford was ordered to advance to Abrantes, and to push forward a detachment of his corps upon the enemy's posts at Punhete. A brigade, under major-general the honorable William Stewart, was actually threatening Punhete, and feeling its way upon their rear, when suddenly, on the night of the 5th of March, the French corps withdrew from their strong position at Santarem. The head-quarters of the allies were in that city on the following day; and Wellington, completing all the necessary arrangements with his wonted promptitude, was already in full pursuit; but the preparations

for this retreat of the French were so perfect, and their conduct of it so masterly, that very seriously to embarrass them was not easy.

Massena preferred that route which ascends the left bank of the Mondego to Guarda and Almeida. To gain this line with security, he made a demonstration with one corps d'armée from the neighborhood of Leyria, as if he would again advance, while with the main body he fell back upon Thomar, detaching Loison, with one division, upon his flank, by the road of Espinhal.

Wellington caused Beresford to move all his people up the left bank of the Tagus on the 5th, and at break of day on the 6th he passed through Santarem himself to pursue the enemy.

It was at first thought that Massena designed to assemble and unite his forces at Thomar, for his boats at Punhete were not destroyed till the 6th. Under this impression, the greatest part of Beresford's corps crossed the Tagus at Abrantes, and moved by Punhete upon Thomar, crossing the Zezere by a boat bridge brought down the river from Abrantes.

Three divisions of the army, and two brigades of cavalry, marched also by Golegao upon Thomar. Here, however, the true direction of the retreat was ascertained; and it appeared that the French columns were pointing their marches upon Pombal.

Upon the 9th, Massena halted in front of this place in position. Upon the 10th, Wellington brought up, with all possible expedition, as many troops as he could collect, and had assembled six divisions and the cavalry in front of his adversary. In the night Massena retired through the town of Pombal. He was here closely pursued by the light division; and there was a hot skirmish near the castle of Pombal, from whence the enemy were driven away by so brisk and resolute an attack, that they had no time to destroy the bridge, though it was already mined.

Upon the 12th, Ney, who covered the retreat of the main body with some thousands of the choicest troops, drew up this fine rear-guard in front of Redinha, upon ground so favorable, and disposed them with such skill, that it was not possible to discover whether the position was not about to be disputed by a very large force.

Lord Wellington having attacked the wooded heights upon Ney's right flank, with a brigade of the light division under Sir William Erskine, directed Picton to ascend those upon the French left. These two points were seized upon with great vigor in a short time; but Ney continued to hold his ground with a most resolute countenance, till Wellington, bringing forward a great mass of troops in battle order to assail him, he withdrew rapidly by the village, bridge, and ford of Redinha; covering his movement by the smoke of his musketry, and effecting it without

further loss than that which had been already sustained in fair combat. Many hours were thus gained for the sick, the baggage, and the main body of the French, which had retired upon Condeixa; whither Ney, with the rear-guard, now followed them. About 200 men fell on either side in this affair.

Animated by the determination to prevent, if possible, Massena's passage of the Mondego,—a line of march that would have thrown his opponent into a country, the supplies of which were unexhausted,—Wellington pressed forward upon the 13th, and found the main body of the French in a position of great strength near Condeixa. Montbrun, who had marched with a strong reconnoissance upon Coimbra, found, upon the evening of the 11th, by his patroles, that the bridge of Coimbra was broken down, and the city occupied, as he thought, in strength. They examined the bridge and fords again upon the 12th; but the gallant bearing of colonel Trant, with a few hundred of the militia, and some guns, opposed their passage, and saved the city When this state of things was reported to Massena, he decided on retiring by the Ponte Murcella. To secure his communications with the eighth corps, and with Loison, he moved the division of Clausel to Ponte Coberta, about five miles on his left; while the position of Condeixa, unassailable in front, was held by the troops of Ney.

It was about ten in the morning when Wellington came before it; and judging that Massena considered his position too secure to be disturbed, till his arrangements for continuing his retreat should be completed, he resolved to dislodge him. Accordingly, he sent the third division, under Picton, by a circuitous and difficult path across the mountains to the eastward, to [illegible] the only road open in his rear: no sooner were the advanced files of Picton's column of march discovered at a point already beyond the French left, than, alarmed by this bold and brilliant manœuvre, the French broke up in haste, and pushed for Casal Nova, followed by the British as fast and close as the prepared obstacles on the road and the flaming fires of Condeixa would suffer them to move forward. Nevertheless, the enemy's rear was pressed so closely, that the advanced guard got between the troops at Ponte Coberta, where Massena had fixed his head-quarters, and the main body; as Ney would make no effort to drive back the British skirmishers, and recover the point where the roads from Ancião and Miranda de Corvo unite, Massena was very near taken, and had to scramble over the mountains by night to regain the army.

At day-break on the 14th, the light division, under Sir William Erskine, marched in pursuit, led on by that officer without orders, without due precautions: the consequence was, that the leading regiment, the 52d, advancing under a thick mist, in col-

umn of march, came suddenly without support upon the face of the heights occupied by the army of the enemy, and was immediately engaged. Thus was such a combat as interfered with the designs of lord Wellington forced upon him, and the whole of the light division was soon extended and engaged with a thick cloud of the enemy's skirmishers. It had been the original intention of lord Wellington to turn the enemy's left, and accordingly, when this was accomplished by the movements of the third and fourth divisions under Picton and Cole, the main position, on the slope of which this useless combat had been stoutly maintained, was at once abandoned. Ney drew off in fine order, retiring by echellons of divisions, and disputing every favorable bridge and position, till (though hurried in the afternoon by the close pursuit of the artillery and the light troops in advance) he gained the pass of Miranda de Corvo with a trifling loss. In this position lay the main body of the enemy, and here Montbrun, returning from his unsuccessful march to Coimbra, rejoined them.

Lord Wellington, by his vigorous and skilful movements, had now succeeded in confining the army of Massena to one narrow line of retreat between the mountains and the river Mondego. Here the French general destroyed much ammunition and baggage. Ney, who covered the movements of the main body with a strong rear-guard, had halted upon the left bank of the Ceira, in a rugged and defensible position near the village of Fons d'Aronce. Here lord Wellington found him late in the afternoon, and amusing his right with a feint attack, vigorously charged his left with the third division, while a battery of horse-artillery being advanced rapidly to a favorable point opened hotly upon his dismayed battalions, and they were driven upon the river in such confusion, that many were drowned in attempting to discover the fords, and many were trampled to death on the bridge. In this panic the French lost at the least 500 men: the casualties of the allies were trifling. In the night, Ney blew up the bridge and retired; and upon the 16th the entire army of the enemy had passed the Alva, and occupied the bold and formidable line of mountain behind that river. Upon the 16th, lord Wellington was constrained to halt. Upon the night of the 13th he had heard of the disgraceful surrender of Badajos, and resolved instantly to reinforce the corps of Beresford, which he had already halted at Thomar, and sent back to the Alemtejo, with the fourth division, and a brigade of heavy cavalry. These last troops had been detached immediately after the affair of the 14th at Casal Nova; and it was the desire of lord Wellington that Beresford should take instant measures for the recovery of Badajos. But these matters on the Alemtejo frontier may be related in another place. In the night of the 16th a bridge upon

trestles was thrown over the Ceira by the staff corps, and on the morning of the 17th the army passed onward in pursuit. Wellington found his antagonist at rest, and expecting secure repose behind the Alva, having destroyed the bridges upon that river at Pombeiro and Ponte Murcella. So satisfied was the French marshal of a long breathing time, that he sent out his foragers in some strength to procure supplies;—but Wellington disturbing him upon the lower Alva by a strong demonstration and a lively cannonade, menaced his left by marching three divisions over the mountains. These movements compelled Massena to concentrate his forces in the strong position of the Serra de Moita, out of which he was soon forced by the brilliant manœuvres of his opponent. Two divisions of the allies passed the wide and swollen Alva by a flying bridge, between Pombeiro and Ponte Murcella, while the right wing threatened Massena by Arganil, and upon the north bank of the Mondego, a body of militia, under those indefatigable leaders Trant and Wilson, harassed his flank. Thus pressed, he again destroyed all such stores and baggage as encumbered his march, left his scattered foragers as a sure prey to the allies, and pushed for Celerico and Guarda. The main body of the French was at Celerico on the 21st, under Massena, whose cavalry instantly communicated with Almeida. Meantime, Regnier with the second corps had occupied Guarda. Thus holding the defiles of Guarda open, Massena calculated upon maintaining himself in that strong country for some time, and avoiding the mortification of a forced retreat into Spain. The pursuers outmarched their supplies, and suffered great privations. The Portuguese troops, whose commissariat was wretched, were almost starving, and the means of transport were unequal to keep the men fed during the exigencies of this rapid advance: therefore, a short pause was unavoidable. Massena considered the pursuit at an end; and moving Regnier with the second corps to Belmonte, posted the sixth corps at Guarda, and the eighth and the cavalry in the valleys to the eastward. During these operations, Massena and Ney had quarrelled. Massena had desired to march by his left through the Estrella to Coria in the valley of the Tagus, and thus to establish a communication with the armies of the south and the centre. To this plan Ney had violently objected, and had, in disobedience of orders, marched in the direction of Almeida. Thus the design of Massena was crossed; and though he superseded Ney in his command, and sent him to Paris, the moment for the operation had gone by. Nevertheless, in his present position at Guarda, he still calculated on being able to keep open a communication with Soult, and by his co-operation to maintain himself in Portugal till he could resume the offensive.

This dream of security was dissipated, on the morning of the

29th, by the sudden and simultaneous appearance of five columns of attack ascending the Guarda mountain by five different roads or paths. This position, one of the strongest in Portugal, was abandoned by the French with the utmost precipitation: without one effort for its defence, they hurried down the only open road, and crossed the Coa. Upon this river the enemy halted till the 3d of April; having the sixth corps at Rovina, the eighth at Alfayates, and the second upon the heights behind Sabugal, at which point the stream takes a sudden turn. Massena thus held command of some passes to the south beyond Alfayates; communicated with Almeida; guarded the bridges and fords on the Coa; and presented two strong fronts, covered by a river, and connected by the strong and convenient point of Sabugal. At daylight on the 3d, Wellington manœuvred to turn the left of the second corps, and, by a well-combined movement, to envelop and cut it off. To this end the light division was to cross the Coa several miles above Sabugal at a ford; the third division at another a little to the left; while the cavalry under Slade passed the river at another upon the extreme right; the fifth division was to force the bridge at Sabugal; the sixth was to observe the enemy at Rovina; and the remaining divisions were in reserve.

The morning was dark and misty. A brigade of the light division, under colonel Beckwith, was, by some error in the calculation of a staff officer, ordered to the attack before the other troops were in motion on their respective points.

Colonel Beckwith forded the river with four companies of the 29th (the rifles), and with the 43d regiment. The riflemen led up the heights in extended order; the 43d followed in column. The riflemen drove in the enemy's piquets, but were almost instantly forced back upon the 43d by a strong reserve, and, the fog clearing, Beckwith found himself in the presence of Regnier's whole corps. He instantly charged and repulsed the French column, and gained the brow of the height; but here he was directly exposed to the fire of two guns loaded with grape within one hundred yards; and was forthwith assailed in front and upon both flanks by very numerous forces, of which some were horsemen. The heroism of Beckwith and his men was only equalled by his ability and their steadiness. He took advantage of a small stone inclosure, and made it good against all assaults, with desperate resolution. The fighting was furious, and the fire of the 43d deadly; and in the midst Beckwith charged out upon the enemy, and took from them a howitzer within fifty yards of the low stone wall which he was defending. The other brigade of the light division now came up to their support, and the combat was continued with equal spirit by the 52d. In vain did Regnier bring forward fresh and stronger

columns, in vain did cavalry fall in upon the skirmishers of the 52d, and cause a momentary confusion; the fierce efforts of the enemy were all firmly repulsed, and the brave light division kept the howitzer, and still crowned the hill. In this short and bloody struggle the French left more than 300 dead bodies upon the ground, and their wounded were very numerous. The allies had only 200 killed and wounded.

Regnier, maddened by this repulse, was collecting all his reserves for one more effort, when the fifth division carried the bridge of Sabugal, and a column of the third appeared on his right flank. He now retired hastily upon Alfayates, and he was joined at Rendo by the sixth corps. The next day, Massena took the road of Ciudad Rodrigo, and on the 5th of April entered Spain. Thus terminated the memorable invasion of Portugal. The light division had the high honor of seeing it recorded in the dispatches of lord Wellington, that the affair at Sabugal was "one of the most glorious actions that British troops were ever engaged in."

Upon the 28th of March the army was joined by considerable reinforcements from England, which were organized as a seventh division. These troops had been embarked in January; but, being detained by contrary winds, did not anchor in the Tagus till the 2d of March. Had they arrived a month sooner, the expulsion of Massena would not have been so long delayed; for, with the aid of these 7000 men, Wellington could have acted upon the offensive, before the French general, yielding to a stern necessity, broke up from his position at Santarem. By the want of wholesome and sufficient food, by consequent sickness, and by relaxed discipline, his army had very severely suffered: it had wasted down to 40,000 combatants. He had, with a wise and denying economy, kept rations sufficient for a long march in store; and these, being issued at the moment they retired, kept his men well together, and in good spirits; and, in fact (owing to the scarceness and badness of the transport of the allies), they were far better supplied during the retreat than their pursuers. It will be seen that both the retreat and the pursuit were conducted with consummate ability and skill. The positions of the enemy's rear-guard were, in general, chosen with a fine judgment, and maintained with steadiness to the latest moment. When, however, it is considered that lord Wellington pursued his adversary with a force various in composition, not even in the early part of the advance superior in numbers, and from the 14th greatly inferior,—that the enemy were turned or driven from every position where they attempted to delay him by skilful manœuvre or vigorous assault,—that, from Condeixa onwards, they were compelled repeatedly to destroy carriages, stores, ammunition, and means of transport,—that they suffered, in various affairs, a

severe loss in killed and wounded, and lost, including the foragers upon the Alva, near 2000 prisoners; and, when all these results of the campaign are set in contrast with the haughty and boastful proclamations of Massena eight months before, the reader will have little difficulty in deciding which was the greater captain of the two,—the "spoiled child of victory," or the firm and illustrious warrior who delivered Portugal. Nevertheless, those public men and public prints at home, whose patriotic care it was to disparage the exploits of Wellington, and to exalt the generalship of the French, described the retreat of Massena as "*a mere change of position from the Zezere to the Agueda,*" —as a manœuvre to lead the allies to a distance from their resources, and to approach his own. Thus spoke the Opposition, both in and out of parliament; but the people of England held very different language: they read of the sufferings of the inhabitants of Portugal with a deep sympathy, and of the ferocious atrocities of the French with honest and undisguised indignation; they rejoiced in the triumph of Wellington; they were proud of the conduct of the British troops; and they were made sensible of the blessing of that happy locality, and *that admirable constitution*, which saved them from the fearful visitations of foreign and the unnatural ravages of civil war. Of a truth, the afflictions of the Portuguese were very heavy. A wide and spacious district of the land had been for months occupied by a hostile army, and abandoned by all those inhabitants who had listened to the counsel of lord Wellington and the orders of their government. The condition of these fugitives was pitiable enough; but the fate of those who, from indifference, indolence, or incredulity, either lingered in their homes to take their chance of events, or fled at the latest moment to some hiding-place not far from their abode, never has been, never can be, fully ascertained. Suffice it to say, that during their occupation of that district the French troops suffered grievously for want of food; that their discipline was gone; that they foraged for themselves; that all the evil spirits among them had opportunity for crime. He who knows how intimate is the connexion between animal wants and animal ferocity, and how, in such connexion, cruelty the most abominable may consist with *infidel* civilization, will require no details of the conduct of the French army. A large proportion of the officers and of the men of that army looked with horror upon the atrocities committed, and with contempt upon those orders of their general whereby the crimes of ruffians who disgraced the name of soldiers were approved and sanctioned.

By express orders from the French head-quarters, the city of Leyria, and the church and convent of Alcobaça (which last, says Mr. Southey, are to the Portuguese as Westminster Abbey

and the Bodleian to an Englishman), were given to the flames. The whole line of their retreat was marked by fire, desolation, and blood. "The cruelties perpetrated cannot and ought not to be described."—"Every horror (says Colonel Napier) that could make war hideous attended this dreadful march." In the district of Coimbra near 3000 persons were murdered by the French, as they passed it on their retreat. In those provinces where the French were cantoned during their partial occupation of the country, the sufferings of the people were dreadful. Thousands hid themselves in the woods and mountains; but even here, the marauders of the enemy, prowling like wolves for food, found them,—some in large and trembling companies, some caverned in lonely fear; and, seizing their little stores of maize or pulse, slew them: at times, in cruel favor, sparing the women.

Prepared by such actions, they became the ready agents of destruction and cruelty, at their general's call; and the retreat of Massena was marked by "a barbarity seldom equalled, and never surpassed." Yet it is but just to repeat the observation, that countless enormities may be the work of but a small number of villains; and that of 40,000 French soldiers, a large and gallant majority may have viewed these acts and orders with abhorrence.

The last body of the enemy which passed the Agueda, after the combat of Sabugal, was a brigade of French infantry of the 9th corps, which had been detached on a particular service, near Almeida, and was actually in motion to attack Trant and his militia (then watching that fortress), when the cavalry and horse artillery of the allies fell hotly upon it. This brigade retired in fine order, across open ground, sustaining a close cannonade, and being menaced on both flanks by the British cavalry. It lost near 300 men, killed, wounded, and prisoners, in this movement; but at last, gaining a stronger country, made good its retreat across the Agueda, by Barba del Puerco.

Not a French soldier was now left in arms upon the soil of Portugal, save the garrison of Almeida. This fortress was immediately blockaded. The head-quarters were established at Villa Formosa; the troops were cantoned in advance; and Wellington, relieved from any present apprehension for the frontier of Beira, suddenly left the army, and rode, by long journeys, to the Alemtejo, to visit the detached corps under marshal Beresford.

CHAP. III.

BADAJOS AND CAMPO MAYOR TAKEN BY THE FRENCH.—BERESFORD DRIVES THEM FROM CAMPO MAYOR.—MOVES TO ELVAS.—PASSES THE GUADIANA.—PREPARES FOR THE SIEGE OF BADAJOS.—LORD WELLINGTON VISITS THIS CORPS OF THE ARMY.—EXAMINES THE DEFENCES OF BADAJOS.—IS SUDDENLY RECALLED TO BEIRA.—AFFAIRS OF CADIZ.—BATTLE OF BARROSA.—WAR IN CATALONIA.

The defeat of Mendizabal, on the Gevora, has been already recorded. It was witnessed from the walls of Badajos. Three thousand of the routed soldiers entered that fortress by the bridge, and joined the garrison, which was thus swelled to 9000 men. Many of the inhabitants had fled to avoid the perils and privations of an expected siege, therefore food was abundant. They had military stores in plenty; the weather was severe, and the rains heavy. Every thing favored the besieged—every thing was against the besiegers. However, on the evening of their victory, the French, with their wonted activity, immediately broke ground before the place. Don Raphael Menacho, the governor, was a resolute and excellent officer; the troops had great confidence in his measures; the sallies were bold and frequent; the fire of the besieged was true and weighty; and all appearances justified the expectation that Badajos would be most successfully defended. The French had pushed their approaches to the covered way, and were making preparations to blow in the counterscarp, when, upon the night of the 2d of March, Menacho led a vigorous sally against their nearest batteries, spiked their guns, and destroyed a great deal of their late work. For this advantage the Spaniards paid incalculably dear—Menacho was slain, and the heart of their hopes was struck. One Imas succeeded to the command; the French made rapid progress; the ditch was gained, and the rampart was breached; upon the 10th of March, the governor was sternly summoned to surrender the place, or abide the consequences of a refusal.

Menacho, before his death, had retrenched the streets, and shown sufficiently his intentions. Imas was a man of another sort. He had received clear and correct information of the state of affairs on the Tagus; he knew of Massena's retreat; he knew that a very strong corps of British and Portuguese was advancing to his relief; the breach was as yet narrow, imperfect, and difficult; he had 8000 soldiers within the walls, while the camp of the besiegers contained only 14,000 men. Yet Imas, upon this summons, immediately surrendered the place. The garrison were made prisoners of war; and, as if to amuse themselves with his dishonor, the enemy suffered his grenadiers

to march out by a breach, which his own workmen had to enlarge that they might do so. As Imas obtained his own liberty, and gave the French all the intelligence of which he was in possession, of his treachery there can be little doubt. This disgraceful business was a severe mortification to lord Wellington, whose plans were thus of necessity disconcerted.

As soon as Badajos fell, Soult, alarmed by the recent operations of the British at Cadiz, returned to Seville. Mortier, pursuing his directions, marched upon Campo Mayor with his infantry, and summoned that place, while his cavalry under Latour Maubourg seized upon Albuquerque and Valencia d'Alcantara, making a few hundred prisoners in those towns. Mortier looked for the instant surrender of Campo Mayor, for it is a weak place, commanded, at the distance of 400 yards, by a low hill; and it was only defended by 200 men and five mounted guns. But these means of defence were under the orders of a brave and able man, a major Tallaia, an officer of engineers in the Portuguese service; and Mortier was compelled to open trenches, to batter in breach, to bombard the place, and to advance to the crest of the glacis by the regular process of the sap. When the breach was made, and the place was again summoned, this faithful Portuguese demanded of his enemy twenty-four hours, to see if it were possible that he could be succored. Mortier granted this honorable demand, and, at the expiration of the time agreed upon, the gallant Tallaia surrendered his charge.

This conquest, however, the enemy did not long retain; for already Beresford was advancing at the head of 22,000 men, with instructions to repair the disasters in this quarter, by relieving Campo Mayor, and laying siege to Badajos.

Upon the morning of the 26th, Beresford's advanced guard, consisting of 2000 horse, and a strong detachment of infantry under Colonel Colborne, came upon the place just as the enemy were hastily moving out. Their battering train of thirteen guns, escorted by three battalions, was in march upon the road to Badajos, accompanied by 1200 cavalry, with horse-artillery. The allies pursued them. Colonel Colborne, with his infantry on the right, and at some distance; Colonel Head, with the 13th Light Dragoons, supported by two squadrons of Portuguese, was upon the left, close in with them. The fine brigade of the British heavy cavalry was in reserve. The ground was an open plain, and favorable for the operations of horse all the way to Badajos. Some French hussars charged out upon the 13th and the Portuguese, to favor the march of their infantry and guns, and gain time for them to push onward; but they were driven off instantly. Four regiments of French dragoons now drew up and presented a very formidable front; but the 13th British

with great spirit charged through them; galloped forwards; cut down the French gunners upon the road, who were conducting the heavy train; and, pursuing their success, headed the French column of march. Some of them formed far in front of it, while others, more hot and uncontrollable, carried on a running and irregular combat with the fugitive horsemen of the enemy, several of the British dragoons being actually at last taken at the very gates of Badajos. The French pursued their march without further interruption. They had about 300 killed and wounded, and lost one howitzer. Colonel Clamorin, a distinguished officer of French dragoons, was slain in this affair.

Marshal Beresford made no use of his heavy cavalry, so that Colborne's detachment of infantry could not of course be brought to bear upon the enemy's line of march, and they got safe into Badajos, having very narrowly escaped destruction or captivity.

The marshal now placed his troops under cover at Elvas, and in the towns and villages convenient to that fortress, in which all the necessary stores for his future operations were to be collected. The enemy had placed a garrison of 3000 men in Badajos, and 400 were left in Olivenza. Beresford's troops, who had been harassed with severe marches ever since the beginning of the month, were greatly in want of shoes, and needed some refreshment and repose.

Captain Squires of the engineers was directed to prepare, with all possible expedition, the means of passing the Guadiana, at Jurumenha; and a bridge laid down upon trestle piers, and connected by some large boats, was ready by the 3d of April; but, in the night, the river rose and carried away the trestles.

This difficulty was met by constructing a bridge upon pontoons and casks, strong enough for the passage of infantry, and with the boats forming flying bridges for the cavalry and guns.

By the evening of the 6th of April the whole force had crossed the river, and taken up a position upon the left bank. While these things were doing by the allies, general Phillipon was busily engaged in restoring the defences of Badajos; and Latour Maubourg, who had succeeded to the command of Mortier, was sweeping up all the supplies of Estremadura with movable columns and cavalry, to provision it for a siege. Therefore the passage of the Guadiana, owing to the employment already on their hands, was not looked to by the French till it was actually effected; and Latour Maubourg did not move to oppose it till the 7th, when he came in front of the allied position with 3000 infantry and 500 horse. In the night the enemy, passing undiscovered between some Portuguese videttes, surprised and captured a squadron of the 13th Light Dragoons: nor was this all. Some of them penetrated into the village, where head-quarters were established, and were fired upon by a

serjeant's guard. From this strange and successful adventure they returned without further molestation than the alarm, which they had at once shared and caused, when they found themselves fired upon in the village.

Beresford now advanced, and summoned Olivenza. The officer in command of the place returned the answer to be expected; and the marshal, sending for heavy guns, after a halt of two days, moved forward himself, and left general Cole with the 4th division to reduce the place. Upon the 14th of April, a battery of six twenty-four pounders was opened upon Olivenza. It was breached in one day, and surrendered on the next.

Beresford, now desirous to push the French out of Estremadura, advanced with a view to clearing ground for his subsequent operations against Badajos, as far as Zafra. Upon the way up, the advanced guard came upon two regiments of French hussars, at the village of Los Santos de Mamona. They were immediately charged, driven, and pursued, losing men, killed or taken, every hundred yards. More than seventy of the 4th and 10th French hussars were captured. The allies had not a man killed or wounded.

The troops lay for a few days collected at Zafra and the towns near: meanwhile great exertions were made at Jurumenha to construct strong bridges; and a position was marked out and intrenched upon the left bank, to admit of their being defended by a strong force of infantry, should circumstances arise to endanger the communication. Lord Wellington reached Elvas on the 21st, and proceeded on the 22d to reconnoitre Badajos, passing the Guadiana below the mouth of the Caya with a strong escort of German and Portuguese cavalry. This reconnoissance was so happily managed that the governor was made to sally out and show the strength of his garrison. The convoy, which the allies had threatened, and for which he was properly jealous, reached the town. The loss on either side was inconsiderable. Before Badajos was invested, lord Wellington assured himself of the co-operation of the Spanish generals, and of their consent to follow the plan of operations which he laid down. It was arranged, and justly, that the general commanding the largest portion, and the best disciplined and most effective of the troops, whose movements were to be now combined, should command the whole. Castaños, the senior general of the Spaniards, met this proposal with a very ready and generous consideration. Lord Wellington foresaw the probability that Soult would advance to raise the siege; and giving Beresford permission to fight a battle, if circumstances admitted of his doing it with prudence, he named Albuera as the point of assembly for the Spanish and British forces, and the best field of battle. The Guadiana rose again on the 24th to the height of ten feet, and

carried away the bridge at Jurumenha. Thus, for a short time, Merida became of necessity the line of communication with Portugal, though the detour was considerable. By this serious difficulty the commencement of operations against Badajos was again delayed. Until the bridge was re-established, it was, of course, impossible to bring forward the engineer and artillery means required for the siege. In addition to this obstacle great inconvenience arose from some angry misunderstanding between the Portuguese and Spaniards, originating in some excesses committed by the latter at Fernando in Portugal. These bitter differences Mr. Stuart at last succeeded in composing. Before, however, the Spanish generals had given their full and final assent to the siege of Badajos being actually undertaken by a force composed of English and Portuguese troops, lord Wellington received a summons from the general commanding the main army in his absence, and returned hastily to Beira. Thus marshal Beresford remained in a difficult command alone,—with a city to besiege, and Soult for an opponent in the field. Before we follow the steps of Wellington to the north, the operations of the allies at Cadiz, in the beginning of March, deserve a particular notice. While Soult was engaged in Estremadura, general Graham and the Spanish general La Peña, concerted an expedition for raising the blockade of Cadiz and destroying the French works in front of the Isla de Leon. Anxious that the attempt should be made, and hopeful of its success, Graham, looking only to the good cause, consented to act under the orders of La Peña. There were not more than 10,000 troops in the French lines,—there were no less than 20,000 in Cadiz and the Isla. Towards the close of February, about 12,000 of the allies were embarked at Cadiz for Tarifa. This force was destined to act upon the enemy's rear at Chiclana, while general Zayas, commanding in the Isla de Leon, was to throw a bridge over the Santi Petri near the sea-mouth, and with the troops from the Isla was to support the attack.

A gale of wind carried the transports past Tarifa, and they were forced to land in Algesiras Bay. From hence they marched to Tarifa, while the guns, there being no road for artillery, were shipped in launches, and towed back to that point by the hard and hearty exertions of the seamen. On the 27th the whole force was assembled at Tarifa, and Graham was joined by the 28th regiment, and the flank companies of the 9th and 82d. Upon the 28th La Peña advanced. On the 2d of March he carried an outpost of the enemy at Cassa Viejas, which they had intrenched two days before; and on the 3d he drove them from Vejer de la Frontera, another of their detached posts. Zayas had fulfilled his part by throwing a bridge over the Santi Petri on the 2d, and had cast up an intrenchment to protect it. On

the nights of the 3d and 4th, the enemy made attacks upon the bridge, but without success. Upon the morning of the 5th the allies reached the low ridge of Barrosa. These heights are about four miles from the sea-mouth of the Santi Petri. To open the communication with the Isla was La Peña's first object. He sent forward general Lardizabal, with his division, to effect this. Lardizabal attacked the French posts, which interposed at that point, and after a very severe affair, conducted on his part with great spirit, and with considerable loss of men, he carried the enemy's intrenchments, and gained the bridge-head. The junction with Zayas was thus effected. La Peña now moved with the main body of the Spaniards to the heights of Bermeja, and sent orders to Graham to follow in support. The line of Graham's march was not far from the coast; the direction was nearly parallel with it, and the road lay through a rough plain, thickly wooded. While the general was advancing across this ground to the Bermeja height, distant about three miles, he discovered a French division upon his right flank, only a few hundred yards from the wood, and another ascending the Barrosa ridge, which he had just quitted, and where he had only left a weak rear-guard of British and two Spanish battalions. The French corps was commanded by marshal Victor in person. Graham saw all the danger of his situation, and decided upon striking the first blow, trusting to valor and a good cause for the issue. He countermarched his small force; directed the right brigade, under general Dilkes, against the Barrosa height; and the left, under colonel Wheatly, against the division beyond the wood upon the plain. The rear-guard having no power to resist the enemy's occupation of the Barrosa hill, had retired, as they marched up, and the division of Ruffin was now formed upon its summit. That of Laval, upon the plain, was the first reached by the British Ten guns, under major Duncan, opened upon it with a most true and destructive fire; and colonel Wheatly gallantly advanced, the French division meeting him most readily. The musketry soon began to roll heavy and deadly; while the riflemen and Portuguese, under colonel Barnard, who had been thrown out on colonel Wheatly's left at the commencement, gradually gained ground. At last, Wheatly ordered a charge; and the first line of the French, despite a valiant resistance, was driven upon the second: but the bayonets of the 87th, and some companies of the Coldstream, were in the midst of them, before they had time to reform, and they were driven from their ground in confusion, leaving an eagle with the 87th regiment. While this was passing on the left, Dilkes marched upon the Barrosa height, and on the lowest part of the brow Ruffin met his attack with eagerness. The fighting was very fierce, and the carnage great, but the struggle was not long; and the French hurried

from the hill, leaving three guns and a field of dead with the British. The beaten divisions inclining towards each other as they retired, as soon as they met attempted a new formation; but the British artillery poured upon them so terrible a fire, that to recover from their confusion was impossible, and they crowded fast away, in tumult and disorder. 'These bloody combats lasted little more than an hour; but in that short time 1200 British and 2000 Frenchmen were struck down, slain, or wounded. Two French generals were mortally wounded; 400 prisoners, six guns, and an eagle, remained with the victors.

General la Peña, who had not made a single movement in support of the British, while thus terribly engaged with very superior numbers, when the field was won, and the French were retreating without order, and with a lost heart, would undertake nothing against them, and suffered a glorious opportunity of doing good service to pass without one effort to improve it. This disgusted Graham. While Victor, with Ruffin and Laval, had attacked Graham, he left Villatte, with 3000 men, to cover the French works, and to watch the Spaniards at Santi Petri and on the Bermeja height; yet La Peña, with 12,000 Spanish infantry and 800 horse, under his immediate orders (for Zayas had joined him), would strike no blow. The day after the battle, therefore, Graham led back the British to the Isla de Leon. The Spanish general remained for several days without; but he did nothing against the enemy's works, and refused acting, unless Graham and the British would co-operate. While thus he sat idle in his camp, admiral Keats, with his seamen and marines, was actually destroying several of the enemy's batteries and stores at different points of the harbor, before his eyes. At last the French, wondering at their own fortune, returned. Garrisons had, indeed, been left at some of the strongest points of their line, but the rest of the troops Victor had drawn off. Finding, however, that he was not followed, and his lines not attacked, he came back with a bold face; La Peña passed into the Isla de Leon, and destroyed the bridge, and the blockade of Cadiz was re-established.

With far different support, with irregular forces under their orders, and with no such brilliant opening of fortune as that just recorded, the Catalan chiefs maintained the unequal struggle against their able enemies, with a constancy and vigor which gilded their very disasters with glory. Wherever the French moved, wherever they halted, how strong soever the fortresses and towers which they garrisoned, from the line of march, from the bivouac, from the bastions, their scouts and sentinels saw hostile forms on every commanding rock, and bands of sandalled peasants were moving upon the mountain tops in arms. The British flag, indeed, flew encouragingly upon the coast; and no

opportunity was ever lost by the zealous navy of England to support the enterprises of this true and faithful people, or to menace the communications and harass the movements of the French: but here, in Catalonia, where a strong division of British troops might have saved the province, not one soldier was sent till the moment for any wise or hopeful effort was gone by, and the kingdom was already lost.

As early as July, 1810, Suchet commenced his preparations for the siége of Tortosa, a point upon the Ebro of the first military importance. In this operation, marshal Macdonald, who had succeeded the fierce and severe Angereau in command of Catalonia, was to assist; but for a time he had his own hands full of constant and vexatious employment in Upper Catalonia. Amid so active and brave a population as the Catalans, it was no light labor to establish magazines at the necessary depôts; to provide for the supply of Barcelona, and to free it from the inconveniences of a perpetual blockade. Macdonald effected these objects, but not without the active opposition of the Spanish general O'Donnel. Barcelona, however, having been effectually relieved, Macdonald took post at Cervera, as a central position, whence he might at the same time cover the operations against Tortosa and menace the line of the Llobregat. The troops of Suchet were already in the environs of Tortosa, and he intrenched Mora and Xerta; the one as a tête de pont upon the Ebro, the other as a depôt for his siege stores.

While marshal Macdonald lay in position at Cervera, O'Donnel suddenly quitting Tarragona, in force, marched upon Mataro. His guns were conveyed by sea. He arrived at Mataro on the 10th of September, and upon the 14th he surprised the brigade of general Schwartz, at Bisbal, and, after a short and ineffectual resistance, the general and his men were made prisoners. At [illegible], at Palamos, and in the little castle of Calonge, the detachments from this brigade were captured by the column of colonel Fleyres. In all, 1100 good French soldiers were [illegible], many fell in the act of resistance; and a very complete [illegible] crowned the happy enterprise, and skilful movements, [illegible] O'Donnel. This sadly disconcerted the French marshal, who [illegible] soon obliged to move again into Upper Catalonia, and to [illegible] with him his whole force, to give escort to a convoy assem[illegible] Gerona, for the provision of Barcelona. This duty performed, the marshal, who had now received considerable reinforcements from France, returned to the Ebro at the head of [illegible]. The absence of the corps of Macdonald, and the inconvenient but unavoidable delay in his projected siege of Tortosa, was most embarrassing to Suchet; but he maintained his position resolutely, though subjected to the frequent attacks both of the Catalan and Valencian forces, as also to the sorties

of the garrison. In all these partial engagements the French were quite successful; and especially in one, near Vineros, the Valencian army, under Bassecourt, was severely beaten by general Musnier, and lost from 2000 to 3000 men. At length, on the 15th of December, Tortosa was closely invested on both sides of the river, and Macdonald took post at Perillo, to cover the operations of the siege on the side of Tarragona. Upon the 18th, the French established themselves on the heights, in front of Fort Orleans, and dug their first parallel the next night, on the low ground between that fort and the river. As the works of the besiegers proceeded, the sorties of the garrison were frequent, but had no success. The covered way was crowned on the seventh night; nor had the French, as yet, opened a single battery. On the afternoon of the eighth day, as they were bringing their guns into the batteries, the Spaniards made a furious sally, in very great strength; gained the trenches; overpowered the guard, and filled in a portion of the sap, with one column, while another body rushed upon the artillery; but these last were bravely checked, till a heavy reinforcement was brought up, and the Spaniards were instantly driven back, leaving 400 men killed and wounded in the hands of the besiegers. After seventeen days of open trenches, the place was laid open to assault. The counterscarp was blown in; there were two good breaches, and the troops were assembled for the storm. The count de Alacha, after vainly attempting to obtain better terms, surrendered at discretion; and the garrison marched out 7500 strong, having lost 1500 men during the attack. The force of the besiegers amounted to 10,000, and they did not lose 500. The siege was under the able direction of the baron Rogniat; and to his skilful attack the speedy and comparatively bloodless triumph of the French is due. The fort on the Col de Balaguer was surprised and taken the very next morning.

Among the many efforts made during the siege to disturb the enemy, one by a party of British seamen, under Captain Fane, most gallant and successful at the first, terminated in disaster. They landed on the 13th of December, at Palamos, attacked and drove away a French battalion, and captured a convoy of eleven vessels laden with provisions, which lay under the guns of the Mole. Their work done, they neglected to keep together, and being scattered about the town, the French troops rallied, returned, and fell briskly upon them. The sailors, thus taken at a disadvantage, could make no effectual resistance. They fought in a brave, disjointed manner: 122 were killed and wounded; Captain Fane and 86 men were made prisoners.

By the fall of Tortosa, the gallant Catalans were left without any hope of aid from the neighboring provinces. On the side of Arragon, the capture of Lerida and Mequinenza had before

straitened them; this last blow shut them out from all communication with Valencia. No succor could reach them now otherwise than by sea. The fortress and port of Tarragona yet remained, but the eye of the invader was already on them; and the bare-bosomed peasant well knew that the last dreary citadels of Catalonia would be the rocky summits of her naked mountains, at the foot of which lay the blackened and roofless walls of desolated homesteads.

CHAP. IV.

MASSENA REAPPEARS SUDDENLY IN THE FIELD.—THE BATTLE OF FUENTES DE HONOR.—THE FRENCH EVACUATE ALMEIDA.—BERESFORD LAYS SIEGE TO BADAJOS.—SOULT ADVANCES TO SUCCOR THAT FORTRESS.—THE BATTLE OF ALBUERA.

THERE is no feature in the military character of the French more admirable than that hopeful elasticity of mind with which they cheerfully apply themselves to repair losses and misfortune. Within a little month the discomfited army of Portugal was organized anew; was reinforced by the army of the north, and by two divisions of the ninth corps; and Massena was again in the field at the head of 40,000 infantry and 4000 horse. To this force the allies could only oppose 1500 horse and 32,000 infantry. Wellington was no sooner apprized of the early and unexpected concentration of so formidable a French army, than he returned rapidly from the south, and reached Villa Formosa on the 28th of April.

The relief of Almeida, where the French garrison was closely blockaded, was an object that deserved the best efforts of Massena; for it was the sole acquisition of his long and disappointing campaign.

Almeida stands on the right bank of the Coa: the banks of that river are mountainous and difficult, and the points of passage are few. There is a bridge at Almeida, another at Castello-boim, seven miles higher up, and a third at Sabugal, near thirty miles above the fortress of Almeida. The bridge at Sabugal forms the great military communication between Ciudad Rodrigo and Guarda.

Lord Wellington could not submit to see Almeida relieved; and as soon as Massena advanced, he resolved, though both the ground and the circumstances were unfavorable, to accept the invader's challenge, and give him battle. Wellington had not only an inferior force, but a perilous position; he had to fight with the Coa in the rear, and to provide in his arrangement for the two distant points of Almeida and Sabugal.

In front of the Coa is a small river, which also runs northerly, and nearly in a parallel direction. A fair village, called Fuentes de Honor, is situate on the left bank of this small stream, which is named the Duas Casas. The ground behind the Duas Casas is high and open. This table-land was selected for the field of battle. The divisions of generals Spencer, Picton, and Houston, were collected in position behind Fuentes de Honor; and the village itself, a most romantic spot, and a strong military feature, was occupied by a body of light infantry, under the command of lieutenant-colonel William Williams. In the same line, with these divisions upon the left, at some little interval, those of generals Crawfurd and Campbell were drawn up behind the village of Alameda, at which place there is a bridge over the Duas Casas. General Pack, with a brigade, shut in the garrison of Almeida most closely; and the great road leading to it, which crosses the Duas Casas by a ford under Fort Conception on the extreme left, was guarded by the division of Sir William Erskine. The guerrilla horse of don Julian Sanchez were posted two miles beyond the British right in observation, at the village of Nava de Aver.

Upon the 3d of May the enemy took up their ground on the opposite bank of the Duas Casas, menacing Almeida with their right, and Fuentes de Honor with their left. Towards evening, under cover of a hot cannonade from the ridge of their position, they made a resolute and fierce assault upon Fuentes de Honor. Colonel Williams, with a battalion of light companies, sustained this attack in a manner worthy of his well-tried zeal and of his choice command. The low parts of the village were defended for a while; but the French guns played upon them with such fury, and the assailing column was so strong and violent, that the British withdrew to the upper, and confined their defence to a few houses and a chapel, that stood upon the rocky summit of the ravine through which the river flows. Here the struggle was very fierce, and could not have been maintained but for the opportune support of a brigade sent down from the line above. The French, in like manner, fed their assailing troops with reinforcements; but the 71st, 79th, and 24th regiments fought so stoutly, that they won back every foot of ground which had been yielded of sheer necessity, and drove the French quite out of the village, and across the river.

During this angry contest, in many instances the French and English soldiers met in the main street of the village, at the very bayonet's point; a very rare occurrence. Colonel Williams was severely wounded in this honorable affair. The light companies were withdrawn after sunset, and the village was held through the night in quiet by the regiments already named, under the command of Colonel Cameron of the 79th. Colonel

Cadogan of the 71st regiment, who never omitted any possible occasion of standing foremost in the ranks of honor, very greatly distinguished himself when he led up the first support, by which the light battalion was succored.

Massena, foiled in this effort to pierce the British front, passed the next day in reconnoissance, and lord Wellington anticipated his dispositions. The division of general Houston was extended to Nava d'Aver, and with its right supported don Julian Sanchez; while the left occupied a wood and a village called Pozo Velho, about half-way between Nava d'Aver and Fuentes. It should be observed, that the ravine of the Duas Casas loses itself above the village of Fuentes in easy slopes, and disappears in the wood of Pozo Velho. On the morning of the 5th, as early as three, the enemy's columns were in motion to their left; and the entire corps of Junot, with the whole of the French cavalry, were assembled in front of Pozo Velho. The light division under general Crawfurd, the cavalry, and a troop of horse-artillery, were sent to support Houston; and the divisions of Picton and Spencer were moved a little to the right.

About six o'clock, a heavy body of French infantry attacked and carried the village of Pozo Velho, from which the advanced brigade of general Houston's division retired in good order. The French cavalry, under general Montbrun, now passed Pozo Velho; and, marching against the hill of Nava d'Aver, drove away don Julian Sanchez, who fell back at once, and uncovered the right of Houston's division, which was thus turned. The British cavalry moved up to support Houston's foot, but the French horse, charging upon their weak squadrons with overpowering numbers, forced them out of the front, and they took refuge behind the light division of infantry. At this moment Wellington executed a very anxious change of position;—abandoned all communication with the bridge of Sabugal, and took up a new line at right angles with his original formation. His left rested still upon the Duas Casas, and Fuentes was stoutly held:—his right upon a lofty knoll near Frenada, on the left bank of another small stream, which runs parallel with the Duas Casas between it and the Coa.

To execute these movements, the seventh and light divisions had to retire for nearly two miles in the face of a formidable and intrepid cavalry. So rapid and bold were the French horsemen, that, but for the uncommon steadiness and gallantry of the Chasseurs Britanniques, the division of general Houston would not have gained time for the formation of their squares.

The enemy at first mistook the intention of Wellington; and, viewing this movement as a general retreat, pressed on with the confidence of victors. They had at one period actually surrounded the horse-artillery of captain Ramsay; but that officer,

trusting to his fine cattle and his brave gunners, broke a way through their astonished squadrons, and brought off his battery in safety. They continued to follow the squares of the light and seventh divisions till these troops were again in line of battle; and, seizing the opportunity offered by some little confusion, as the new alignement was taken up, (owing to the cavalry passing through the intervals, and a regiment of the Guards changing front,) Montbrun directed a general charge; but he was met by so heavy a fire of artillery, and such close, steady volleys of musketry, that he hastily drew off, leaving the ground covered with fallen horses. After this disaster, no other attempt was made on the new line than by cannonade.

While all these things had been passing on the British right, the village of Fuentes de Honor was the scene of a bloody and incessant struggle. Colonel Cameron was mortally wounded early in the combat; and the three brave regiments posted in the village were, as in the case of yesterday, driven from the lower parts by columns of overwhelming strength, and at one time lost the chapel also; but it was recovered by the brigade of colonel Mackinnon. From either side the battle in Fuentes was fed with strong reinforcements; nearly the whole of the sixth corps of the French army was engaged in these assaults; but the defenders, though outnumbered, were never entirely driven from the village. Some of the enemy did, at one time, penetrate quite through it, and attempted a formation beyond; but they were immediately attacked and driven back again by the 88th, 74th, and 83d regiments, and confined to the defence of the streets. This obstinate fighting continued till dark, when the French recrossed the Duas Casas, leaving the lower village to the silent occupation of the dead, and the upper buildings and the chapel to the resolute defenders.

These brave men were now relieved by a brigade of the light division. A renewal of the struggle was looked for on the morrow, and lord Wellington threw up some works in the upper village, and upon the position behind it; but they were never assailed. The enemy remained quiet throughout the 6th and 7th; upon the 8th, withdrew from their ground; and upon the 10th, the army of Portugal was again upon the Spanish bank of the Agueda. Both sides laid claim to the victory; but Massena's object was not attained; he fought to relieve Almeida, and he was repulsed. The allies lost nearly 2000, and the enemy near 5000, men in this battle. Massena, foiled in his efforts, sent orders to Brennier, the governor of Almeida, to evacuate that fortress, thus resigning the only fruit of his invasion, and his only hold on the country of Portugal. These orders were conveyed by a private soldier, who, eluding the allied posts, with great presence of mind, reached the place safely.

Wellington, thoroughly prepared for some such enterprise on the part of Brennier, made such clear and admirable arrangements that, had they been attended to, the French garrison must inevitably have fallen into his hands; but a delay in the transmission of his orders for one corps, attributed to a general officer since dead, left a passage of the Agueda unoccupied. Brennier, having done all possible injury to the works of Almeida, sallied from it in the night of the 10th; opened a way through the piquets with his bayonets; and pushing on at a rapid pace, in silence and in compact order, gained the Agueda at Barba del Puerco, and passed it, with the loss of many killed and wounded, and about 300 taken, but he carried his main body in safety to the French camp. Lord Wellington now detached two divisions to the Alemtejo, to reinforce Beresford; and learning, upon the 16th, that Soult was in motion for Estremadura, he hastened thither.

After the failures recorded, Massena resigned the command of the army of Portugal; and was succeeded in that charge by marshal Marmont, who, having recovered the garrison of Almeida, retired to Salamanca, and placed his troops, for a short repose, in cantonments.

As soon as ever the Spanish generals in Estremadura gave their assent to the plan of lord Wellington, and the difficulties spoken of in the last chapter were overcome, the bridge communications on the Guadiana were restored, and marshal Beresford invested Badajos.

Upon the 4th of May, at early dawn, the columns of the second division, under general William Stewart, crowned all the little eminences near Badajos, upon the left bank of the river, and formed a regular investment of the place on that side. Upon the 8th, general Lumley approached Fort Christoval, upon the right bank of the Guadiana; and formally shut in the garrison with a brigade of general Cole's division, a Portuguese battalion, and some troops of Portuguese cavalry.

Upon the night of the 8th of May, ground was broken against the detached works of Picurina and Pardaleras, and before St. Christoval. The ground being rocky, the work could not proceed fast. The fire of the garrison was incessant; and upon the 10th they made a vigorous sally on the side of Christoval, but were driven back by the besiegers. Nevertheless, the enemy were pursued with so little discretion, and so close to the walls, that the allies lost 400 men, killed and wounded, without the slightest necessity for their exposure. A battery to breach Christoval opened at daylight on the 11th; but in a few hours it was silenced by the heavy and well-directed fire of the place.

The real attack was intended to be made against the castle; and upon the 10th the marshal and the commanding engineer had

resolved upon commencing their operations on that point. A report of the advance of Soult induced Beresford to wait another day before he broke ground. The intelligence from the front was contradictory; and it was doubted whether Soult had collected all his forces, and was coming forward in full strength. Therefore, Beresford opened his trenches before the castle on the 12th. As soon as it was dark the work began, and 1400 men had nearly covered themselves by midnight; but at this hour the labor was suddenly suspended. The men were withdrawn; and upon the instant the preparations for raising the siege were commenced. The intention of Soult was no longer doubtful: he was in full march to relieve the place. Upon the 14th the main body of the allies moved upon Valverde; and there it was concerted between Beresford and the Spanish generals that they should unite their forces at Albuera, and offer battle. By great and admirable exertions the siege artillery and stores were safely passed over the Guadiana by noon on the 15th, and the flying bridge was drawn ashore. These operations were covered by the fourth division and a corps of Spaniards. Upon the 15th the rear-guard drew off: the garrison made a sally, and handled a battalion of Portuguese very roughly as it retired. The siege was now raised. At about five in the evening of the 15th the allied infantry from Valverde reached the field of Albuera: here they found their cavalry had already taken post, and the advanced piquets of the enemy were in front.

The village of Albuera is a street of mean houses, with a church; situated on a little river, from which it is named. This village is traversed by the high road leading from Seville to Badajos; which, about two hundred yards to the right, crosses the river by a handsome bridge of stone. Immediately to the left of Albuera, and just below the rough and rising ground on which it stands, there is another bridge, of unhewn stone, old, narrow, and incommodious. The river, in summer, is not above knee-deep. Its banks, to the left of the old bridge, and directly in front of the village, are very abrupt and difficult; but to the right of the main bridge the passage of the stream is easy for all arms.

Upon a gentle elevation, about three quarters of a mile beyond the Albuera, is one of those extensive open woods peculiar to Spain. The wood, immediately beyond the French left, had a bend, and approached close to the very banks of the stream, at a point in like manner beyond the right of the allies. A rivulet, called the Feria, flowed, in an oblique direction, along the left flank of the French, and joined the Albuera in front of their left wing.

The wood between the two streams was not occupied by either force at sunset on the 15th. The whole of the space

between the banks of the Albuera and the skirt of the wood occupied by the French troops is open. Ground more favorable to a general preparing an attack cannot be conceived. This wood effectually concealed his numbers and disposition; and was, at the same time, so open and unencumbered with underwood, that his cavalry might march through it in columns without trouble. Here marshal Soult had collected a body of 20,000 infantry and 4000 horse, with fifty guns.

On the side of the allies, although the ground rose in swelling eminences, still there was nothing that could be called a height; no part of the field, upon the British right, up which horsemen and guns could not move with ease: there was not a tree, not a ravine, not a rock, to impede their movements.

In the night of the 15th the Spanish army joined the British; and early on the morning of the 16th general Cole brought up the fusileer brigade, and one of Portuguese. Thus the allies mustered for the battle 29,000 men; but of these only 2000 cavalry of all nations, with thirty-eight pieces of artillery. Of this force only 7000 of the foot were English. Beresford placed the Spaniards on the right, in two lines: their left touched a road which diverges at the great bridge from that of Seville and Badajos towards Valverde. Upon the eminence above the main bridge stood the second division, under Sir William Stewart, with its left upon the road to Badajos: beyond this point the Portuguese division of general Hamilton was drawn up, on the extreme left, having its front strongly covered by the broken banks of the Albuera. The village was occupied by two battalions of German riflemen, under general Alten. General Cole formed, with his two brigades, a second line, supporting Stewart.

The allied cavalry was concentrated in rear of the centre, and placed under the orders of general Lumley, who was expressly taken from the command of his infantry brigade for that purpose.

About eight o'clock on the morning of the 16th a heavy column of French infantry, preceded by artillery, flanked by cavalry, and supported by a reserve, issued from the wood opposite Albuera. They directed their march towards the bridge, under a smart cannonade, to which the guns of the allies, from the eminence above the village, replied; but there was not either rapidity or earnestness enough in this attack to deceive: it was soon apparent that the enemy's main effort would be upon the right. Accordingly, an order was sent to the Spaniards to form front to their right, to meet the attack that was expected, and was soon developed.

Blake, surly and self-opiniated, would not execute this change of front till the personal remonstrance of Beresford, and the appearance of the French columns on the right, compelled him. The Spanish troops were not a little perplexed between the

various commanders who directed their movements. They are ill disciplined, and manœuvre with great slowness; and it required no common exertion to get them formed at all in time to meet the attack. The main body of the French infantry, with the great mass of their cavalry, moving far upon their left, was now advancing upon the right of the allies, in columns of attack. The order of battle was thus already changed. All the movements were originated by the French marshal, and Beresford had to oppose manœuvre to manœuvre; and an army, various in nation and in discipline, to legions who formed and moved with precision and celerity; the grammar of whose tactics was the same, and whose confidence in the science of their leader was the firm support of a lofty courage.

The soldier, Beresford, was ready and able for any fight, how thick soever might be its perils; but the responsible commander was startled by the perplexities of his most difficult situation.

The resistance of the Spanish troops, though gallant, was short; they were overpowered, and driven from their post. The enemy was now formed upon a vantage-ground; from whence, with a numerous artillery, he raked the whole of the allied position.

In this posture of affairs it became necessary, at any price, to retake the hill which they had gained. The first brigade of the division of Stewart moved on it in double quick time, led by that general, and by colonel Colborne, its immediate commanding officer. These troops were precipitated into action in a thick rain, and under a heavy fire. They were led close to the enemy, in column, before they deployed; and the corps did so, in succession, and hastily advanced at once upon the French infantry. But amid this obscurity and confusion, a body of Polish lancers, and some squadrons of the enemy's hussars, galloped round upon these exposed battalions, and overthrew them with great slaughter, driving some hundreds before them into the French lines, who were there made prisoners. Of the regiments composing this brigade, the 31st, not having deployed, was the only one which escaped this misfortune: with this Colborne maintained himself, till Stewart brought up the brigade of general Houghton, and re-established the battle; being speedily supported by the British artillery under major Dickson.

The musketry rolled fierce and fearful: cannon thundered in quick discharges from the French batteries; and the massive columns of their infantry stood up valiantly against volleys, which forbade them to deploy, and embarrassed their crowded ranks with the dying and the dead. The soldiers of Houghton's brigade fought like men, who were willing to be destroyed, but would not be defeated.

Houghton, the general, fell covered with wounds; colonel Duckworth was shot dead: all the field officers, and the greater

part of all the other officers, were slain or disabled, and not a third of the men were standing. Their heroism was not vain. This was an anxious crisis of the battle, for the enemy had lodged a column of their left well forward upon the very brow of the position. Marshal Beresford might well have doubted whether he should be justified in continuing a battle which looked hopeless, and in which defeat, with his Spanish allies in company, would be ruin. At this important moment, general Cole led forward a British brigade against the enemy's left. This movement was suggested by colonel Hardinge, who was with Cole at the time, and saw from that point the strong necessity. The marshal observed this gallant and well-timed advance, and made immediate dispositions to support it. It was under desperate circumstances that the fusileer brigade, under Sir William Myers, and the remaining brigade of Stewart's division under colonel Abercrombie, were brought hastily into action. Already was a French column established in advance upon the right of Houghton's weak and exhausted brigade; already had the allies lost three guns by a charge of Polish horse; when general Cole, with his fusileers, supported by Harvey's Portuguese brigade, and a battalion of the Lusitanian legion, under colonel Hawkshawe, pressed forward upon the right of Houghton's diminished line, won back the cannon, and was immediately engaged in a combat, not differing in severity or sternness from that which Houghton had sustained. Upon the left of Houghton's line, Abercrombie's brigade advanced in the finest and firmest order, at the same moment that the fusileers were re-establishing the battle on its right. The French columns were resolute, and the struggle was bloody and stubborn. The gallant Myers was slain: general Cole, and all his staff, and almost all the field officers, of the fusileers, were wounded; and the men dropped fast: for all this, the brigade gained ground foot by foot, and made it good. They fought for victory; to the heavy fire of the frowning masses in their front, fast and steady were their stern replies; till, at last, the hostile columns, confused by carnage, entangled with each other, and thoroughly disheartened, broke and fled away, leaving to their conquerors a field covered with pale bodies of dead, and stained with the blood of many thousands of their bravest soldiers.

The French artillery covered the confused flight of their broken masses; and the numerous squadrons of their horse, against which, the allied cavalry, commanded throughout the day with the finest judgment by Lumley, could attempt nothing, gave such protection to the fugitives, that none but the wounded left upon the ground were taken.

There was a sharp contest at the village and bridges throughout the battle; and this part was skilfully protected by the Ger-

man light infantry, under general Alten. Here, and everywhere, the firing soon ceased. The discomfited battalions of the enemy filled the wood, and their piquets and videttes took post as in the morning.

A victory was won. The annals of time have not recorded any thing more heroic than the conduct of the two British brigades, led by Myers and Houghton, upon this field.

Each of these brigades lost 1000 men, and neither of them mustered more than 1400 bayonets when they marched into the battle. Against weighty masses they fought fearless in line: they were never thrown into confusion; and the standards of these battalions flying all nigh to each other, in the centre of their weakened lines, as the enemy fled from their front, was a sight as noble as a field of victory did ever show.

The entire loss of the allies was above 6000; the Spaniards losing near 2000; the Portuguese only 400; and the German light infantry 120. Thus, out of 7000 English soldiers engaged, 3500 lay upon the ground. The Spaniards behaved with admirable courage, but their want of discipline, and very especially their unwieldiness in taking ground right or left, was severely felt early in the day. The French lost 9500 men; they carried off with them a few hundred prisoners, taken from the most advanced regiment of the first brigade, when that body was hurried on precipitately by the orders of the brave general Stewart, and they took four colors from the battalions of that brigade. But the bodies of many of the soldiers (especially of the 66th regiment) lay pierced by lances in that part of the field, and fixed by death, in the frightful postures of brave, desperate, and unyielding conflict with the horsemen above them. In the evening after the battle, the allies were reinforced by the British brigade of General Kemmis, which, being employed on the right bank of the Guadiana, near Christoval, had to make the long detour by Jurumenha before it could join its division (the 4th) upon this ground. The enemy remained in their old position till the 18th, when, destroying the contents of their tumbrils and ammunition wagons, to furnish conveyance for their wounded, they leisurely retired, and the allies slowly pursued. On the 19th, Wellington arrived from the north and rode over the field of battle. He is said to have regretted that the battle was fought; and that, as it was, the precaution of strengthening the position by field-works had not been adopted, as a little ground thrown up on the naked eminences on the right would have done a great deal for their security.

It falls not within the limits of a memoir such as this, to offer observations upon the battles recorded. The responsibility of a general in command is a weighty matter; and military talent of a high order must be possessed by him who professes rigidly to

examine the strategy and the tactics of a commander, by the precedents and the practice of warfare, and by the strict rules of military science. An examination of nine battles out of ten, fought by the ablest men, will exhibit many and compelled departures from rule; many instances where ordinary rules could not be applied; some where the temptation to violate them was strong. Dispositions are often pronounced erroneous or otherwise, because in one case a foe has seized upon a part of a position and displayed its value; in another, he has assailed a part where no one expected him, and has made it his path to victory. It is undeniably true, that the army engaged at Albuera was dissatisfied with marshal Beresford. Even in the days of their first exultation at the glory of their achievements, they murmured loudly at the loss of standards, and at the expenditure of human life. The living wall of many a regiment, save a mournful fragment, had been beaten down entire, and lay in the dust of death. Marshal Beresford's occupation of the field of battle has been spoken of as the cause of all his disasters; but it is by no means clear that if the Spaniards had been posted on the left, Soult would not have forced the village and bridge, and uncovered the road to Badajos. There were many anxieties on the mind of the marshal in this terrible battle; first, his own vast responsibility; next, the knowledge that he was weak in cavalry, and ill provided with guns; third, a mistrust of Spanish troops. Thus, in the most desperate crisis of the battle, though awed by apprehensions for the safety of his troops, he continued the struggle, and a memorable triumph was the result. From the day of his arrival on the Guadiana to that of the battle, he had met with many crosses and vexations, and his situation had been most trying. Lord Wellington met Beresford on the 19th at Albuera· directed him to follow the enemy with caution; returned instantly to Elvas himself; and caused Badajos to be forthwith invested on the right bank by the two divisions, which had arrived in Alemtejo from the north. Beresford meanwhile advanced and occupied Almendralejos. Here he found a small hospital of French wounded left to his protection; but the enemy carried to Seville all those whose hurts suffered them to march, or who were in a state to be transported with safety, and their number fell little short of 4000. On the 25th the cavalry of the allies under Lumley came upon the enemy's horse near Usagre. The general, by a retrograde movement and skilful disposition, drew forward a brigade of French heavy dragoons; and then, directing Madden's Portuguese to support the charge in flank, he rode hard at them in front with the 3d and 4th dragoon guards, and in a moment overthrew them. They dispersed in confusion, and near 200 were sabred or taken. About this time general Hill, who had always commanded the detached

corps, returned to the army; and, to the joy and contentment of the troops, resumed that post. Beresford went back into Portugal to the important charge for which he was so eminently qualified, and in which he had rendered a service to the common cause of Europe never to be mentioned without respect. Admirable as a second in command, skilful to organize a new-raised army, a good aid in battle, and personally intrepid, the marshal with all this was not popular; and therefore, perhaps, it is that the censures of his conduct in this battle have been so constantly, and with so little abatement, reiterated. However, despite all censure, his name will go down to posterity associated for ever, and that too in the relation of commander, with those unconquerable soldiers who upheld the fame of England upon the bloody field of Albuera.

CHAP. V.

SECOND SIEGE OF BADAJOS.—FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND SOUTH UNITE FOR ITS RELIEF.—THE ALLIES RETIRE INTO PORTUGAL.—LORD WELLINGTON OFFERS BATTLE ON THE CAYA.—FRENCH ARMIES SEPARATE.—WELLINGTON MARCHES TO THE AGUEDA.—MENACES CIUDAD RODRIGO.—MARMONT AND COUNT DORSENNE ADVANCE TO RELIEVE IT.—THE AFFAIR OF EL BODON.—FUENTE GUINALDO.—RETREAT OF MARMONT.—AFFAIRS OF ESTREMADURA.—MOVEMENTS OF GENERAL HILL.—HE SURPRISES AND CAPTURES A FRENCH BRIGADE AT ARROYO DE MOLINOS.

THE repulse of Massena at Fuentes de Honor, and the discomfiture of Soult at Albuera, enabled lord Wellington to maintain, for a short time, a superiority of force upon the Guadiana, and to make a second attempt upon Badajos. But it was clear that Marmont, who now commanded the army of Portugal, would be soon again in motion; and that Soult and that marshal would make early and earnest efforts to save to the French arms so important a place as Badajos; therefore, whatever was done against that fortress must be rapidly effected. It was not possible, however, to recommence the siege under eleven days. The plan of the former attack was again followed, and with all the means that Elvas could supply. But to divide the attention of the place, it was resolved, that the attacks of Fort Christoval and of the castle should be commenced at the same time. A corps of investment under general Hamilton, had again shut in the garrison on the left bank of the Guadiana, as early as the 19th of May. Upon the 25th, major-general Houstoun, with the seventh division, invested Badajos upon the right bank; and on the 27th, the third division, under general Picton, forded the river above the town, and joined the besieging force on the left

bank. The working parties broke ground on the night of the 30th. That before the castle worked, without discovery or interruption, and completed their parallel by break of day. That before Fort Christoval had not the like good fortune. They had to labor on a rocky soil, from the surface of which, since the last siege, the French had scraped away all the earth, and many of the besiegers were killed and wounded in the early part of the night. The necessary precaution of providing the workmen with stuffed gabions for their defence, had not been omitted; but the fire from the garrison, both of cannon and musketry, was heavy and effective. However, by perseverance and spirit, the batteries on both sides of the river were completed by the 2d of June, and at daylight upon the 3d they opened. Before evening the outer wall of the castle was beaten down, and a very unwelcome and difficult obstacle to the speedy forming of a practicable breach was thus discovered. The wall, it seems, had been originally built against a natural bank of clay, and this "peeled off in perpendicular sections," under the fire, and remained a scarp almost as regular as the wall itself. Moreover, as the guns in battery were for the most part brass, and very soft, the fire could not be kept up with sufficient rapidity and weight, to hasten the fall of so large a quantity of the bank, as might form a good ramp.

The breach of Fort Christoval was examined in the night of the 5th of June, and reported practicable: it was assaulted on that following. The advance descended into the ditch in perfect order; but they found that, between night-fall and the hour of attack, the enemy had removed the rubbish from the foot of the breach, and seven feet of wall stood clear before them. An attempt was now made to force in by escalade. The ladders were applied to almost every face and flank of the work, and the effort was persevered in, with the most resolute spirit, under showers of shells, hand-grenades, stones, &c., till 102 men, out of 180, fell, and the remainder of the storming party retired.

Upon the evening of the 9th of June, the breach being much widened, and again considered practicable, it was again stormed. Again the assault failed. Nothing could be more determined than the conduct of the assailants. The various means of defence prepared at the breach were well supported by a strong and steady garrison; the face of the breach was covered with rolling shells; combustibles of all sorts were exploding at its foot; and the storming party could not force its way. The escalading party secured almost all their ladders, and rapidly ascended them; but not a man could crown the parapet. All who reached it were bayoneted, and the ladders were thrown down. Others were quick to rear them again, and renew the attempt, but they shared the same fate; and hand-grenades and bags of

powder, were thrown down upon them without intermission. Of two detachments, each 100 strong, 140 were killed and wounded; and the survivors, disappointed and reluctant, were ordered to retire. It was now evident that Christoval could not be taken without regularly advancing to the crest of the glacis; and, till Christoval had fallen, the breach at the castle could not be stormed, even when the difficulties of making it practicable should be overcome.

On the 10th of June, lord Wellington decided to raise the siege. This was effected in good order on the night of the 11th. The loss of the besiegers amounted to 500 killed and wounded, in all, from the commencement.

This attempt on Badajos was rather a venture upon fortune, than any justified expectation of success. Wellington had neither good nor sufficient means; nor had he time for regular and certain operations. Marmont and Soult were rapidly approaching when the siege was raised.

The British divisions left in the north of Portugal, under the command of Sir Brent Spencer, were led south by that officer, under instructions from Wellington, as soon as ever Marmont put himself in motion for the Tagus. When the French marshal crossed that river, Spencer passed into the Alemtejo, and marched to the Guadiana. Soult, meanwhile, having collected all the troops which could possibly be spared from Andalusia, and being reinforced by 8000 men, under Drouet, from Toledo, advanced to Merida on the 18th, and established his communications with Marmont.

The corps of Sir Rowland Hill retired from Almandralejos on the very day on which the siege of Badajos was raised; and bivouacked, upon the 14th and 15th, in the position of Albuera. Here Wellington had taken post, to cover Badajos; and here, had Soult ventured to advance, without awaiting the junction of Marmont, he would have been received and checked.

Upon the 16th, a division of Spaniards, under Blake, was detached along the right bank of the Guadiana, with instructions to cross the river, enter the country of Niebla, and alarm Soult for those posts, the garrisons of which he had so much weakened for his present effort. Upon the 17th, the intentions of Marmont and Soult being evident, their junction easy, and not to be prevented, lord Wellington withdrew his people by the fords of the Guadiana, and fixed his head-quarters at Elvas. Upon the 19th, the French advanced guards entered Badajos. On the same day, the allies were placed in position upon the banks of the Caya; and were joined, on the 20th, by the northern army, under Spencer.

The combined force, under Marmont and Soult, mustered 62,000 infantry and 8000 horse; while that of Wellington did

not exceed 56,000 men, including his cavalry; in which arm he was so deficient that he could only collect 3500 horsemen, British and Portuguese. It was a severe trial to lord Wellington to be constantly cramped in his efforts by the want of cavalry; for, with a superior cavalry, no general can ever be *fully* beaten; and, without it, he can never so follow up a victory as to make considerable captures, and obtain large successes. Nevertheless, having a favorable and improvable position on the Caya, he resolved to fight a battle upon the frontier; and made immediate preparations for the expected struggle, by strengthening with field-works and batteries the position he had selected. Head-quarters were established at Vicente as early as the 19th; and the troops were placed in bivouac in the woods and among the gardens near the Caya. Disposed of in Campo Mayor and other cantonments, or in camps, from whence they could be most readily assembled for battle, lay almost all the divisions of the allied army. Sir Rowland Hill was on the right, at Torre de Moro; Picton on the left, behind Campo Mayor: Spencer was in reserve.

Upon the 22d of June, Soult and Marmont made a close reconnoissance, on the side of Campo Mayor, with a very large body of horse, and some batteries of light artillery. The allies were immediately collected in rear of the position in heavy masses, and lay upon their arms waiting for the battle. The French marshals, however, could not induce their opponent to show them his dispositions; and after halting till evening within two gun-shots of the position, they withdrew. On the same day, another body of French cavalry passed the Guadiana in reconnoissance, and moved upon Elvas. A piquet of the 11th light dragoons, recently arrived from England, mistook these horsemen, for Portuguese; and, before they were aware of their error, the French rode past them in strength, and the piquet was taken.

An action was generally expected on the 23d, and great efforts were made through the night to prepare and strengthen the position. The enemy, however, did not risk an engagement. Nevertheless, from the 22d to the 26th, working parties were regularly employed; and what at first were mere emplacements for guns, were at last converted into strong redoubts.

Soult and Marmont remained together in Estremadura for nearly a month longer, commanding the Spanish plain with their numerous squadrons, and eating up all the supplies that province could furnish; after which, they separated without attempting any thing against the allies. Soult retired upon Seville; and Marmont returned north, crossing the Tagus on the 23d of July. Wellington moved again, by corresponding marches, to the north-eastern frontier of Beira; and his head-quarters, by the 10th of August, were established at Fuente

Guinaldo. Hill, with his old command of 14,000 men, was left in the Alemtejo. With this exception, the whole of the allies were again cantoned upon the line of the Agueda, under Wellington. Between the 19th of July and the end of September, more than 50,000 men were sent from France, to reinforce the armies in Spain. These were, for the most part, veteran troops, and included 9000 cavalry familiar with war. Four divisions of these reinforcements crossed the Ebro, and joined Marmont: a considerable body also marched through Biscay to the army of the north. This acted as an independent corps, under the orders of count Dorsenne, overawed the Asturias, and held Gallicia in check. But although the command of count Dorsenne and marshal Marmont were independent of each other, they were instructed to concert operations, and to combine their forces whenever an opportunity should offer for striking a blow at the British army. Marmont did not remain long at Salamanca and its neighborhood; but, leaving a weak garrison in that city, marched into the valley of the Tagus. Meanwhile, Dorsenne advanced in force upon Astorga, and compelled the Spanish army of Gallicia to seek refuge in the strong defile of Villa Franca. These movements, and the leaving Salamanca defenceless, were designed to lure Wellington to advance to that city; but they failed to move him. The recovery of Ciudad Rodrigo was his sole, undivided object. Immediately after raising the siege of Badajos, he had sent his battering train and stores from the Tagus to the Douro; and he watched Rodrigo with close and jealous attention. This fortress was situated four marches from the ordinary cantonments of the French at Salamanca; nor did the intermediate country admit of their being cantoned nearer: neither could it subsist a large force in the field for any length of time. Thus the French garrison of Rodrigo, with a hostile country around them, could only be fed by convoys from the army of Portugal; and, while the allies lay upon the frontier, these convoys would require an army for their escort. This state of things was vexatious and embarrassing to the French. They dare not detach and employ forces on distant services, for fear Ciudad should be suddenly besieged; and if they would not lose it by blockade, they must soon revictual it. For this object they collected, from the valley of the Tagus, from the north, and from Navarre, every battalion and squadron that could be mustered for the field.

Upon the 22d of September, Marmont, count Dorsenne, and Souham had united their forces; and the French head-quarters were at Tamames. This formidable army amounted to 60,000 combatants, of whom 6000 were cavalry. The allies could only oppose to this host a body of 40,000 men; and of these, including the Portuguese, not 4000 horse. Therefore Wellington with-

drew all his detachments from the plain of Ciudad Rodrigo. Upon the 24th, an immense convoy was seen defiling into the city, while the enemy covered all the country around with their numerous columns.

The allies were now so distributed that their advanced corps closely observed the enemy; while a defensive position had been prepared at Fuente Guinaldo, in which they might, if pressed, be securely collected by the enemy. The right of the army was near Martiago, and leaned upon those mountains which are upon the right bank of the Agueda, and divide Castile and Estremadura. The left of the army was on the lower Azava; the cavalry was upon the upper Azava. One division in rear of the right observed the road leading from Perales; one remained at Guinaldo; and one, the third, was posted well in advance upon the heights of El Bodon. The Spaniards of don Julian and Carlos d'España watched the lower Agueda.

Upon the morning of the 25th of September, the French advanced upon the position of El Bodon with thirty squadrons of horse, and a heavy column of infantry. The heights occupied by the third division were naked, and of great extent; the brigades were distant from each other, and did but thinly cover them.

To the left, and in advance of El Bodon, lord Wellington posted the 5th and 77th regiments—two weak battalions, mustering between them about 700 bayonets. The height on which they were drawn up commanded the road from Ciudad Rodrigo to Guinaldo, by which the enemy were advancing. Upon the crown of it, in front of the two battalions, was a brigade of Portuguese artillery, supported by a few troops of the 1st German hussars, and the 11th light dragoons.

There was a ravine in front of this Portuguese battery within point-blank distance. the ground, both on the heights, and on the face of the ascent, was nevertheless perfectly practicable for horse, though it was rough and rocky. Confident in their numbers, their courage, and their kindled zeal, Montbrun led forward his cavalry in hot and eager mood, and came upon the position long before the French infantry could reach it. He immediately sent ten squadrons against the guns. They spurred across the ravine, and pressing fiercely up, under a heavy and destructive fire of grape and canister poured upon them to the latest moment by the Portuguese gunners under Arentschild, they took the battery, and cut down the Portuguese at their guns. But these victorious squadrons were now to see a new thing. A weak battalion of infantry came steadily up against them in line, firing as they advanced; and when close, charged bayonets, retook the guns, and drove them fairly off, pursuing them with a volley as they fled.

The British regiment thus distinguished was the 5th, under major Ridge; and the honor of the 77th regiment, commanded by colonel Bromhead, will be for ever associated with that of the 5th, and with the memory of that remarkable day. For these two corps, taking with them the guns, retired across the open plain in presence of all the French cavalry, supported by horse-artillery. Montbrun rode furiously upon them; but vain were the haughty efforts, though again and again repeated. In silent and steady square, the British soldiers received and repulsed these fierce charges: the gallant horsemen of France falling on three sides of their square, at the very bayonet's point. As each repulse was given the march was resumed, and they retired with perfect regularity. Having effected their junction with the 83d British, and the 9th and 21st Portuguese, the retreat was continued under the command of general Colville, in the finest order; the Portuguese, especially the 21st, distinguishing themselves greatly. The great mass of the French dragoons* still covered the plain, and accompanied their movements, every moment menacing an attack. But the gallantry and steadiness of the allies enabled them to effect their object with little loss, save from the French artillery. The right brigade of the third division, composed of the 45th, 74th, and 88th, had a more protected line of retreat; much of their road lying at first among vineyards, and across broken ground: but as soon as it cleared these covers, it came out upon a wide open flat, and had to march six miles, accompanied the whole way by the enemy's cavalry, and losing many men by the fire of the French guns.

General Picton conducted his division upon this trying day with the stern and cool courage, which can alone, under such circumstances, inspire confidence and insure safety. The few squadrons of the allied horse in the field did whatever could be done in the way of countenance and check during such opportunities as were afforded them. In the presence of such a mass of cavalry, this, of course, was little. But the 16th British light dragoons was greatly distinguished in a gallant and successful charge on the famous lancers of the imperial guard.

When the division of Picton reached the position of Guinaldo it was halted, and the enemy took up ground in front. This position was on a lofty ridge. The Agueda flowed immediately

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* Lord Wellington was very near taken, during the operations of this day, from the perplexing resemblance of the English and French cavalry—in dress. He was always exceedingly averse to the changes which had been adopted at home in the uniform of the British cavalry, and to the broad-topped caps. "At a distance, colors," he would observe, "are nothing, the profile and shape of cap, and general appearance, guide the eye. And it is a great advantage to those who look at long lines of posts opposed to each other, that there should be a marked difference in their appearance."

past the right: the left was about three miles from the right, and was bounded by the extremity of the ridge, which there terminated abruptly: below was a spacious plain. Only two divisions occupied this position—those of Picton and Cole. The temporary object, for which it had been retrenched, was attained. The whole of the French army had been brought forward and shown, and was in front. Lord Wellington now issued orders for the troops to retire further to a battle position of great strength, already selected upon the Coa. But this intention was frustrated by a sudden and not a slight embarrassment. General Crawfurd did not receive his orders in time; and misapprehending both the movements and disposition of the enemy, he thought it hazardous to ford the Agueda at Robleda, and decided to join lord Wellington by a circuitous march across the mountains. Now Perales and Gata were occupied by French troops, of which Crawfurd was ignorant. Therefore orders were immediately dispatched to him, to retrace his steps and march by Robleda. By this circumstance lord Wellington was compelled to remain in an indifferent position, where only two divisions could be allowed for the front: for it was necessary to provide a large force in rear of the left flank on the plain, lest the enemy should march by that flank on the rear of his position: and it was necessary to place a division in observation upon the Agueda higher up than Guinaldo, lest the enemy should penetrate by the pass of Perales, and so turn his right. Pre-eminently furnished is the illustrious subject of this brief and meagre memoir, with the firm resolve and the moral courage necessary in such an anxious and perilous position.

Upon the morning of the 26th, Marmont assembled 35,000 infantry, including twenty-two battalions of the imperial guard, and his numerous and superb cavalry, directly in front of the position.

Lord Wellington formed his two weak divisions for battle, and undauntedly looked on while the French general, preparatory as it was thought to an attack, very leisurely reviewed his splendid host, at the distance of a gun-shot. Meanwhile, the English soldiers piled their arms, and lord Wellington sat cool and quiet on the ground.

It was at this moment that a Spanish general, remarkable for his zeal and gallantry, and a great favorite of Wellington's, observed to him,—"Why, here you are with a couple of weak divisions in front of the whole French army, and you seem quite at your ease;—why, it is enough to put any man in a fever."—"I have done, according to the very best of my judgment, all that can be done," said Wellington; "therefore I care not either for the enemy in front, or for any thing which they may say at home." Here was the golden secret of his calm unalterable

demeanor. Duties were his, and he did them. Events were not his, and to the great Disposer of all he left them. It was no fault of his that he was thus dangerously exposed. He could not and would not abandon his light division, without such a struggle as might and must have ensued, had the French attacked. But Marmont, who was remarkably fond of handling troops, and handled them well,—passed several hours in display and manœuvre. During the time thus lost, the light division was in full march, crossed the Agueda, and joined the army. At night Wellington withdrew the troops, and marched upon Alfayates. Before sunset on the 26th, the infantry of Marmont were augmented to 60,000, and he had 120 pieces of artillery on the field. On the 27th, two of the French columns followed the allies, and attacked their rear-guard at Aldea de Ponte. They twice carried the village, and were twice driven out of it again by the division of general Cole. The same night the allies entered the selected position on the Coa, near Sabugal; and, on the morrow, Wellington offered battle to his opponent. At the point chosen, the Coa makes so favorable a curve that both flanks of the allies were effectually protected. Marmont declined the challenge, and retired. Count Dorsenne returned to the north; the army of Portugal moved, a part to Salamanca, and a part, by the Puerto de Baños to the valley of the Tagus. The allies were now put into good cantonments, being distributed far to the rear; and head-quarters were fixed, for a season, at Frenada.

While these movements were passing in the north, the force under general Hill was covering the Alemtejo. That officer, disposing his troops in convenient quarters in front and around, remained with a strong reserve at Portalegre. By means of his own advanced troops, and by the officers, constantly on the reconnoissance, he kept a strict eye not only on the garrison of Badajos, but on the whole province of Estremadura; and no assembly or march of the enemy escaped his vigilance.

Supported by the vicinity of Hill's corps, Castaños had established himself at Caceres with the wreck of the Estremaduran army, and was endeavoring to recruit his weak battalions and organize them anew. To disturb this arrangement Soult sent a division of infantry and a numerous detachment of horse, under general Girard, with orders to scour the province in every direction, to drive away all levies he might hear of, to seize upon all supplies, and to intimidate the peasants. Girard crossed the Guadiana at Merida, in pursuance of these instructions, and proceeded to insult and forage the northern district of Estremadura at his ease. The Spaniards retired or dispersed wherever he came; and he reckoned not upon any serious interruption from the allies, whose plan was apparently limited, for a season, to

the defence of the Alemtejo. But Hill had no sooner reported the presence of this movable column in Spanish Estremadura, than lord Wellington directed him to advance and drive it away. Upon the 22d of October, the general assembled a considerable part of the force under his orders at the village of Codiceira, on the frontier; and the next morning he marched forwards upon this duty. As soon as general Hill reached Albuquerque, and learned with what security and carelessness his enemy was moving, he resolved by all possible efforts to overtake him. On the 25th, the Spanish horse under the conde de Penne Villemur, came up with the French cavalry at Arroyo del Puerco. The enemy immediately fell back upon Malpartida, and retired from that place the same night. Hill reached Malpartida at daylight on the 26th, ascertained that Girard had quitted Caceres, and halted his troops till he obtained correct information of the route which the enemy had taken. It was no sooner found that Girard had marched on Torre Mocha, than the general moved the allies by the shorter route of Aldea del Cano and Casa de S. Antonio; but Girard moved from Torre Mocha to Arroyo de Molinos in the morning of the 27th, and posted his rear-guard at Albala.

This information reached general Hill upon the line of march. He had brought his columns from Malpartida that morning; he led them, by a forced march, that same evening, to Alcuesca, within four miles of Arroyo. Satisfied that the enemy was ignorant of his vicinity, and had no suspicion of danger, the general made such dispositions for the morning as would bring Girard to action, and with all the suddenness of a surprise. To favor this design, the allies lay upon their arms all night, without fires. At two in the morning, the columns were again put in motion, and defiled silently, by a narrow and bad road, upon Arroyo. The division did not clear the defile till half past six o'clock. It was halted about half a mile from the town, and formed in columns of attack, under cover of a rising ground which effectually concealed them. Here the most clear and distinct instructions being quietly delivered to the leaders of columns in the general's presence, he immediately gave the signal to advance. The three columns, under favor of rain and mist, diverged from this point of formation to the concerted attack. The first brigade moved directly upon the town: this column was led by lieutenant-colonel Stewart. The second brigade, followed by one of Portuguese, made a rapid circuitous march to the right of Arroyo, to intercept the enemy's retreat on the road to Medellin: major-general Howard commanded this column; colonel Wilson leading with the British, and colonel Ashworth, with his Portuguese, supporting them. The Spanish horse and the cavalry of the allies moved in the centre, between the two columns of attack, ready to act as occasion might require.

The enemy was already forming upon the road to Medellin in rear of Arroyo, preparatory to his march, when the first brigade under Stewart rushed into the town, and fell upon the rear-guard with the bayonet. Some few were taken; and the rest, hurrying out, were closely followed by the 71st and 92d regiments, supported by the 50th, with three pieces of Portuguese artillery. The French readily formed into two squares: what cavalry they had took post upon the left; while the squares opened fire upon Stewart's column, and compelled him to form up the 92d in line, to post the 71st behind a wall on their left, and to cannonade them with a couple of Portuguese guns. These dispositions completed, Stewart was about to charge them with the 92d, when the brigade of Colonel Wilson, composed of the 28th, 39th, and 34th regiments, came up, under cover of the fog and rain, within a few yards of the Medellin road, directly upon the enemy's left and rear. At this moment, the Spanish, supported by a few of the allied cavalry, galloped upon the French horse. These not being sufficiently numerous to maintain any posture of defence, were sabred or dispersed, and fled. About 200 yards to the right of the French infantry, rose the Sierra de Montanches; a range of rocky and precipitous heights, traversed by no roads, but a few narrow difficult paths known only to the goat-herd and the peasant. The French, seeing one British brigade advancing in their front, and another rapidly closing at double quick time upon their exposed flank, and already masters of the only road by which they could retire, suddenly broke their ranks, and rushing to the mountain scrambled up the pathless side in confused crowds. The brigade of Wilson followed; and the 34th regiment, which led, was soon mixed with the enemy. Very few of them fired a shot, or attempted any resistance, but as soon as they were overtaken, broke or threw down their arms, and surrendered. General Girard, with a very small remnant of his brigade, escaped across the mountains to Serena; being pursued for many leagues by a few British and Portuguese, and by a corps of Spaniards under Murillo. The pursuers found most of their knapsacks, and many of their arms, upon the path by which they fled.

In this affair, so honorable to general Hill, the loss of the British did not exceed sixty-four. That of the Portuguese was very trifling; the Spanish infantry were not engaged, and their horsemen suffered little. The enemy left 1500 prisoners, three guns, and all their baggage, in the hands of Hill. Among those taken were general Brun; the duke d'Aremberg, colonel of chasseurs; and a chief of the staff. The first brigade of Girard's division had marched at five in the morning, under general Remond, and thus escaped being surprised under the same

circumstances, and subjected, as they must have been, to the same confusion and panic.

The troops taken at Arroyo were all fine men and old soldiers. Among them was a battalion of the French 34th, taken chiefly by the leading companies of the 34th. British. The brass drums of that corps, and the baton of their drum-major, with "Austerlitz" and the eagle engraven on it, are still with the English 34th, as the treasured trophies of that joyous day.

General Hill returned to Portalegre with the highest satisfaction a commander can enjoy. He had executed a very able march;—had obtained a brilliant success in a masterly style;—and brought back to his cantonments full numbers. His troops exulted at his fortune, and lord Wellington felt increasing satisfaction in his able and zealous support.

CHAP. VI.

MILITARY STATE OF SPAIN.—THE GUERILLA SYSTEM.—PROGRESS OF THE WAR IN CATALONIA—IN ANDALUSIA—IN VALENCIA.

All the efforts of the French to establish and maintain themselves in Portugal had signally failed. They had employed in these efforts, at the lowest calculation, 100,000 of their choicest troops.

When it is considered that the effective strength of the British army did, at no period of 1810, exceed 26,000 men, did never in 1811 amount to 34,000, and fell below that number very considerably after the battles of Fuente d'Onor and Albuera, the reader will be assisted in forming a right estimate of the genius, the judgment, and the firmness with which that army was commanded.

It is not undervaluing the worthy spirit or the brave service of the Portuguese soldiers, to say that the small army which represented the lion heart of England was the rock of resistance round which they rallied, and to which they clung; that the directing mind of one great man, providentially given to their need, was the stay of their confidence, and the star of their hope. In every cottage in Portugal the name of Wellington was a household word. Napoleon saw these things with astonishment and anger. The military spirit of England was awakened; her vast resources were developed; the martial qualities of the British soldier had been shown upon the open field; and the charm of French invincibility was gone.

Throughout the length and breadth of Spain, the successful defence of Portugal gave heart and hope to the patriots. They were not idle. The French corps in Spain, though largely

drained for the army of Portugal, still counted, upon the soil of Spain, a strength of nearly 150,000 men, independent of that army. Nevertheless, their stations in the interior, or central provinces, were not very numerous, and the corps holding them were for the most part weak.

Bodies of guerillas, which had sprung up and rapidly multiplied on every side, assailed and harassed these weak divisions by an incessant warfare of posts and detachments. Whether in cantonments or on the march, the French never knew how soon or how suddenly they might be attacked. No convoy of grain or provisions could move without a strong detachment for its protection; and the escort of every courier was, by a general order, never to consist of less than 250 men, to be composed both of cavalry and infantry, and to be kept by its commander always ready for battle. Such was the regulation upon the line of correspondence between Valladolid and Bayonne.

South of the Ebro, in the autumn of 1811, there were not less than 10,000 guerillas; while, to the north of that river, the celebrated Mina and Longa headed corps of 5000 or 6000 men, and achieved many brilliant successes. The extent to which Mina troubled and irritated the French may be gathered from the fact of their hanging or shooting every officer and soldier of Mina's corps who fell into their hands, and setting a price upon his head. In the Asturias, Porlier, called El Marquisito, surprised the regular garrison of St. Ander. The famous Juan Martin el Empecinado was constantly descending from the Guadalaxara mountains, and spreading terror and alarm among the French garrisons. In one of these marches he surprised and captured three battalions in Calatayud. The intrusive king dared not to sleep beyond the gates of Madrid. Every village occupied by a French detachment was intrenched, and made otherwise defensible. Don Julian Sanchez gave the Frenchmen in Old Castile no repose; he was always in the saddle, and continually surprising detachments and making prisoners. On one occasion he drove away the cattle from under the walls of Ciudad Rodrigo, and, disposing an ambush with very happy skill, he succeeded in capturing and carrying off the French governor who sallied out to chastise him.

These were the more celebrated chieftains; but there were many others, who, by their activity and address, obtained great distinction in the provinces where they acted. These were known by the admiring natives under some familiar appellative, indicating their ordinary calling, as El Medico, El Pastor, El Frayle; or some accident which made their persons remarkable, as El Manco. Thus every province was provided with its hero, and the market-places were busied with their fame.

A few of these chieftains mustered bodies of 400 or 500 men,

but the majority of them led small bands of forty or fifty. The guerillas, however, were to be seen, according to the nature of their service, in parties of ten or of a hundred;—here patroling on the scout,—there lying close in ambush at the very gates of a town filled with French soldiers. It mattered not to these patriots where they moved, or where they halted; they had no baggage, no supplies; any hamlet could feed them for a night, any town could provide them for a week. Every forest was a safe cover; every rock was a ready citadel.

By these small bands great evils were inflicted upon the enemy. In vain did the French march against them: they were never to be seen; or only from afar, moving upon some inaccessible sierra in cheerful security. The duties of the French soldiers were doubled; their toil incessant; and all their smaller posts and detachments spent their unquiet nights in uneasiness and fear.

This desultory warfare had its peculiar advantage, was eminently suited to the genius and habits of the Spanish peasantry, and should have been watched and encouraged by the government, or left to grow up into a wide and wild spirit of resistance to the invader, without the control of suspicious and jealous interference. But the government began to regulate these irregulars; or rather, they clumsily attempted that which was not possible, and, if it had been, was not wise or advisable. They rewarded men who had made themselves chieftains, made themselves a name, with a military rank, which, by subordinating them to the officers of the regular army, destroyed their independence, shackled their movements, and froze up that fountain of zeal which had fed the torrent of their revenge.

Under this arrangement the once enterprising guerillas became bad, tame, indolent regulars, or they dispersed to their scattered homes. Thus many of the lesser bands disappeared and melted away. Mina and Longa, however, being very superior men, and having a genius that way, became eminent commanders; collected divisions under their orders in the provinces of Aragon and Navarre, and maintained the war with all the guerilla spirit, but with much professional ability as officers.

But it was in Catalonia that the true bright spirit of patriots shone with the most steady lustre. In a combat at Vals with the Italian division of general Eugene and a brigade of French horse, general Sarsfield, at the head of 6000 Spaniards, gained a very brilliant victory. Eugene himself was slain; his division was driven away in disorder, and only saved from utter destruction by the gallant countenance of the French dragoons, who charged the pursuers and checked their advance.

This affair gave great vexation to marshal Macdonald. He remained inactive in the very presence of Sarsfield, and retired

before him upon Lerida, making his march silently under cover of the night. Macdonald passed two months at Lerida, and, about the end of March, moved upon Barcelona. He took the route of Manresa. Sarsfield got intelligence of his intended march; hastened to the strong country of Montserrat and Manresa; and so skilfully disposed his force, that the advanced brigade of Macdonald came unawares upon a large ambush of foot and artillery, and was cut up and driven back by grape and musketry.

For this irritating check the Italian soldiers took a mournful and fierce revenge:—they set fire to Manresa, and that fair and populous town was totally destroyed. The flames of Manresa were seen from Sarsfield's camp at Montserrat, and through a wakeful night of angry curses, the Spanish soldiers stood gazing upon that scene of ruin; while from all sides the inhabitants of the neighboring villages came pouring into the bivouac in arms. The next morning the French marched forwards, entered the defiles of the Col d'Avi, and with a brave perseverance forced their way up the mountain, and finally reached Barcelona. But amid the rocks and precipices of this defile they were exposed to so heavy a fire of small-arms, that they were six hours before they completed the passage, and nearly half their numbers were killed or wounded. Of the latter, such as could not walk fell into the power of the Spaniards, and were sacrificed on the spot by the Manresans, who ran after them houseless and frantic.

Early in this year, the French army of Aragon, by its previous success in that province, was left disposable for operations in the kingdom of Catalonia; and the Catalan forces could no longer maintain the field.

The marquis of Campoverde, who had succeeded general O'Donnel in the chief command, encamped his troops in a strong position, protected by the works of Tarragona, and watched his opportunities of annoyance with vigilance and spirit. Upon the 19th of March he attempted the recovery of fort Montjuic, at Barcelona, by surprise. The undertaking was bold, and the plan was arranged with all secrecy and good promise of success; but those in whom he trusted betrayed his designs. The French governor was prepared for the assault, and, when the leading battalion of the Spaniards descended into the ditch, the garrison poured down upon it so heavy and murderous a fire, that in a few moments it was a confused heap of slain and wounded men. The remainder of the force precipitately retired; but, so completely were the French prepared, that their march was intercepted by detachments, which, though not in strength to cut off their retreat, caused them a very considerable loss.

However, the heart of the Catalans fainted not. A similar

enterprise was attempted against Figueras early in April. General Martinez and colonel Rovira, already celebrated as most active and fortunate leaders of Miquelets, were intrusted with the direction of this service.

To Rovira, indeed, the suggestion of this effort is due; but his proposal had been hitherto regarded as rash. It was not surprising that any officer should so view the matter professionally; but Rovira was a leader formed by the times. He had suddenly cast off his doctor's gown, and left his college and his books for the bivouac and the sword: to him nothing was contemplated as impracticable, that was possible. These leaders, therefore, collecting about 1000 volunteers, stole upon Figueras by night marches, and lay concealed in the woods by day.

There were three soldiers belonging to the French garrison in the citadel of Figueras, who were Spaniards. These men had been won to the interest of Rovira, and with them he had previously established a good intelligence.

The march of Rovira was accomplished with the most perfect secrecy. In the dead of night all his men were silently admitted into the citadel by the three Spaniards serving in the place. One sentinel was killed before he could give the alarm; and the castle of Figueras was in the power of Rovira before the governor and the garrison were awake. They were made prisoners in their very beds. The Spaniards now turned the guns of the castle upon the town, and immediately took possession of it. This brilliant success was hailed by the Catalans with a joy the most lively. Baron d'Eroles marched instantly from Martorel to reinforce Rovira; and, upon his way, captured the forts of Castelfullit and Olot, making 500 prisoners.

But Figueras, though once more in the power of its rightful masters, was without provisions in sufficient abundance to admit of its being securely maintained for any considerable period.

Towards the end of April, the marquis of Campoverde collected a large convoy, and marched with all the troops which he could muster to its relief. It was already invested by a corps under general Baraguay d'Hilliers.

Campoverde approached the place on the 3d of May, but while endeavoring to force the blockading line, he was assailed by the French in flank and rear: his army was instantly struck with a panic; it broke and fled in confusion, leaving the convoy, 1500 prisoners, and several hundreds of killed and wounded, in the hands of the enemy.

While these things were passing at Figueras, Suchet marched upon Tarragona, and invested that important fortress, on the 4th of May, with 20,000 infantry and 2000 horse. The depôts of Tortosa and Lerida supplied artillery and stores for the siege: his communication with Tortosa was already secured by Fort

Balaguer, and by an intrenched camp at Perillo; he proceeded to secure that with Lerida, by fortifying a large convent on the heights above Montblanc.

The direction of this siege did not, of right, belong to marshal Suchet, but to marshal Macdonald, who was the commander-in-chief of all the forces in Catalonia. Napoleon, however, visited the ill fortune of Macdonald in the action at Vals, by selecting Suchet to conduct the attack of Tarragona.

This important place was the last hold of Catalonia; the works had been examined and repaired; and it was provided with a garrison almost as numerous as the troops of the besieging army. Moreover, a squadron of English men-of-war, under captain Codrington, most effectually secured the free entrance of the port; so that reinforcements and supplies might be easily admitted. Under these circumstances, a very obstinate defence was most confidently expected.

The site of Tarragona is formidable. It stands upon the side of a rocky height, the summit of which is crowned by the upper town. To the north, west, and south, the rock, which is steep and lofty, has by nature a precipitous fall, and has been scarped with care. To the east and south-east the ground slopes gently to the lower town, the harbor, and the Francoli river; the town being situated between the points where the Francoli and the Gaya flow into the Mediterranean sea.

The principal outwork of Tarragona was the Fort Oliva, a detached work, erected upon a height about 400 toises from the upper town, and at the same elevation. This fort was armed with sixty guns, and surrounded by a deep ditch cut in the solid rock.

To describe the works of Tarragona minutely, or to give the particular details of this memorable siege, falls not within the limits of this memoir. Enough has been said to convey a general idea of the strength of Tarragona, and to picture that once fair and pleasant city.

Fort Oliva was first attacked, a breach was formed, and it was carried by assault on the night of the 29th of May. Fifteen hundred of the garrison of Oliva were bayoneted on the spot.

The attack was now directed against the lower town, and the advances were pushed forward with great vigor and distinguished skill.

The works of the lower town were stormed and carried through two practicable breaches on the 21st of June. In this assault the French soldiers gave no quarter, and more than 2000 Spaniards fell beneath their bayonets.

The works of the upper town were now the last defence of the Spaniards; and batteries to breach them were soon formed by the besiegers. Before they were finished, a British force

of 2000 men arrived in the bay from Cadiz. Colonel Skerret, who commanded this succor, immediately landed with his engineers to examine the state of the defences. The British engineers reported that, as soon as ever the enemy began to batter in breach, the front attacked must immediately be beaten down. Therefore Contreras, the governor, did not invite the British to land, but recommended that they should join the field army under Campoverde at Vendrels, about twenty-five miles to the eastward, and act in concert with that general upon the rear of the besiegers. He at the same time announced to colonel Skerret his own intention to abandon the place, as soon as the French opened their batteries in breach, and to force his way through the lines of the enemy with the 7000 regulars which yet remained to him, and which would thus be preserved to the cause. Unhappily this design of Contreras became publicly known to the inhabitants, and was treacherously conveyed to Suchet. The preparations of the French were hastened; their batteries suddenly opened at daylight on the 28th of June; and by ten o'clock in the forenoon, a practicable breach was formed. During the insufferable heat of noon, the fire of the besiegers ceased, and all seemed quiet in the trenches. But soon after, the French troops rushed hotly to the assault, and in a few minutes they were masters of the place. They behaved with terrible ferocity. Many thousands of the wretched inhabitants were butchered in the streets. The hearths and the altars of Tarragona were stained with the blood of the helpless.

Crowds of fugitives hurried to the sea-side, and many of them were rescued by the boats of the British squadron, under the fire of the French batteries; but these bore no proportion to the sufferers. The efforts of the French officers to arrest the savage violence of their men were vain. The frightful massacre was continued for many hours; and a licentiousness the most brutal acted all its wanton and heartless atrocities amid flaming edifices and bleeding victims.

Thus was Tarragona taken. According to the official report of Suchet, 4000 men were killed in the streets; 10,000 or 12,000 attempted to save themselves by getting over the walls, of whom 1000 were sabred or drowned; and he made 10,000 prisoners, including 500 officers, besides 1500 wounded men found in the hospitals.

The vigor and talent with which Suchet conducted the siege gave great satisfaction to his imperial master; and the military severity with which he punished the citizens of Tarragona for defending their own homes, was plainly stamped with his approbation.

It may be, and doubtless it is, true, that the soldiers, in their rage, exceeded the measure of chastisement which he had

calmly contemplated, and had previously announced his intention to permit. Thus the general wrote officially to his government *before the assault*, "I fear much, should the garrison stand the assault behind their last defences, that I shall be forced to set a terrible example, and intimidate Catalonia and Spain for ever, by the destruction of an entire city."—"And thus," said the general, in his official report *after the capture of the place*, "has the terrible example which I *predicted*!!! taken place; and it will long be remembered by the Spaniards." Yes, it will be long remembered by the Spaniards—and not by them only!

Exulting in his success, and confiding in the terror of his arms, Suchet was not slow to improve the advantages of his late conquest.

The baron d'Eroles had established himself in the famous convent of Montserrat, on the celebrated mountain of that name, not far from Barcelona. Among the difficult and rugged rocks of this singular mountain, D'Eroles had formed several strong posts and magazines; from thence commanding a clear view of all the principal roads, he was enabled to direct the movements of his force with security; and he made incursions into the neighboring country, pushing his men to the very gates of Barcelona, and alarming the garrison

On the 24th of July, Suchet, collecting a very superior force, marched against Montserrat, and made various attacks at different points. D'Eroles, not having troops sufficient to offer resistance on all sides, was, of course, beaten. The position was carried by the French columns: D'Eroles himself narrowly escaped being taken prisoner; and many of his people effected their retreat by the most intricate passes under cover of the night.

In the following month, the French recovered possession of Figueras. Martinez, with his gallant Miquelets, sustained a blockade for four months with enduring constancy: at last, provisions failed; the magazines were exhausted; the last rations were issued; and the brave Spaniard sallied forth, and attempted to force the French lines. The French were thoroughly prepared for this attack. The sally was made on the night of the 16th of August; and the Spaniards, to the number of 3000, forced their way to the abatis by which the enemy's line was covered. Martinez found the roads blocked up, ditches cut wide and deep, and obstacles of every kind multiplied to impede his progress. Moreover, these lines were defended by the fire of strong bodies of the enemy, alert and confident. After bold, resolute, repeated efforts to effect his object, Martinez, having lost 400 men, returned to Figueras. The next day he capitulated; obtaining from the enemy, as he well deserved, the most honorable terms.

Thus all the strong fortresses of Catalonia were again in the

power of the French. But under all these reverses the heart of the Catalan was unsubdued. The provincial forces still found places of strength and refuge among those natural fastnesses which abound on their native mountains. Here, upon the rocks, they watched every movement of the invader. Such was the state of the province when general Lacy was appointed to the command of it. His firmness and spirit were well seconded by the enterprise of baron d'Eroles. This leader, with the assistance of a British frigate, recaptured the islands of Las Medas, —of which mention has already been made. They command the along-shore navigation, and the possession of them is very important to the party holding Barcelona.

When the French concentrated their main force at Tortosa for further operations, Lacy immediately projected the attack of those detached posts which they had left in the principality to secure their communications with Aragon. Several of these were surprised and wrested from them: thus the town and the fortified convent of Igualada, the city and the fortified university of Cervera, and the town and castle of Belpuig, were successively recovered to the Spanish arms, by the activity and valor of D'Eroles; while Lacy defeated, in the field, a strong detachment that marched to the relief of Igualada, when D'Eroles was before that town, and had shut up the garrison in the convent. In these various affairs the French lost not less than 1500 men, whereof the half were made prisoners, besides a convoy which fell into the hands of Lacy.

The enemy made great efforts to intercept D'Eroles, but in vain. He boldly passed the Pyrenees; entered Languedoc; and, after a well-conducted incursion, returned, with corn, cattle and a contribution in money, to renew his bold exertions in Catalonia. It is recorded to his honor, and that of his gallant band, that not one inhabitant of France was put to death, or treated with personal violence, during this tempting opportunity for severe reprisal.

Before we follow the march of Suchet to Valencia, we turn to relate the state and progress of the war in Andalusia.

At Cadiz, nothing, in a military point of view, occurred worthy of note. From the period of the battle of Barrosa there was a great coolness between the British and Spanish officers. The court of inquiry, instituted by the cortez, had supported general la Peña. Sir Thomas Graham had quitted Cadiz for the camp of Wellington, and general Cooke had succeeded him in command of the British on the Isla de Leon.

The cortez were occupied with debates upon questions of a speculative nature, and amusing themselves, each with the statement of his own theory of government; while French soldiers were barracked in the halls of Seville, and the armed

patriots of Andalusia seeking refuge under the guns of Gibraltar. *After Massena was driven out of Portugal, some more reasonable Spaniards were found, who proposed that the frontier provinces in that quarter should be placed under the command of lord* Wellington. This question was debated in the cortez, and rejected by a large majority.

The brightest feature of affairs in the south at this period was the spirited and prudent conduct of Ballasteros. This chief, supported by Gibraltar and the mountains of Ronda, maintained so good a countenance with the troops under his orders, and so menaced and harassed the French, that Soult, in the apprehension that the army of Ballasteros, which amounted to more than 8000 men, might grow formidable if neglected, sent Godinot with equal numbers to crush him; but the Spanish general marched and manœuvred so ably, as to foil this design most effectually.

With a view to support Ballasteros, Tariffa was now occupied by strong detachments of British and Spanish troops from Gibraltar and Cadiz.

At the very moment that Ballasteros was prudently taking shelter under the works of Gibraltar, these detachments landed at Tariffa and garrisoned the place. The news no sooner reached Godinot, then he faced about, and marched in that direction by the pass of La Peña; but here the road is commanded from the sea, and his columns were received with so hot a fire by the batteries of some British men-of-war, which lay well in shore, that they were compelled to return. As this was the only road by which his artillery could have advanced, any attempt against Tariffa was of necessity for the time relinquished.

Ballasteros, emboldened by the enemy's embarrassment, now ventured to assail and press Godinot, and gained considerable advantages over him on two occasions, by attacking his rear-guard, as he was returning to Seville, with great vigor, and causing him some loss. These successes begot such a confidence in the soldiers of Ballasteros, that he projected the surprise of a corps of 2000 men posted at Bornos under general Semele. The French were completely routed; abandoned their artillery and baggage; left more than 100 prisoners on the ground, besides killed and wounded; and fled in great disorder.

The ill success of his expedition against Ballasteros sunk deep into the heart of Godinot; and, as soon as he reached Seville, he shot himself, and took refuge, from the reproaches which he expected, in the grave.

Tariffa is not a fortress; it is surrounded by an uncovered wall, flanked by small projections; but there is an island connected with it by a bridge, which affords a secure point of re-embarkation for a garrison compelled to abandon the town. This island is armed by two batteries and a martello tower.

General Copons and colonel Skerret decided to defend Tariffa; and, by great exertions, they soon improved the defences, and materially increased their strength: 1200 British and 900 Spaniards composed the garrison.

On the 19th of December, 1811, general Laval appeared in front of the place with 10,000 men and eighteen pieces of artillery. He broke ground on the night of the 24th; upon the 31st he had established a practicable breach. On the morning of the 1st of January, a column of 2000 men advanced bravely to the storm; and they were so well and steadily received by the garrison, that, after spirited and fruitless efforts, they retired with the loss of 500 men killed and wounded. The artillery of the garrison was admirably served, and the fire of the 87th and 47th regiments British was very destructive; nor could any thing exceed the zeal and the ability of colonel Skerret in the conduct of this service.

On the night of the 4th of January, Laval buried his artillery, which, owing to the severity of the weather and the badness of the roads, he could not have withdrawn, and retired upon Seville, whither he was then summoned by Soult, whom the movements of general Hill in Estremadura had effectually alarmed. The siege of Tariffa lasted seventeen days; and the loss of the French during the operations was very heavy.

We must now relate their successes in another quarter. Towards the close of the July preceding, Blake sailed from Cadiz for Almeria with a strong reinforcement for the army of Murcia, and assumed the command of that force. The army of Murcia now mustered 20,000 men: therefore Soult collected all the troops of his command that were disposable, and marched to bring Blake to action. This he effected at Lorca, on the 9th of August; and defeated the Spaniards so completely, that Blake could not afterwards collect more than 9000 men at Lebrilla. In time, the dispersed soldiers returned; reinforcements were sent from Cadiz; Soult had gone back to Seville; and Blake, who, amid all his disasters and reverses, still retained the confidence both of the government and the army, was intrusted with the defence of Valencia. The command of the forces in that province being now united to that of his own, he was at the head of more than 30,000 men; and among them were some divisions of the very best soldiers in Spain. His officers were known and tried commanders; and every lover of his country turned his eyes with hope to the army of Valencia.

After the fall of Tarragona, marshal Macdonald was recalled from Catalonia, and general Decaen was sent to command that province. Thus Suchet was intrusted with a large authority, and the military resources of the French army in Catalonia were at his control.

In the middle of September, Suchet assembled 25,000 men at Tortosa, and advanced into the kingdom of Valencia. He presented himself before Murviedro, on the 27th of September, without artillery, and made a bold attempt to possess himself of that important citadel by escalade. He was repulsed with considerable loss.

It now became necessary to bring up his battering train; this he could not do without reducing the little castle of Oropesa, which commands the great road coming from Catalonia. This castle, therefore, was regularly breached, and capitulated on the 11th of October; and upon the 18th, his heavy guns reached Murviedro.

He now hastily threw up some distant batteries, established a breach, and gave the assault. The attack was spirited and resolute, but the approach was found difficult; and it was defended so well, that the French column was driven back, with the loss of 300 men killed and wounded. Instructed by these failures, Suchet condescended to proceed with more regularity. Meanwhile Blake advanced to raise the siege. Suchet left a detachment of six battalions before Murviedro, to confine the garrison, and marched with his main body to offer battle. He placed his troops in a position, the left of which rested upon the sea in rear of Puzol; while the right stretched to the mountains beyond the village of Val de Jesus. The Spanish left rested on the village of Betara; their right extended to the sea. These dispositions were completed on both sides on the evening of the 24th of October. On the morning of the 25th, about two hours after daylight, the Spaniards advanced to battle in good heart, and in very fine order. Their right wing, commanded by general Zayas, promptly seized Puzol, and, moving forward with rapidity, carried a strong height in advance of the village with signal valor. Thus the French left was, for a short space, turned; and Zayas, having pushed forward the brigades on his right, while he held his left in hand, had already changed his front, and was formed almost at right angles to the line on which he advanced.

The left wing of the Spaniards obtained a corresponding advantage on the French right. They also carried an important height upon the enemy's right flank, and threatened to turn the right wing of the French. By these movements, Blake had dangerously extended his wings, and weakened his centre. The fire was, at this time, general along the whole front. The walls and towers of Murviedro were crowded with exulting spectators; who, as they saw the Spanish wings advance, concluded that the battle was already won, and their deliverance at hand. But Suchet's strength was yet to be developed. He had so disposed his reserve, that it could either succor the blockading force, or support his left. Now, therefore, he brought it forward;

And, after strongly reinforcing his left, he drew together the remainder of his forces into a compact body, and hurrying upon the Spanish centre at the charge step, immediately overthrew it, and drove it from the field in the greatest possible disorder. This done, he fell vigorously upon their wings. The left he soon overpowered; the right, under Zayas, fought to the last with the same constant and valiant spirit which they had shown at the commencement of the action. It was not without a stout struggle that they gave up the height which they first gained: they maintained the village of Puzol long after the centre was beaten: they again showed a gallant front on the heights near Puig; and they finally retired in unbroken order along the coast-road, towards Valencia. Blake attempted to make a stand with the left and centre behind the Betara, but it was of no avail, and he was compelled to urge forward the retreat of his exhausted battalions, and to pass the Guadalaviar. The loss of the Spaniards in this engagement nearly amounted to 6000 killed, wounded, and taken: that of the French did not exceed 800.

Murviedro capitulated the next day. Blake now posted his army in a very strong position on the right bank of the Guadalaviar, his right touching the city of Valencia. He broke down some of the bridges; covered those he suffered to remain with regular têtes-de-pont; surrounded the villages of Quarte and Mislata in his front with intrenchments; very strongly fortified those of St. Onofre and Manises on his left; and strengthened his right by forming inundations,—a mode of defence which the canals covering his right suggested and made easy. Thus protected, Valencia for a time defied the victorious Suchet. He pushed his advanced posts to the very suburbs, indeed, soon after the fall of Murviedro; but, having surveyed the formidable preparations of Blake, he halted his army in position upon the left of the river, covered his front with redoubts, and representing his situation to the major-general of the imperial armies at Madrid, and to the emperor at Paris, he quietly awaited reinforcements. For nearly two months nothing could be undertaken; yet, with a weak force, he calmly maintained a line, the left of which held the Grao or port, and the centre occupied the Serrano, a suburb of Valencia.

On the 25th of December, Suchet was joined by nearly 10,000 men. These reinforcements came for the most part from Catalonia. He had a park of 120 pieces of heavy cannon and mortars; his bridge apparatus was complete; and he resolved to pass the Guadalaviar. During the night of the 25th the French laid down three bridges; two about a league above Manises, and a third at Mislata.

Early on the 26th, the main body of the French passed the

river. Blake's left division of infantry, under general Mahy, held the intrenchments of Manises and St. Onofre: his cavalry were posted on the left, near Ribaroja. This infantry abandoned their posts at once, and hastened beyond the Xucar. The cavalry, after making a very feeble opposition at Torrente, gave way also, and fled in confusion from the field. They were bewildered by the movements of the French general; and, considering themselves outmanœuvred and turned, yielded instantly to their apprehensions.

The divisions which crossed the river between Quarte and Mislata could not penetrate far, for the ground is intersected by canals and ditches, and the Spanish troops in this quarter opposed them with success, and forced them back. Harispe, however, upon the French right, pursued the Murcians under Mahy, as far as Cotterroja, on the road to Murcia. Thus he was already upon Blake's rear, and had driven one division of his army away. When Blake found the Murcians cut off, and the French at Cotterroja, he gave up the struggle near Mislata, withdrew his forces, and entered the city. The French closely invested it the same evening. Valencia is not a fortress: it is a large city, with a lofty wall flanked by towers, and upon the south side has no natural defences. However, a line of defensive works had been erected since the commencement of the war, to cover the city and the suburbs. Supplies of arms and ammunition were provided for a garrison, however large; and the artillery collected was sufficient to arm the place most formidably.

A population of 80,000 inhabitants reposed behind these intrenchments, and they were protected by a garrison of 18,000 troops. Nevertheless Blake at once perceived that any long or effectual resistance to a besieging force would be impossible. The defences were weak and extensive; the city was ill provided with food; its communication with the sea was cut off; and thousands of fugitives from the country had taken refuge within the city, and swelled a population, before great, so largely as to threaten famine, tumult, and disease.

Blake, therefore, upon the 28th, made an effort to sally out, and force a way for his army to the open field. But he was immediately driven back with loss; and discovered that Suchet's line of circumvallation was strong, and not to be penetrated. Upon the night of the 1st of January, Suchet broke ground before the Spanish advanced line, at the distance of 180 yards. He directed his attacks against the works of Mont Olivete, and St. Vicente. In four days the Spaniards abandoned the advanced line, and retired within the walls.

The French marshal now bombarded the city, and pushed his sap to the very wall. Upon the 8th of January, Blake capitu-

led, and the conqueror of Tarragona became master of Valencia.

In recording these events, it is impossible not to regret Blake's absence of resource and skill; and we are led unavoidably to contrast the citizens of Valencia and Zaragossa.

Blake, an honest and heroic patriot, was eminently unfortunate throughout the whole course of this melancholy war; and this was the gloomy close of his disastrous military career. Suchet, the talented, brave, and severe servant of a warlike tyrant, here crowned the brilliant successes of a life of campaigns; was rewarded by a dukedom; and had his rich portion among the gardens of Valencia.

CHAP. VII.

THE SIEGES AND CAPTURE OF CIUDAD RODRIGO AND OF BADAJOS.

The winter season was now come: the allied army lay quiet in cantonments; a part of it, indeed, in stations remote from the frontier. General officers and others applied to lord Wellington for leave of absence on their private affairs, and obtained it; while the troops in quarters reckoned upon a long interval of repose before the next campaign.

Satisfied by these appearances, Marmont had detached three divisions of infantry and a body of horse to Valencia; suffered count Dorsenne to move another to the Asturias; while a fifth division was ordered to scour the province of Las Montanas, and the remaining divisions were put into cantonments on the Tagus.

By the middle of November the works of Almeida, which the French had destroyed, were again in a defensible condition. In this fortress a battering train and siege stores were expeditiously collected; a measure which, being represented and considered as necessary for the armament of Almeida, excited little curiosity either among the inhabitants or the soldiers. Their true destination was suspected by a few officers of the staff, and of necessity confided to others. Secrecy and dispatch are the life of enterprise, and the fidelity and zeal of all engaged are necessary to insure success.

Upon the Agueda there are several fords, but the best is so close to Ciudad Rodrigo as to be commanded by musketry from the wall. None of these passages, however, are to be depended upon in winter, as the river will oftentimes rise many feet in one night. Therefore a bridge was secretly constructed in the arsenal of Almeida, under the superintendence of major Stur-

geon, of the staff corps. It measured, on the platform, 400 feet in length; the trestles were eighteen in number, and placed twenty-two feet asunder.

When this important work was nearly finished, the troops lying nearest to the Agueda received orders to prepare fascines and gabions.

Upon the 6th of January, all things were ready for the meditated attack of Rodrigo; the bridge was laid down at Salices; all the stores were up and at hand; and the place was already shut in by the guerillas. On this day head-quarters moved to Gallegos. Upon the 7th, lord Wellington rode across the Agueda, by a ford about two miles below the town, and proceeded to reconnoitre its defences. He had no escort, and was only attended by colonel Fletcher and a few staff officers.

The French, since they had taken possession of Rodrigo, had fortified three convents,—one on either flank of the suburbs, and one in the centre; and they had placed an infantry post in the convent of Santa Cruz, just beyond the glacis at the north-west angle of the place. Thus the suburbs, which are 300 yards from the town, and inclosed by an earthen retrenchment, were considered secure from a coup-de-main. The French had also erected a small redoubt on the upper Teson, a height distant about 600 yards from the ramparts, on the north side, and thirteen feet above their level. This redoubt was supported by two guns and a howitzer, placed upon the flat roof of the convent of St. Francisco, at a distance of 400 yards, and a large proportion of the artillery of the place was in battery upon this approach. The weather was severe: from the night of the 1st of January, much snow had fallen, and lay deep. To this fall of snow succeeded gales of wind and sleet. The weather moderated a little on the 5th, and the investment, which had from these causes been a little delayed, was fixed for the 8th.

Four divisions were assembled for the service of the siege. They had no camp equipage; and there was no cover in the immediate vicinity of the place. In order, therefore, that the men might suffer as little as possible from exposure at that inclement season, they were cantoned in the nearest villages.

The duties before the place were taken by the divisions in regular succession; each remaining twenty-four hours on the ground, and furnishing the guards and working parties for that period.

At daylight, on the 8th, a large train of cars, with engineers' stores, crossed the bridge at Marialva, near Salices, and were parked in a concealed situation about a mile from the fortress. At noon, the light division crossed the Agueda, at the fords of La Caridad, and invested the place.

At eight in the evening, lieutenant-colonel Colborne, with

three companies of the 52d regiment, stormed the redoubt on the upper Teson. It was carried with some loss, and ground was immediately broken upon its flank. The soil was stony; but, by daylight, the work of the night was already three feet deep and four wide. On the night of the 9th, the first parallel was established, and the batteries traced out. They were three in number, and traced for eleven guns each.

One thousand men were employed on the batteries, the approaches, and the magazines. The garrison threw a great many shells, and kept up a well-supported fire of round shot; by which, so accurate at last was their range, the workmen suffered greatly, especially in the batteries. They also fired shells filled with powder, and having long fusees, in salvoes: these, falling into the parapets, blew away, in an instant, the work of hours. From the vigorous fire of the place, the severity of the cold, and the incessant fatigue of the besiegers, the progress of the work was slow.

On the night of the 13th, the convent of Santa Cruz, on the right of the attack, was escaladed and carried; a lodgment was made in it, and a communication established by the flying sap.

At noon, on the 14th, during the relief of the divisions, the garrison made a sortie, and succeeded in upsetting most of the gabions placed, during the preceding night, in advance of the first parallel; but they were repulsed from the batteries by the steadiness of a few workmen under an officer of engineers; and, on the advance of the relieving division, they retired into the town with little loss.

Lord Wellington, receiving intelligence that Marmont was already in motion, decided upon forming a breach from the first batteries; and upon storming the place, with the counterscarp entire, if he should be pressed by the advance of the enemy in strength.

On the afternoon of the 14th, the batteries opened their fire in breach; but, before it was steady and correct, darkness obliged them to cease. At night the fortified convent of San Francisco, which flanked the left of the approaches, was carried by escalade. A lodgment was thus made in the suburbs, which were from henceforth held by the besiegers. At daylight, on the 15th, the breaching batteries resumed their fire with twenty-three 24-pounders and two 18-pounders. The main scarp and fausse braie walls were considerably shaken by sunset; and a new battery was marked out, more in advance, for seven 24-pounders to establish a second breach. So much heart was shown in the exertions of all, of the artillery in particular, that, by the afternoon of the 19th, two good breaches were established. Lord Wellington reconnoitred them closely; and being satisfied that they were practicable, he directed the fire of the batteries

to be turned against the enemy's defences, and decided upon storming the place that evening. Seated upon the reverse of one of the advanced approaches, he wrote the orders for the assault; accompanying them with a clear minute detail of the arrangements. The large breach measured 100 feet in front, the lesser thirty. The division of general Picton was to assault the former; the light division, under Crawfurd, the latter: a body of Portuguese, under general Pack, were to create a diversion by threatening to escalade on the opposite side of the city.

At the appointed hour, the leading columns, preceded by sappers carrying bags filled with hay, to cast into the ditch, advanced to the assault. As soon as the sappers had thus reduced the depth of the ditch, and fixed the ladders on the bags, the brigade of general M'Kinnon descended into the ditch opposite the great breach. As they did so, hundreds of shells, and other combustibles, arranged along the foot of the breach, suddenly exploded: these had been prematurely fired, and rather animated than injured the assailants. They pushed up the breach, and, after a short and severe struggle with the defenders at the bayonet's point, gained a footing on the summit. But, though they crowned the rampart, an entrance was yet to be won, for they found traverses thrown up on either side; the way before them strongly retrenched, and the enemy defending the passage with a hot fire of musketry. The third division maintained this desperate struggle with an unconquerable resolution.

While the fight was thus loud and fierce upon the main breach, the lesser was assailed boldly by a brigade of the light division, and, having no interior defences, was carried instantly. These troops, with admirable discipline and good order, had no sooner passed the breach, than they formed up regularly, and were led on in a compact column upon the rear of the garrison, whose main attention was engaged by the defence of their retrenchment. But, while the light troops were advancing with this object, the gallant third division, having extended their efforts along the parapet, on both flanks of the main breach, and maintained themselves stoutly in front of it, the retrenchment was already turned, and the enemy hastily abandoned it, exploding a quantity of powder in its ditch, by which the gallant M'Kinnon, and many of his brave men, perished. Thus, nearly at the same moment, both breaches were forced. The garrison now dispersed, each seeking his own safety; and they were pursued from street to street, and from one refuge to another, till all were made prisoners.

Very few were put to the sword, for the victorious soldiers behaved to them not only with forbearance but friendliness. But the city shared the common and melancholy fate of all places taken by storm. The captors revelled in the license of

the hour;—they drank; they plundered public stores and private dwellings: and, in the frenzy of intoxication, they committed many acts of senseless and wanton destruction.

The loss of the allies on this memorable service was, of necessity, severe. Nine officers and 217 men were slain, and 84 officers and 1000 men wounded. Of these, more than one half fell in the assault. Only six officers were killed in the act of storming; but of this small number, two were generals; the one a gallant officer of the highest promise, and the other a leader of acknowledged ability and established fame. The names of M'Kinnon and Crawfurd are to be seen upon the walls in that stately dome, where England places votive tablets to the memory of her heroes. At Ciudad Rodrigo they fell.

The consequences of this victory were most important. The immediate fruits were 1500 prisoners, more than 300 pieces of cannon, a battering train complete, an armory of small-arms, a well-supplied arsenal, and military stores of all descriptions. Marshal Marmont had collected 60,000 men, and was advancing to the relief of the place, nothing doubting of his success, when intelligence was brought him that the British flag was flying on the walls; that the trenches were filled in; and the breaches were already in a defensible state.

Angry and baffled, the Frenchman retired. He had written to Berthier on the 16th of January, stating his strength, and the object of his march; and bade him expect events as fortunate as glorious for the French army. He had now to report his disappointment. He did so in a dispatch; in which, after stating the shortness of the siege, and the success of the assault, he added, "There is something so incomprehensible in this, that I allow myself no observation."

The capture of Ciudad Rodrigo was indeed a very proud achievement—most honorable to all the officers and troops employed; and an enterprise so secretly prepared for, so suddenly commenced, and so brilliantly concluded, not only astonished the French marshals in Spain, but all those frenchified politicians at home, to whom it was a constant and a mean delight to disparage the fame of Wellington, and the glory of the British arms.

The news was received at Cadiz with the most grateful and generous enthusiasm. The cortez conferred upon lord Wellington the rank of a grandee of Spain of the first class, with the title of Duke of Ciudad Rodrigo; the proposal was received by that assembly with the liveliest joy, and carried by acclamation.

In England, the government manifested a due sense of the importance of this service. Lord Wellington was raised to an earldom by command of the regent, and parliament settled on him 2000*l.* a year for the maintenance of that dignity. The army also was honored with a vote of thanks. How well these

honors and rewards were bestowed, was yet more fully shown in the events which followed.

No sooner was Rodrigo rendered thoroughly defensible, than it was delivered over to the Spaniards, and once more occupied by a garrison and a governor of that nation. Lord Wellington, being now freed from any anxiety for the present safety of this recovered fortress, directed all his thoughts and efforts to the recapture of Badajos.

It was on the morning of the 5th of March that he made his final arrangements with the Spanish governor, general Vivas, and that he directed lieutenant-colonel Fletcher to give up the charge of the fortifications of Ciudad Rodrigo to the Spanish engineer, general Calvet. It was in the afternoon of this same day that head-quarters commenced their march for the Alemtejo.

Several divisions of the army were already in movement in the same direction. On the 11th of March head-quarters were established at Elvas, and the troops from the north were collected in convenient cantonments on the frontier of Spanish Estremadura. It had been long confidentially known to the heads of the commissariat, artillery, and engineer departments that the siege of Badajos would be undertaken; and, on the fall of Rodrigo, the most active preparations were made for that service.

As long before as December a secret order was sent to an officer at Lisbon to prepare for service twenty-four pontoons to form a bridge at Abrantes. Upon the 26th of January, the preliminaries for besieging Badajos were most carefully arranged with the commanding engineer by lord Wellington.

A battering train was embarked at Lisbon in large vessels, which put out to sea; and there it was received on board small craft; and being conveyed up the river Caldao to Alcacer do Sul, was there landed, and transported on country carriages across the Alemtejo to the banks of the Guadiana. On the arrival of head-quarters at Elvas, the preparations were found to be in a most forward state. The tools and stores had all arrived; the bridge apparatus from Abrantes was up and in good condition; and from 3000 to 4000 gabions and fascines had been prepared by the Portuguese soldiers at Elvas, or rather in the woods around. The whole of the ordnance was parked upon the glacis of that fortress. The train consisted of sixteen 24-pounders, twenty 18-pounders procured from Lisbon, and sixteen iron 24-pound howitzers brought from Almeida. These vast means being happily collected, and all the minor preparations complete, a pontoon bridge was laid down over the Guadiana on the 15th of March; and also a flying bridge was established, formed by two large Spanish boats. That evening general le Marchant passed the river with a brigade of cavalry; and, on the 16th,

Marshal Beresford crossed the bridge with 12,000 men, and invested Badajos, on the south side, without any opposition.

This force consisted of the light, third and fourth divisions of the army under lieutenant-colonel Barnard, generals Picton and Colville. The remaining divisions, under generals Graham and Hill, advanced considerably; occupied Merida, Llerena, and Almendralejo; and thus covered the besieging force, and lay ready in the field observing the army of Soult. This marshal had 35,000 men under his orders; Marmont a much stronger army; and, as it was their duty to combine operations, and succor Badajos, few expected that the fortress would be allowed to fall without a battle.

Lord Wellington and the commanding engineer made a close and leisurely reconnoissance of the place. They discovered that the defences had been very materially improved and strengthened. The scarps were many of them heightened, the outworks strongly finished, and a portion of the enceinte was covered by an impassable inundation. They had also put the castle in such a state of defence, that no thought of a regular attack upon it could be entertained. For it should be remembered the British army had no miners; sappers without experience; no mortars; and a very inadequate proportion of guns for the siege of such a well armed and well provided fortress,—a fortress which the governor had twice successfully defended when in a condition less formidable, and with a garrison less select and efficient than that now confided to him.

To reduce Badajos by a regular attack was not possible for the British commander. He had not the means; he had not the time necessary for so a patient a process.

The decision of his own mind, the boldness of his soldiers, and the zeal of his devoted officers, were his resources, and they did not fail him. In the night between the 17th and 18th of March, under a heavy and tempestous rain, ground was broken within 160 yards of a detached fort called the Picarina, and before daylight the approaches were three feet deep; nor had the workmen been discovered.

During the 18th the work went forward; the weather was wet and windy; the enemy endeavored to hinder the progress of the labors by a fire of musketry and field-pieces from Picarina, and by a cannonade from the ramparts of the town; but the casualties were few, and the interruption little.

On the 19th, the fire of artillery from the town was very heavy; and in the afternoon the garrison made a sortie with 1500 infantry and 40 horse. The working parties were surprised and driven out of the parallel for a few minutes, but were soon rallied; and the enemy, being fiercely charged, in turn retired. The French sappers overthrew a few gabions, and carried off a

few intrenching tools, but did very little injury to the parallel. Much confusion was caused among the unarmed men in the engineer's park by the few French cavalry, but no stores or materials were destroyed.

The loss on this occasion amounted to 150 killed and wounded.

Colonel Fletcher, the commanding engineer, was unfortunately disabled, by a musket-shot in the groin, from continuing his active personal superintendence: but lord Wellington had so high a confidence in this officer, that the attack was still continued under his direction; and the commander-in-chief came to his tent every morning, accompanied by a staff-officer, with the plan of the work executed, and in progress, and concerted with the colonel on the operations for the day.

The rain fell in torrents on the evening of the 19th, and throughout the night. The same weather continued; and the duties in the trenches were of necessity very severe, both from the long-continued exposure of the men, and the little progress which could be made in low ground where the trenches were full of water.

On the 22d, the Guadiana, swollen by the continued rains, suddenly rose and swept away the pontoon bridge, eleven of the pontoons sinking at their anchors. By this misfortune the difficulties of supplying the army with provisions and military stores were so great, that some fear was entertained it would become necessary to raise the siege. However, the flying bridges were still enabled to work, though slowly, for the force of the current greatly impeded them.

The workmen were nearly knee-deep in the trenches, which ever, as they were cleared of water, filled again. Nevertheless, the troops, being full of confidence in the firmness of their leader, persevered in their labors with good heart; and the sight of their enemies, and the sound of the cannonade, kept their minds interested and engaged.

In the night between the 24th and 25th of March, six batteries were completed and armed. Ten 24-pounders, eleven 18-pounders, and seven howitzers were distributed on these batteries; and they opened their fire before noon on the 25th. Two of these batteries bore upon Fort Picarina, and the remainder were directed against the supporting defences of the place.

The guns of Picarina were soon silenced, but the defences of the work itself were not otherwise much injured: a few palisades were, indeed, broken down in the covered way; but it was in a state to resist any assault less determined than that to which it was exposed.

Lord Wellington directed that it should be taken that night, and charged major-general Kempt with the details of the exe-

cation. Five hundred men of the third division were appointed to this service. One detachment of 200 men was ordered to pass round the flank of the work, and force the gorge; while another of like strength was to march upon the communication from the town, and posting one half of its numbers to await and resist the advance of any succor, was to support with the remainder the attack upon the gorge. A reserve of 100 men was formed in the advanced battery, ready to aid these attacks by escalading the front.

At ten o'clock at night the signal was given, and the troops advanced; the reserve being formed and ready at its post.

The fire at the gorge was so heavy, and the obstacles so great, that, despite the bravest efforts, it was found impossible to force it. Nevertheless, that half of the second detachment, which, in obedience to its orders, had supported the attack of the gorge by vain attempts to get over the palisades under the enemy's fire, searched round the left flank for a favorable place to rear their ladders, ran bravely up, and the foremost men were soon engaged in a hot and very doubtful struggle.

At this moment general Kempt pushed forward the reserve: they escaladed boldly; many were bayoneted back; but they fought their way over the parapet, and, after a short and bloody combat within, the work was taken.

Alarums were sounded in the town; rockets and lights were thrown up; a fire opened from every rampart, as if in dread of a coup-de-main; a sortie was attempted in the direction of Picarina, but instantly repulsed.

Of the garrison, three officers and eighty men were made prisoners; a few escaped: several were drowned in an endeavor to cross the inundation, and the rest were slain. Of the resolute assailants, 4 officers and 50 men were killed, 15 officers and 250 men wounded.

Lord Wellington was the man thoroughly to appreciate the valor of the soldiers employed in this affair, and to estimate, as it deserved, the calm and admirable conduct of general Kempt.

The second parallel was now established in front of Picarina; enfilading and breaching batteries were erected; and a fire of great weight was directed upon the solid walls of Badajos. Upon the morning of the 5th of April, the breaches were reported practicable; in the main breach a great extent of wall had fallen; and the ascent of both was easy.

Lord Wellington, who began now to be pressed for time by the advance of Soult, and the menacing demonstrations of Marmont on the frontier of Beira, was eager for the assault, and desired to storm the place that evening; but, upon a close reconnoissance of the two breaches, he judged that they had interior and formidable retrenchments, and for twenty-four hours

he deferred the attack. He employed this time by directing the heaviest possible fire to be turned against the old wall of the curtain between the two breaches, so that a third opening might be obtained, whereby their retrenchments could be turned.

The fifth division of the army, which had been left in Beira, had been lately withdrawn from that province, and joined the besieging force at this period.

The covering army, under Sir Rowland Hill, retired leisurely before Soult; two arches of the bridge at Merida were blown up, and that general took post at Talavera.

The masonry of the old curtain being exposed to the guns of all the batteries, soon crumbled under their fire, and a third breach was thus made in one day. Lord Wellington now instantly gave orders for the assault. It took place at ten o'clock on the night of the 6th of April, at the appointed moment.

Two divisions, under colonel Barnard and general Colville, were directed to assault the breaches; general Picton, with his division, was appointed to escalade the wall of the castle; and general Leith, with his, to scale the bastion of San Vicente at the other extremity of the town.

The columns moved out of the parallels at the same moment in silent order, and darkness canopied the city. Led by their steady guides, the columns destined to storm the breaches no sooner crowned the glacis, and came upon the ditch, than a light brighter than that of day, but of another sort, illumined all things; and they could see distinctly the armed walls and the ready foe. A line of levelled muskets, and the cannon of the ramparts, already pointed, vomited forth a deadly fire; and, amid the lurid splendor of countless fire-balls, war clouds of a pale and leaden hue rose thickly into upper air.

The men advanced; they leaped into the covered way where the palisades had been destroyed by the batteries. Bags filled with hay were cast into the ditch; ladders were lowered; and the brave assailants hurried down the counterscarp into the ditch. It was soon crowded with troops. Suddenly an incredible number of fougasses, shells, and other combustibles, which had been laid along the foot of the breach and in the ditch, were fired by the garrison. They exploded with an appalling effect. The destruction was terrific, and the confusion unavoidable; yet there was no pause in the attack. The fourth division pressed boldly up a ruinous and unfinished ravelin, mistaking it for the breach. No sooner were they on the summit, than they found that a difficult descent yet separated them from the breach, and they stood exposed, to the very feet, to the small-arms of the garrison. A hot fire was opened on them, which, without orders, they began to return. The head of the light division being led, amid all the smoke and noise, a little too far to the right, here joined

the fourth; and the officers had great difficulty in restoring order, and leading the men to the true points of attack.

They did so with a gallantry and zeal never surpassed, and led up to the breaches with devoted heroism. But the main breach was found strongly retrenched: over the greater part of its face, planks, studded with iron spikes like harrows, had been laid down after dark; and chevaux-de-frise, formed of sword-blades. were fixed strongly along the summit. The boldest hearts, the strongest arms, were unable to force a way past obstacles like these. The gallant groups, as they came upon these defences, were stayed. Volleys of musketry were showered upon them from the ramparts, and they all fell slain or disabled upon the rubbish.

Long after the breach was found to be impracticable, and the idea of attempting it was abandoned, the work of destruction went on. The brave men, who could not advance, and would not retire, clustered near the unfinished ravelin, and the traverses in the ditch, and met confused and bloody deaths.

"Never," says colonel Jones, "probably never, since the discovery of gunpowder, were men more seriously exposed to its action. Shells, hand-grenades, every kind of burning composition, and missiles of every hellish variety, were hurled into the ditch. The roll of musketry was incessant; and the night was now light with the most dazzling fires, and now black with utter darkness."

Perhaps there was never a moment in the life of Wellington that he more deeply felt for his intrepid soldiers than when the reports were brought to him of this state of things at the breaches.

About midnight this report was made, and, yielding to the severe necessity, lord Wellington gave orders to withdraw those divisions, and to form them again a little before daylight for a fresh effort. It was at this moment that a report came in from general Picton. The castle was taken. The escalade had been obstinately opposed. Logs of wood, large stones, loaded shells, had been arranged along the crest of the parapet, and these were rolled off upon the assailants as they sought to rear their ladders. All the men who first ascended such as were fixed, fell by musketry or the bayonet; but their comrades boldly and closely followed, and upon the summit of the wall the British bayonet proved the better weapon, and forced its way. The castle was taken. Nor was this a solitary success. The fifth division, under general Leith, ascended the bastion of San Vicente with like intrepidity and like reward. As soon as his first brigade was formed within the bastion, it moved forward to drive the defenders from the breaches; it was soon discovered by a party of the garrison, most briskly assaulted, and driven

back, under the impression that a great force was upon them, and that they were already turned; but this check was short, the mistake soon rectified, and the combat renewed. A battalion of the 38th regiment had been formed in reserve in the bastion of St. Vicente: with this body, only numbering 200 bayonets, colonel Nugent received the enemy with a steady volley, and charging home, instantly overthrew them. The brigade now advanced towards the breaches. The French immediately abandoned them, and dispersed through the town: one body only, under Philippon the governor, retired over the bridge to Fort Christoval for the night, and surrendered at daylight. The rest of the enemy's soldiers were all made prisoners in the city. The divisions which had so dreadfully suffered now marched in at the breaches, though it was not without difficulty that they could pass these accumulated obstacles. The third division had blown open the castle gates, and descended into the town.

Badajos was taken. Three hundred and seventeen officers, 3344 men, had fallen in the assault. The foot and the ascent of the main and second breach were heaped with slain. In the confusion of the storm, the breach in the curtain was never attempted; the guides were probably killed, and the way was missed. Thus this formidable place was carried at the moment of assault, not by the breaches, but by a bold and successful escalade of two distant points where the defences were entire. The walls of the castle rose from eighteen to twenty-four feet, and it was deemed secure from attack. The bastion of St. Vicente had an escarp wall twenty feet in perpendicular; and the troops, having ascended this, had yet twelve feet which inclined at an angle to an old parapet to surmount by scrambling. Both here and at the castle the resistance of the garrison was considerable, and the loss of the assailants great; nor do the annals of warfare record any exploits more brilliant than these gallant escalades. In these efforts, generals Picton, Colville, Kempt, Walker, and Bowes were wounded. Lieutenant-colonel Macleod, commanding the 43d, and major O'Hara of the 95th, were killed at the breaches.

There is nothing more deeply humiliating to man, or more mortifying to military pride, than to find noble qualities and base passions in the close alliance in which they are too often found. It is true, the British soldiers did not stain their bayonets with the blood of their yielding and captive enemies; and out of a captured garrison of 4000 men, few, if any, were put wantonly to the sword: but they no sooner got into the place than they broke the reins of discipline; they drank, they plundered, they revelled in all licentiousness; and their wild orgies and frantic excesses were continued for many hours before their noble commander could possibly control them. This was, at

last, done by extraordinary measures and severe examples, and by bringing fresh and steady troops into the town.

The precautionary orders of Wellington had been admirable; and his example and exertions after the capture of the city were great, as were those of all the officers under his command. But the plunder of a city taken by assault seems to have been considered, from time immemorial, by all soldiers, a privilege. It is a privilege deeply dishonorable to the profession of arms; deeply injurious to good discipline; and which is, in our judgment, falsely regarded as inseparable from the confusion of a storm. It is evident, however, that a long and steady course of discipline, obtaining generally everywhere throughout the armed force of a nation, and enforced by the moral power of a nation's voice, can alone effect the important object of putting an end to this horrid custom.

The crimes of the deepest dye committed on these and like awful occasions, are invariably the work of a few; but the wanton destruction of property, the drinking and the bonfires in the streets, are offences participated in by hundreds, who rush in from a scene of blood and peril drunk with slaughter and giddy with success. This we say, as accounting for, and not excusing, wickedness. May the hint of this humble pen fall upon the heart of some youthful Briton, destined hereafter to lead our armies or to influence our senate.

We return from this brief digression, satisfied that it is not misplaced in a memoir of that great man whose services it is our high honor to record, and whose active and humane exertions upon the capture of Seringapatam the reader cannot have forgotten.

Upon the fall of Badajos, Soult led back the army of the south to Seville, which place a small Spanish force under the conde de Penne Villemur was already menacing. The cavalry of the allies followed Soult's march, and gained some advantage over his rear-guard at Llerena. Upon the 13th of April, Wellington was again in motion with the main body of his army, to drive Marmont from Beira.

That marshal had advanced from Salamanca while Wellington was besieging Badajos; had left one division to blockade Ciudad Rodrigo, and had invested Almeida with the remainder of his force. After vainly endeavoring to alarm the governor of Almeida by the demonstration of a sudden assault, he crossed the Coa at Sabugal, drove away a body of militia which would have opposed his advance, and penetrated to Castello Branco. But for the sudden and unexpected fall of Badajos, and the approach of his active and indefatigable opponent, he would have pushed on to Villa Velha, to destroy, if possible, the

bridge. He now retired into Spain, taking with him the division he had left before Rodrigo.

The head-quarters of Wellington were again established at Fuente Guinaldo, and the allied army was again cantoned between the Agueda and the Coa. As he had taken care to form all his principal magazines north of the Douro, his reduced and exhausted battalions were soon and abundantly supplied; nor did the irruption of Marmont cause greater loss than the destruction of one depôt at Celerico, which had been hastily, and without necessity, set on fire when he advanced.

To invite the admiration of the attentive and considerate reader to the energy and genius displayed by lord Wellington, in thus suddenly and vigorously wresting from the enemy the two fortresses of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos, is unnecessary. Be it remembered, that these successes were achieved in the face of two powerful armies, whose combined strength, had they been directed with an ability and activity akin to his own, must have rendered the triumph of lord Wellington impossible.

Napoleon was astonished by these events, and he was apprized of them by reports which exhibited too plainly the confusion and mortification of his chosen generals. His mind was already bent upon a rupture with Russia; and he had for several months conducted his negotiations with the czar with little sincerity and much reservation. He had counted on very different results in the Peninsula. Portugal had been delivered from his armies; Spain was unsubdued; and her banners again floated upon two fortresses, which French soldiers had vainly defended against "the hideous leopard." A triumphant march to the northern extremity of Europe had now captivated his imagination. The prospect dazzled his sight, and he became blind. It presented a gratification to his pride not to be foregone; and he was, for a moment, willing to relax his hold on Spain, that he might pursue the new object of his ambition.

"France," said Napoleon, in a communication to the English government after the fall of Badajos,—"France shall renounce all idea of extending her dominions beyond the Pyrenees. The present dynasty shall be declared independent, and Spain shall be governed by a national constitution of her cortez." When the precise meaning of these expressions was demanded by the British cabinet, he haughtily recovered himself, insisted on the recognition of Joseph as king of Spain, and abruptly closed the negotiation.

Thus, with a violent and indomitable spirit, he would still hold Spain, although the hand with which he grasped it was already torn and bleeding, while, with the other armed, he was striking at the imperial crown of all the Russias.

CHAP. VIII.

LORD WELLINGTON DIRECTS GENERAL HILL TO DESTROY THE ENEMY'S BRIDGE AT ALMARAZ.—GENERAL HILL TAKES FORTS NAPOLEON AND RAGUSA, AND BURNS THE BRIDGE.—LORD WELLINGTON ADVANCES TO SALAMANCA.—TAKES THE FORTIFIED CONVENTS IN THAT CITY—MANŒUVRES ON THE DOURO—BEATS MARMONT IN BATTLE—MARCHES TO MADRID.

Head-quarters, as was stated in last chapter, were again established at Fuente Guinaldo, and the allies were again cantoned between the Agueda and the Coa; but their active and indefatigable leader was busied in preparing for them a new field of glory, and for himself a new title to renown. The French armies of the north and south had a constant, easy, and secure communication by a bridge of boats upon the Tagus at Almaraz. To destroy this bridge was absolutely necessary before lord Wellington could act offensively against Marmont with prudence; for that marshal could readily assemble more than 50,000 men to oppose him, while in the south marshal Soult commanded a force of 58,000 men The army immediately under Wellington could only muster 39,000 bayonets and 3000 horse, for it was necessary to leave a strong corps of observation in Spanish Estremadura. This corps consisted of 10,000 infantry and 1200 horse, under Sir Rowland Hill, and lay at Almendralejo and its vicinity, patroling towards Seville, and observing the movements of marshal Soult. Lord Wellington, having resolved upon his plan of operations, directed Sir Rowland to destroy the bridge at Almaraz. That officer performed the service intrusted to him with his customary zeal, vigor, and good fortune. It was known that the bridge was defended on both sides of the river by very formidable works and a sufficient garrison. Therefore a considerable equipment of artillery and engineers' means was necessary to the success of the undertaking. These, consisting of six 24-pounder howitzers, with the necessary ammunition stores, of six pontoons; and of twelve ladders thirty feet in length; were brought up from Elvas to Merida by Montijo. The two arches of the old bridge at Merida, which, as has been related, had been destroyed, were now hastily repaired with such materials as some ruined buildings near the spot supplied; and, on the 12th of May, the infantry and cavalry destined for this service marched from Almendralejo, filed over the bridge, and the whole force together with its equipment was assembled in that place.

The works at Almaraz had been constructed with skill and care. On the right of the river was a redoubt for 400 men called Fort Ragusa, with a masonry tower of considerable

height, and loop-holed, in the interior. This work not standing sufficiently close to the bridge, was flanked by a flêche constructed on the river bank. Upon the left bank of the river the bridge was defended by a strong well flanked tête de pont; while upon some heights, rising immediately near, was a redoubt for 450 men, called Fort Napoleon. This work, like that on the right bank, had a loop-holed tower, twenty-five feet high in the interior.

The road to Almaraz from the south, crosses a range of difficult mountains, about four miles from the bridge, and descends continually towards the river from one lofty point, marked by the old tower of Miravete. This tower, which stands near the road, the French had fortified; surrounding it by a lower wall and rampart, and arming it with several pieces of ordnance. Upon the road, at a little distance, stands a solitary inn. This house and the tower they had connected by works into a line of defence so strong, that to force the pass and make a way for the advance of artillery was not possible. Not expecting to find the enemy's preparations at all points so very complete, Sir Rowland Hill had so arranged his movements on the evening of the 16th, as to carry the castle of Miravete with one column; to force the high road with a second; and with the third to cross the sierra at the pass of Cueva considerably to his right, and descend at the same moment upon Almaraz.

With these intentions he marched, upon the evening of the 16th, from his ground near Jaraicejo; but the column which marched by the pass of Cueva was so delayed that it was broad daylight before it had descended half-way to Almaraz; it was therefore halted and countermarched. The first and second columns had found both the castle of Miravete and the pass of Miravete in a state of defence which could not justify an attack with any reasonable hope of success; as the surprise of the redoubt below was at that moment out of the question. The three brigades bivouacked on the mountain the day and night of the 17th; and upon that day and the following the whole range of Miravete was examined with care to find some passage for the guns; and the castle and road were reconnoitred with a closer scrutiny; but not a hope was left of forcing the pass, nor was any spot found upon the ridge where artillery could either be passed or lowered. Sir Rowland Hill, disappointed but not dispirited, resolved instantly upon one of those bold and dashing efforts, which, though they cannot command success, deserve it.

At nine in the evening of the 18th, he led a brigade down the sierra, by a goats' path, through Romangorda; and at daybreak the head of his column was halted in a concealed position, about 800 yards from Fort Napoleon. It was nearly eight o'clock before the rear was up and all the troops were formed: but their

march, covered by intervening hills, had not been seen, and their vicinity was not suspected.

The French soldiers were crowded on the parapet of their work, watching the progress of an attack upon Miravete; which, however, was merely a feint, intended to have been simultaneous with the escalade. They had no suspicion of an attack till the rush of the assailants, the sight of their ladders and the opening of their firing parties alarmed them, already on the alert, into swift resistance. With a good order, exceeded only by their valor, the 50th regiment, and one wing of the 71st, soon mounted the parapet, and the defenders gave way. Their contest for the interior defences was but short: they abandoned the retrenchment and tower, and fled to the tête de pont. Here was a scene of great confusion; for the pursuers entered the work with them. They rushed upon the bridge; but three of the boats were already cut away by the fugitives who first crossed. Many fell or leaped into the river, and were drowned: about 250 were made prisoners.

The commandant of Fort Ragusa, after firing a few rounds upon Fort Napoleon, the guns of which were already turned against him, evacuated his post in disgraceful haste, and marched away.

The river was soon passed; the towers and magazines in the forts, and in the tête de pont, were blown up; the guns thrown into the Tagus; the palisades, barriers, stores of timber and of tools, the pontoons and their carriages, were consumed by fire, and the works utterly effaced and destroyed.

This important service was effected with the loss of only 15 officers and 162 privates, killed and wounded.

Soult was already in motion, to act upon Sir Rowland Hill's communications with Badajos and Elvas; while Marmont was hastening to the Tagus. Upon the 21st of May, Sir Rowland's corps was already at Truxillo, on its return. Soult relinquished all hope of intercepting him; and when the advanced guard of Marmont reached the banks of the Tagus, they saw nothing but blackened ruins instead of formidable forts; and a friendly garrison in the tower of Miravete, now useless, whom they could not relieve. It was not until the 11th of July following that this isolated detachment, closely watched by guerillas, and suffering from famine, was released by the advance of a strong detachment from Toledo. They then destroyed the works, and left the pass open.

The bold conduct and happy issue of the important expedition of general Hill gave a security and hopefulness to the offensive movements contemplated by lord Wellington, which they had otherwise wanted, and without which, he could not have availed himself of any success to penetrate far into Spain. He now

rapidly completed his own arrangements for moving forward. A month's provision for the whole army was collected and stored at Rodrigo. Some heavy howitzers and three 18-pounders, with the necessary ammunition, were secretly prepared for a march at Almeida. The bridge upon the Tagus at Alcantara was repaired to facilitate his communication with the corps of Hill, and, on the 13th of June, he suddenly broke up from his cantonments. Upon the 17th of June, he appeared before Salamanca, and crossed the Tormes by fords above and below the city; as the allies advanced, Marmont slowly retired.

Salamanca being a valuable post to the French, and containing a very large depôt, they had constructed, on the ruins of some convents, three strong forts. These works were garrisoned by 800 men, and were so formidable as to be quite secure from any but a regular attack. They were accordingly besieged by the division of general Clinton in due form. This operation was covered by the whole army, which occupied a position three miles in front of Salamanca, called the heights of Christoval. The right of the army rested on the Tormes near Cabrarizos; the left upon a tributary stream of that river near Villares de la Reyna. The besiegers broke ground before the fortified convent of St. Vicente on the night of the 17th. On the 19th the artillery battered in breach, but the ammunition was exhausted before a way into the fort was opened. Nevertheless the defences were so much damaged by the fire of the batteries, that an escalade was attempted. The assailants were repulsed with the loss of major-general Bowes, commanding the attack, and 120 men killed and wounded. The general, a devoted and gallant soldier, was much lamented.

From the 20th to the 27th, marshal Marmont essayed many manœuvres for the relief of these forts, and made various demonstrations of passing the Tormes by his left, and acting upon Wellington's line of communication with Rodrigo; but all his manœuvres and demonstrations were vain. He could not induce the British commander to make one false movement. The allied army was held perfectly in hand; its front changed; and its right being placed on the ford of Santa Martha, it was ready to act upon either bank as required; while only one brigade of cavalry was sent across the Tormes in observation. In the night, however, of the 24th, Marmont passed the river himself at Huerta with the greater part of his force. This being known at dawn, two divisions of infantry and a second brigade of cavalry were sent across the ford of Santa Martha. The rest of the allied army was collected between Morisco and Cabrarizos; the advance still maintaining its position at Aldea Lengua. Marmont pushed on to Calvarassa de Abaxo; but, finding Graham between that place and Salamanca in order of battle, and observ-

ing that he might be easily supported and strengthened from the right bank, he halted, and in the evening repassed the Tormes at Huerta, and took up his old position at Villares on the British left. During these various movements there was no affair of great moment.

On the 20th there was a cavalry skirmish in front of the position of St. Christoval, and on the night of the 21st the enemy established a post on the right flank of the allies, from which he was driven by the 7th division. A general so calm and skilful as lord Wellington, having the advantage of the central base for his own movements, was not to be disturbed or forced from his resolve. The baffled Marmont sought to communicate with the forts in vain; and the error which he had committed in shutting up 800 men in such a post was discovered when it was without remedy. On the 26th a supply of shot arrived, and the batteries again commenced their fire with hot shot. The convent of St. Vicente was soon on fire in many places; but the fires were extinguished by the garrison. The howitzer battery continued to fire hot shot throughout the night; and by ten o'clock the next morning the convent of St. Vicente was in flames; and in the gorge of the fort Gayetano there was an open breach. The commandants of these forts hoisted the white flag, but demanded three hours' delay before they surrendered. Lord Wellington limited them to five minutes, at the expiration of which time, no submission being made, the batteries resumed their fire; the storming parties advanced: and the forts were carried at the bayonet's point with very little resistance. Very few of the enemy were slain, but about 700 were made prisoners.

These works were immediately disarmed and destroyed. The guns and all the military stores were given to the Spaniards; among the latter a large supply of clothing was found: for, as has been already observed, Salamanca was the grand depôt of the army of Portugal, and hence the labor and expense which had been bestowed upon its defences.

The siege and capture of these forts cost the allies 36 officers, and 450 men killed and wounded. No sooner did Marmont ascertain the fall of the works, than he withdrew the garrison from Alba de Tormes, and retired upon the Douro. On the 2d of July the cavalry of the allies overtook his rear-guard, near Tordesillas, and drove them across the river in great confusion. Marmont now took up a position on the right bank of the Douro, having his right at Pollos, his left at Simancas on the Pisuerga, and his centre at Tordesillas. The British line stretched from La Seca on its right to Pollos on its left. Head-quarters were established at Rueda; and the Douro flowed between the hostile armies. The position of the French was strong: the right bank of the Douro does for the most part command the passage of

that river. The bridges were secured, and they had fortified posts at Zamora and Toro. Moreover, the bend of the river was in their favor; for it so encircled the position of the allies, that nothing but vigilance and prompt manœuvre could save it from being attacked on one or other of its flanks at a disadvantage.

From the 3d to the 15th of July, the hostile commanders lay watchful but inactive—with the exception of such corresponding movement on the part of the allies as any change of position on the French line demanded. While Marmont remained stationary behind the Douro, he was joined by a large reinforcement of horse, and by the strong division of general Bonnet, which he had summoned from the Asturias. Soon after this, upon the 15th, Marmont having moved a considerable corps down the river, the allied army was marched to its left, and head-quarters transferred from Rueda to La Nava del Rey. On the 16th two divisions of the French crossed the bridge at Toro. Lord Wellington, suspecting this to be merely a demonstration, only moved a part of his force upon Toro, and with the main body took up a strong position on the Guarena, occupying Fuente la Pena and Canizal; while the 4th and light divisions, under general Cole, were posted at Castrejon on the Trabancos; which, like the Guarena, is a stream tributary to the Douro.

On the night of the 16th the two divisions of the enemy recrossed the bridge at Toro, destroyed it, and again effected their junction with Marmont at Tordesillas. Here the whole force, being concentrated, passed the river; and, by a forced march of forty miles, was early on the morning of the 18th in presence of the two British divisions on the Trabancos. By this great exertion the communication of Marmont with Madrid, from whence he expected to be joined by the army of the centre, was perfectly opened, and the two hostile divisions before him were placed in some danger. This advantage the French marshal lost no time in seeking to improve. His cavalry, supported by infantry and artillery, instantly engaged the British horse; who, being outnumbered, soon began to lose ground in a conflict manifestly unequal. In the distance the whole French army was advancing. The situation of the light and 4th divisions was very critical. Already was the enemy menacing their line of retreat and pressing upon both flanks; when Wellington, quickly advancing a support of cavalry and horse-artillery to check the progress of the French, extricated these troops from their difficulty, and directed their retreat upon the heights of Canizal in their rear. This movement was executed with perfect order, and with small loss; although in the presence of an enemy who pursued so closely as to open upon them from forty

pieces of artillery as they passed the Guarena to join the army now embattled on the heights of Canizal.

No sooner was the main body of the French up, and the hostile armies in presence, than Marmont pushed a heavy column across the Guarena to gain a ridge upon the flank of the allies, which would have commanded the Salamanca road, and have turned the British left. This effort was hotly repulsed by the division of general Cole, and by a brilliant charge of cavalry. In this affair a French general and 300 men were made prisoners. During the operations of this day, the allies lost in killed and wounded from 500 to 600 men, and the French must have suffered a considerable, though not perhaps an equal, loss.*

The 19th was wholly passed in manœuvres; Marmont menacing the right of the allies, and moving several divisions to his left. All these movements were immediately observed and met on the part of lord Wellington by others. The whole of the allied army was collected behind the Guarena, and during the night it was disposed in battle order on the plain of Vallesa.

At dawn of day on the 20th the French army was plainly seen marching to its left along the naked heights of the Guarena in perfect order. The allies were on the instant put in motion to their right; and the two armies marched for several hours in an open country where the heights are very inconsiderable, moving in parallel lines within half-cannon-shot of each other, and ready at a word to form the battle front and engage.

A sight more glorious and more solemn, war does not often present. Ninety thousand combatants marched, side by side as it were, without collision, each host admiring the array of its opponents,—all eyes eager in their gaze, and all ears attent for the signal sound of battle.

The head of the enemy's columns, having the advance of the allies, was enabled to cross the Guarena higher up unopposed, and formed on a range of heights which extended on the left flank of the allied force nearly to Salamanca. Wellington merely threw back that flank, without the slightest confusion, and marched in column along the bottom of those heights in a parallel direction to the enemy Upon this line the allied army remained in position for the night; but lord Wellington detached one division of infantry and a brigade of cavalry, to Aldea Lengua on the Tormes, to observe the enemy, who occupied, in great strength, Babila Fuente and Villaruela.

On the morning of the 21st the allied army was again placed upon its old position of St. Christoval. In the afternoon the enemy crossed the Tormes with the greater part of his troops between Alba and Huerta, and moved by his left towards the

* On this day lord Wellington with his staff was closely pressed by a body of French cavalry, and but for the speed of his horse would have been taken

roads leading to Ciudad Rodrigo. In the evening, lord Wellington, leaving the third division and a brigade of Portuguese cavalry at Cabrarizos on the right of the Tormes, passed the river by the bridge of Salamanca and the fords, and placed his troops in a position of which the right was upon one of two rocky and abrupt heights in the midst of the plain, called dos Arapiles, and the left rested on the Tormes below the ford of Santa Martha.

The French occupied the heights of La Pena, and held the village of Calvarasso de Ariba; and their position was favorably covered and concealed by thick wood. Skirmishing began with the dawn, and a strong detachment of the French soon seized the more distant and strongest of the two hills called the Arapiles. The right of the allied position was thus rather open to annoyance; it was therefore extended *en potence* to the heights behind the village of Arapiles, and that hamlet was occupied with light infantry. At the same time the third division and Portuguese cavalry were ordered to cross the Tormes, and posted at Aldea Tejada, as a further support to the right. Both Wellington and Marmont at this moment were masters of their respective lines of communication, and free to accept or decline battle as they chose. The French army of the centre was advancing to join the army of Portugal, and was only three marches distant; and a strong reinforcement of cavalry and artillery from the army of the north was close at hand.

Marmont was already at the head of 47,000 good troops; outnumbering the allies by at least 5000 men. If he was strengthened by the junction of the army of the centre, Wellington's retreat into Portugal would have been a compelled necessity; but the French marshal sought to alarm his opponent by attempting to turn his right, and threatening to interpose a force on the line of his communication with Rodrigo. This movement was made by the marshal upon some heights, about half a mile in front of the British, by the extension of his troops considerably to the left. This manœuvre was performed with great display; with a noisy cannonade, and a cloudy cover of skirmishers thrown out on his front and flank. The extension of this infantry was first observed through his glass by a staff-officer; who, being near lord Wellington, reported what he saw. No sooner did Wellington satisfy himself of the error which Marmont had thus committed, than he uttered an exulting exclamation, and made immediate dispositions for the attack.

Little suspicious of his intentions, the French were engaged in a partial combat with a detachment of guards which held the village of Arapiles, and resisted all efforts to dislodge them.

Suddenly the 3d division under Packenham, supported by two brigades of artillery and several squadrons under D'Urban, moved

upon the enemy's left at a rapid pace; was formed at once across their flank, and, steadily advancing, drove all before them, outflanking them on all points, where they tried to make a stand, and pursuing them from one height to another, till they made above 3000 prisoners. The divisions of Cole and Leith, supported by those of Clinton and Hope, advanced to the attack of their front nearly at the same time, while Pack led a brigade of Portuguese against that one of the two Arapiles which they occupied. Generals Cole and Leith made an immediate impression upon the enemy's front, and drove his troops before them from one height to another. Then bringing forward their right as they advanced, they continually gained strength upon his flank. These divisions were gallantly supported by the cavalry under Sir Stapleton Cotton, who executed a most brilliant charge against a body of the enemy's infantry with complete success. It was here that, charging at the head of his brigade, major-general Le Marchant, a noble officer, was slain.

The very gallant effort of Pack upon the Arapiles failed, and thus the enemy were enabled to throw some troops on the flank of the 4th division; while that body, which had already carried the crests of the heights in its front, was stoutly met and opposed by a reserve division under general Bonnet. General Cole himself was wounded; and the 4th division, thus severely pressed, was compelled to give way: but the check was of little moment; the ground was regained by a brigade of the 5th division in the second line; which by a skilful change of front took the enemy in flank with a heavy fire, and drove them again backwards. This judicious movement was directed by marshal Beresford. The left and centre of the enemy were now beaten, and a brigade from the division of general Clinton carried the Arapiles. But the French right was as yet unbroken: it was strengthened every moment by the troops defeated on the left; and presented a new and stubborn front on a well-chosen position. Marmont had been wounded, but the zeal and firmness of general Clausel, who succeeded to the command in this trying moment, and here rallied the disheartened army, deserves all praise. Lord Wellington's dispositions for the attack of this new position were soon made. He found a formidable artillery posted along its front; large bodies of cavalry on either flank; and the face of the heights was a clear glacis swept by their guns.

The 1st and light divisions, with one brigade of British and one of Portuguese from the 4th, were directed to turn the right, while general Clinton with the 6th division, supported by the 3d and 5th, was ordered to assail it in front. These orders were promptly and heroically obeyed. The 6th division advanced under a storm of bullets from a well-served artillery, and under a heavy fire of musketry. They sustained a heavy loss with ad-

mirable steadiness; and no sooner gained the level of their enemies, than they rushed upon them with the bayonet, and, supported by the movement of the 4th division on the flank, they drove back the French troops in the greatest possible disorder. It was already nearly dark: the allies pursued them in the direction of Huerta, and the fords on the Tormes; but, under cover of the woods and the night, a vast number of fugitives, who would otherwise have swelled the triumph as prisoners, effected their escape.

A field covered with slain and wounded soldiers of both armies, two eagles, eleven pieces of artillery, and 7000 prisoners, attested at once the severity of the contest, and the greatness of the victory. The allies had 5000 killed and wounded. Generals Beresford, Cotton, Cole, Leith, and Alten were among the wounded.

This success, great and glorious as it was, would have been yet fuller in its fruit, had not the Spaniards abandoned the castle of Alba de Tormes, at which point the enemy was enabled to cross the river without delay or resistance. However, the cavalry of the allies came up with the French rear-guard near La Serna the next morning; and general Bock, commanding a brigade of heavy German dragoons, with unhesitating spirit charged three squares of infantry, broke them, sabred very many, and gleaned 900 prisoners. Such of these battalions as were not cut up or taken threw away their arms, scrambled over the fields, and joined the main body of the retiring army. But the enemy was still strong in cavalry, and was joined by a numerous reinforcement in that arm, as also by horse-artillery, two days after the battle. By making forced marches, and being thus covered, they were enabled to effect their retreat to Valladolid without further loss. To this city Wellington pursued them; they retired upon Burgos as he approached. He entered Valladolid on the 30th, but the next day recrossed the Douro; and, fixing his head-quarters at Cuellar, prepared for a movement against the army of the centre. By great exertions supplies were brought up, and he was enabled to march forwards again on the 6th of August. General Clinton's division, and some of the regiments which had suffered the most severely, were left to observe the line of the Douro; while the main body of the army took the route of Segovia and St. Ildefonso to the capital. The intrusive king had already retired upon that point with the army of the centre. Lord Wellington reached St. Ildefonso on the 9th of August. On the two following days his victorious troops, defiling by the passes of Guadarama and Naval Serrada, crossed the mountains, and descended to the plains of New Castile. On the 11th there was an affair of cavalry at Majalonda, between the horse of the army of the centre and a small body of heavy Ger-

man and Portuguese cavalry. The enemy having approached the post of general D'Urban's brigade of Portuguese cavalry, the general led them to charge the advanced squadrons of the French; but the Portuguese were not equal to the encounter. They turned and gave way,—leaving three guns of the horse-artillery to the enemy, and fell back upon the Germans in confusion, by whose gallantry, however, the French were soon checked. The infantry of the allies coming in sight, they now burned the gun-carriages which they had captured, and fell back upon Madrid.

Joseph Buonaparte retired from that city on the night of the 11th, accompanied by marshal Jourdan; and, leaving 2000 men in the fortified post of the Retiro, marched with the rest of his troops upon Aranjuez, and crossed the Tagus for security. Upon the 16th he continued his retreat in the direction of Valencia.

The reception of the allied army and its illustrious commander, by the citizens of Madrid, was of itself a bright reward and a joyous triumph. They came forth to meet their deliverers with those shouts and gestures of admiration and gratitude which mark the enthusiasm and sincerity of that impassioned people.

Lord Wellington rode instantly to reconnoitre the defences of the Retiro. That palace, with the walled and extensive gardens from which it takes its name, stands upon an elevation at the eastern extremity of the city. Upon this site, where are also to be found a museum, a porcelain manufactory, a circus for bull-fights, and a botanical garden, the enemy had formed a spacious retrenched post. It was in fact an extensive citadel, having a triple line of defence, but requiring a large garrison. Wellington directed the exterior *enceinte* to be forced on the following evening. On the morning of the 14th the arrangements for attacking the garrison in its second line of defence being completed, the commandant surrendered. The troops were made prisoners of war; and an arsenal, containing 180 pieces of ordnance, 20,000 stand of arms, and military stores of every description, was delivered into the power of the victors.

On the morning of the 13th don Carlos de España was appointed governor of Madrid, and the new constitution was proclaimed amid the loud vivas of exulting crowds. The entire population poured into the streets and squares; every tongue was loosened; on all sides were heard the accents of joy; laurels and flowers decorated the gay scene. Tapestry and carpets were hung from the balconies; holiday dresses were put on; holiday greetings were given; and the holiday smiles of men, women, and children repaid the army for all its toils. But Wellington was more especially the object of their praise and honor: wherever he appeared, cries rent the air of "Long live the duke of Ciudad Rodrigo!"—"Long live Wellington!"

Green boughs, and flowers, and shawls, were strewn before his horse's feet. Here it should be recorded, that when, upon the 22d of August, the new council waited upon him with all the ceremonies of state to offer to him a congratulatory address as duke of Ciudad Rodrigo, conceived in those glowing terms which are fitting towards a deliverer, Wellington replied with simple dignity, and unaffected modesty; nor did he notice in his reply their proud and swelling enumeration of his great successes, further than by one line: "The events of war are in the hands of Providence." In this spirit he looked back upon his past achievements; in this spirit he contemplated the severe trials and arduous duties which coming events might yet impose on him.

CHAP. IX.

THE POSITION OF THE ALLIES.—LORD WELLINGTON MARCHES NORTH, AND BESIEGES BURGOS.—THE FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH, SOUTH, AND CENTRE COMBINE THEIR MOVEMENTS.—LORD WELLINGTON WITHDRAWS THE ALLIES FROM MADRID, BREAKS UP FROM BEFORE BURGOS, AND CONCENTRATES HIS ARMY UPON THE TORMES.—IS FOLLOWED BY THE ENEMY'S UNITED FORCE.—RETIRES INTO PORTUGAL.—TAKES UP WINTER CANTONMENTS.—VISITS CADIZ AND LISBON.—RETURNS TO THE ARMY.

THE objects of lord Wellington's advance upon Madrid were only in part attained. The supports, upon which he had hopefully reckoned, failed him. The expedition from Sicily did not reach the eastern coast of Spain till Suchet had beaten and dispersed the armies of Catalonia and Valencia.

With a weak division of 6000 men, a great part of them foreigners, general Maitland could not in prudence then attempt any descent in Catalonia; but, learning that the army of O'Donnel had been defeated at Castella, and driven into Murcia, he sailed to Alicante, landed his troops, and preserved that fortress from the fate to which it was thus exposed. Suchet and Joseph Buonaparte were now free to unite their forces in Valencia, and Soult was in motion to combine his operations with theirs. All the Spanish forces in the south were at this time under Ballasteros; but with a low and petulant pride, that vain and jealous Spaniard refused to acknowledge lord Wellington as commander-in-chief of the allies, or to obey his orders: therefore he made no attempt to impede the movements of Soult, although the importance of such effort was obvious, and he had been commanded to make it. We anticipate:—marshal Soult had advanced in the month of June against Sir Rowland Hill, at the head of 25,000 men; but the firm countenance and judicious dispositions of Sir Rowland forbade him to risk a

second battle on the field of Albuera, and upon the 23d of that month he had again retired on Seville.

During these operations in Estremadura, an affair of cavalry occurred on the 11th of June, in which a brigade of British, under general Slade, having pursued some slight advantage too far, fell in with a heavy body of the enemy's horse in reserve, and was briskly driven back, with a loss of more than 150 sabred or taken.

One of the first effects of the victory at Salamanca was to free the kingdom of Andalusia from the grasp of Soult. He immediately directed the castle of Niebla to be blown up, and that district to be evacuated. At the same time he put Seville so far in a state of defence as to cover his march when he should retire.

Upon the fall of Madrid, he raised the blockade of Cadiz. Here the French abandoned their lines with such haste, that they could not destroy the half of their stores. Thirty gun-boats and 500 pieces of cannon, many of them uninjured, were taken by the Spanish troops. Soult then concentrated the army of Andalusia in Granada, leaving eight battalions in Seville, where the Cartuxa was occupied as a citadel, that he might hold that important city till the necessity of finally retiring from the south of Spain was forced upon him.

The French force from the lines before Cadiz marched therefore upon Seville, when they broke up the blockade, and were astonished as they approached that city to find it in possession of the allies. Concluding that Sir Rowland Hill had taken the place, they hastily turned upon Carmona, and took the route of Granada. But the troops in Seville were a strong detachment of Spaniards under general Cruz-Morgeon, and a British regiment under colonel Skerret. This small force was sent from Cadiz—landed in the Guadalquivir—and making a rapid march by San Lucar, suddenly seized the suburb Triana on the morning of the 27th of August. The French in Seville immediately attempted to destroy the bridge between the suburb and the city; but the inhabitants loudly hailing the allies, soon made a passage for them by laying planks across the part which the enemy had broken down. The advanced guard crossed instantly, and made 200 prisoners in the town. Sir Rowland Hill had already been summoned from Estremadura; and, by the close of August, he occupied Toledo, Yepez, and Aranjuez; thus covering the right of the main army, and guarding all the roads which led from the south of Spain to Madrid. The situation of Wellington in the capital was now difficult in the extreme: his expectations were disappointed; his projects, for a time, at least, defeated; and it became evident that the deliverance of Spain must yet, for another season of patience and perseverance, be

delayed. The military chest was empty, and a few thousand dollars only could be raised. The citizens of Madrid were not wanting in the spirit of generous devotion, but they were poor. The invader had left them little to bestow upon their allies beyond the ration of the passing day, and the word of blessing and good will. The unexceptionable securities offered by the British general produced a sum so scanty as was totally inadequate to the pressing wants of the army.

At this time the cortez were wholly occupied with their new constitution. In the liberated districts no military system had been adopted. The regency, indeed, had decreed the raising of 50,000 men to reinforce the Spanish army; but these were to be obtained by voluntary enlistment, and according to fixed proportions, in each province throughout all Spain.

Cadiz, Carthagena, and Alicante were, at this very moment, garrisoned principally by the allies; and upon the allies, in fact, the whole weight of the war was now imposed.

Independent of the corps of Soult in Granada, nearly 100,000 French troops might yet be brought to bear upon the army of Wellington. From all sides Madrid was menaced. General Clausel, with the army lately under Marmont, had again advanced to the Douro, had driven back the Spanish army of Gallicia,—the most efficient yet remaining together,—and had liberated the French garrisons of Zamora and Toro.

Thus, becoming alarmed for his communications with Portugal, and desirous to open others with the northern coast of Spain, by which he might be more easily supplied from England with such reinforcements and succors as could be spared to him, lord Wellington decided to march in person against Clausel.

He quitted Madrid on the 1st of September, leaving behind him the two divisions most in need of repose. Sir Rowland Hill was directed to take post on the Jarama, and cover Madrid on that side. Should Soult march direct upon the capital, Ballasteros was requested to join Hill; should he move towards Valencia, the Spanish general was desired to take post at Alcazar, and, acting upon his communications, to prevent his junction with the army of the centre; to these arrangements Ballasteros paid no attention.

Lord Wellington passed the Douro on the 6th of September, at the head of four divisions of the allied army, drove the French from Valladolid, and pursued them by Duenas beyond Valencia. Here he was joined by the Spanish army of Gallicia,—a body of 12,000 men, in very indifferent order.

As the allies advanced, the French retired. Upon the 17th, Clausel, for the first time, showed his force in position near Burgos. He had about 22,000 men in the field, but retired the same day, and was joined by 9000 infantry, from the army of

the north, under Souham. That general assumed the command of the whole, and retired to a position near Briviesca. The allies passed Burgos on the 19th; 12,000 men invested the castle, in which the enemy had left a garrison of from 2000 to 3000 men; the remainder advanced to cover the operations of the siege; and head-quarters were fixed at Villatoro.

The besieging force was composed of the 1st and 6th divisions of infantry, under generals Campbell and Clinton, and of the Portuguese brigades of Pack and Bradford.

The castle of Burgos stands upon an oblong, conical, rocky hill; and the defences, as improved most ingeniously by the French, consisted of three lines. The outer line was an old escarp wall, of difficult access, running round the lower part of the hill. This wall they had modernized with a shot-proof parapet; and had contrived flanks at the salient and re-entering points. The second line was a strong field-retrenchment, armed with cannon. The third was similar to the second; and, upon the very summit, an ancient keep had been converted into a heavy casemated battery, and crowned these formidable defences.

The castle of Burgos was a post very important to the enemy; and Wellington decided, therefore, to attempt its reduction with such means, feeble as they were, which he could command.

At 300 yards' distance from the upper works of the castle, and upon a level with them, but separated by a deep ravine, is a hill, called St. Michael. Here the enemy had a large hornwork. Upon this hill it was resolved to make a lodgment: from hence to batter the lines; and to attempt each by assault successively, when the line preceding was safely secured. This plan, from the very small artillery means at the disposal of the allies, gave the best promise of success;—for the park only consisted of three 18-pounder guns, and five 24-pounder iron howitzers.

On the evening of the 19th of September, the hornwork was assaulted and carried. The storming parties lost nearly 400 killed and wounded. Upon this occasion, the conduct and exertions of major the honorable W. Cocks were conspicuously gallant.

Batteries were now erected;—and, on the night of the 22d, an effort was made to carry the outer or escarp wall by escalade. Midnight was the hour chosen for the enterprise. The ladders were reared, and the storming party forced up the wall most gallantly; but as soon as the leading men gained a momentary footing on the parapet, they were bayoneted down. The attempts were bravely and often repeated with no better success. The garrison mounted on the parapet, and not only fired on the assailants with small-arms, but threw down heavy shot, and also combustibles, which caused the men's pouches to explode; they

were at last drawn off, leaving half their numbers killed and wounded; among the former was major Laurie of the 79th.

An attempt was afterwards made to breach the wall. Of three guns in battery, two were soon disabled by the more weighty fire of the castle.

Recourse was now had to the sap and the mine. The former, when pushed near the place, was so exposed, owing to the lofty site of the enemy's defences, and was so destructive to the besiegers, that it was discontinued. However, a gallery was successfully carried under the outer wall; and, on the night of the 29th of September, a breach was formed by the explosion of a mine. Arrangements had been made for storming as soon as the mine should be sprung. A serjeant and four men in advance of the storming party actually mounted the breach; but the division which should have followed them missed its way, and as the breach was but narrow, returned from the wall under the impression that none had been made. The French, who had been at first surprised, seeing the men on the breach without support, charged and drove them down; and these brave soldiers, three of them being wounded, regained their division. Before daylight the garrison had made this breach impracticable. Another breach was formed on the afternoon of the 4th of October. As soon as ever the mine exploded, the 24th regiment rushed up and effected a lodgment. Captain Hedderwick commanded this battalion, and lieutenants Holmes and Frazer led the assault with the greatest regularity and spirit: before the dust of the explosion had subsided, they were in contact with the besieged. About 200 men were killed and wounded in this affair; among the latter, lieutenant-colonel Jones of the engineers.

On the afternoon of the 5th, 300 French voltigeurs sallied furiously upon this post; gained possession, and held it long enough to upset the gabions and destroy the lodgment. In this sortie the allies lost more than 150 killed and wounded. As soon as it was dark, this damage was repaired; and the besiegers began the formation of a parallel along the glacis of the second line. This was, at last, pushed within ten yards of the enemy's line; but the work was attended with great danger, and very many of the laborers were slain. The garrison kept up a constant fire of musketry, and rolled large shells down the steep glacis. At this period of the attack only one piece of siege artillery remained serviceable.

Upon the night of the 8th, the garrison made another fierce sally, and gained possession of the trenches. They maintained themselves long enough to destroy all the latest work, and to carry off the tools. In this sortie above 200 of the besiegers were killed and wounded. Among the former was the honorable

major W. Cocks, commanding the 79th. This officer, already well known to the army as one of the most zealous and intelligent captains that ever led a squadron of British cavalry, here closed his brief but distinguished career.

An opening was at last made in the second line by the battery of howitzers; and upon the 18th of October the assault was again given by detachments of the guards and the German legion. The assailants carried the breach in the most gallant style. Some of the men even pushed forwards into the upper line. The successful assailants, however, were soon attacked in turn: very superior numbers were brought to bear upon them, and they were driven back through the breach with a severe loss. Major Wurmb, the commander, fell, and nearly all the officers were killed or wounded. The storming party of the guards had been directed against the breach first formed on the 29th of September. They advanced with ladders through this to a part of the second line, and gained the summit of the parapet with great gallantry and good order; but, when formed in their position, they were soon assaulted by overpowering numbers, and forced back. This was the last serious effort of a siege of thirty days. The casualties of the besiegers during this arduous service exceeded 2000; and the loss of the besieged must of necessity have been considerable. The attack was persevered in by the allies with a boldness, intrepidity, and skill, highly honorable to the officers and troops employed. The siege failed solely for want of the necessary means of attack. Even with such means as were applied, the resolute efforts of the British might have forced success against an enemy less steady, courageous, and able, than general Du Breton and his garrison. With proper engineer and artillery means, the castle of Burgos must have fallen, and that in a siege not occupying one third of the time, nor attended with one third of the loss of this tedious but unsuccessful attack.

Nevertheless the capture of Burgos was an object of so great importance, that the attempt made was necessary; and that which lord Wellington resolved to undertake at all, if firmness, patience, and perseverance, could have commanded fortune, he would have succeeded in accomplishing.

Lord Wellington's personal superintendence of all the operations of this arduous siege was constant and vigilant. The arrangements for every assault were written with his own hand as he sat upon the ground observing the point of attack; and he was so much and so often exposed to fire, that his escape is remarkable. On the night of the 29th of September, he was in such imminent personal danger on his return from a close observation of the attack, that a field which he had to cross was literally plowed up by grape and musketry as he passed down.

In consequence of the menacing movements of the French general, on the 18th of October most of the besieging corps joined the covering army; and upon the 20th lord Wellington and his staff moved to the front. On the evening of this day, the French drove in the outposts of the allies; but the ground was immediately recovered by a movement of two divisions, under Sir Edward Paget, which lord Wellington directed in person.

On the night of the 21st of October the siege was raised, a measure which the combined movements of the armies of the south and centre, under Soult and the intrusive king, now compelled lord Wellington to adopt. Immediately in his front was an army considerably reinforced of late, and having a superiority in horse so great, that the allied cavalry bore no proportion to it in numbers. The commencement of this retreat was a most dangerous and difficult operation; for not only was it to be performed in the presence of a superior army, but the castle of Burgos commanded the high road and the bridges on the Arlanzon, and the lateral roads were deep in mud. Nevertheless lord Wellington, in one night, threw his whole army, his stores, and his baggage, on the other side of Burgos; and such were the good order and admirable boldness of his movements, that the first division filed over two bridges within close musket-shot of the fort, in a moonlight night, without losing a man. Some other of the troops suffered a little from the first discharges of artillery, which the enemy, when alarmed, directed on the bridge; but so uncertain is the fire of artillery by night, that the range and directions of the guns were soon lost, and the casualties were few. So complete was the success of this bold manœuvre, that Wellington thus gained a march upon the enemy, who did not overtake him in strength, till noon on the 23d, when the French cavalry pressed his rear-guard closely. The British horse twice charged and checked them a little; but as they brought up fresh squadrons every moment, the allied cavalry was obliged to give way, and fell back in some haste and confusion on the German light infantry under colonel Halkett. That officer threw his men into squares and gallantly repulsed them. The same day the army crossed the Pisuerga; and on the evening of the 24th the whole was in position behind the Carrion, the left at Villa Muriel, the right at Duenas. Here lord Wellington was reinforced by a brigade of guards under lord Dalhousie, which had been disembarked at Corunna. The army halted on the 25th. The bridges over the Carrion at Valencia, Villa Muriel, and Duenas, and that on the Pisuerga at Tariejo, were ordered to be mined. Those at Villa Muriel and Duenas were successfully destroyed; but those at Palencia were seized by the enemy before any injury was done; and the mine

at Tariejo not being fully prepared was prematurely fired and failed, the bridge remaining passable. The covering parties at Palencia and Tariejo were overpowered, and that at the latter post was taken by the enemy's cavalry, who crossed the bridge in force and cut them off. The enemy then pushed a corps across the Pisuerga. Lord Wellington instantly sent a column and drove them back. Upon the left of the allies they crossed the Carrion by a ford at Villa Muriel, and took possession of a village on that flank. The Spaniards were ordered to dislodge them; but the French repulsed the Spanish troops. They were, however, immediately rallied, and led on again by general Alava, an officer whose heroic example was never wanting in any difficulty; but he was wounded; and until they were led by the Brunswick Oel's corps, they made no impression on the enemy, and could not force them from the village: when attacked by the Germans, the French immediately evacuated the post; and, as the fifth division of the allies advanced, such columns of the enemy as had crossed the river, withdrew and returned to the other bank. On the 26th the army continued its retreat, and crossed the Pisuerga at Cabezon. Here, upon the 27th, the French made an attempt to gain possession of the bridge, but it was defeated. On the morning of the 28th they tried to pass the river at Simancas, but the bridge was destroyed. On the evening of the same day they entered Tordesillas, but found that bridge also already destroyed.

From the heights above Valladolid they cannonaded the high road on the opposite bank, on which the baggage of the allies was in march, but with little effect. Lord Wellington retired from Cabezon on the 29th, destroying the bridges there and at Valladolid. He this day passed the whole army across the Douro at Tudela and at the Puente del Douro. The bridges were immediately mined and blown up: in like manner that at Quintanilla, and also those of Toro and Zamora, were destroyed. The French observing that there was only a small guard at the south end of the destroyed bridge at Tordesillas, caused a chosen party of volunteers to swim over in the night and attack it. Thus they dislodged the Germans, and immediately proceeded to repair the bridge. Therefore lord Wellington took up ground in front, placed his army in battle position, and there remained till November the 6th. The bridge at Toro, as well as that at Tordesillas, being now repaired, he fell back to Torrecilla de la Orden on the 7th; and upon the 8th took up his old position of St. Christoval in front of Salamanca. The same day Sir Rowland Hill, who had been in communication with lord Wellington on the 3d, and had effected his junction on the 5th, crossed the Tormes, leaving in the town of Alba de Tormes a corps of British and a division of Portuguese. General Hill had broken up

from the Jarama on the 30th of August, and had retired leisurely before Soult and Joseph Buonaparte, bringing away with him the garrison of Madrid.

The French armies of the north, south, and centre were united upon the right bank of the Tormes on the 10th of November. Their combined forces amounted to near 90,000 combatants, counting 12,000 good cavalry, and 200 pieces of artillery. The allied army did not exceed 48,000 infantry, and 5000 horse. On the 10th the enemy attacked the town and castle of Alba with infantry and cannon; but they made no serious impression, and confined the attack chiefly to a cannonade. On the 14th they crossed the Tormes at the fords of Lucinas, considerably above Alba, and took post on the wooded heights of Mozarbes. The same evening there was a little skirmishing and cannonading; the two armies were in presence, and large bodies of cavalry were shown by the enemy on the plain in front of Mozarbes. On the morning of the 15th, lord Wellington placed his army in battle order near the Arapiles, a field which he had already made famous in history by his glorious victory at Salamanca. Soult, who commanded in chief, would not avail himself of the opportunity thus afforded him of bringing the allies to action; but, manœuvred on their right, and, by threatening their communications with Ciudad Rodrigo, compelled lord Wellington, who dared not, under such manifest disadvantages, assume the offensive, to retire.

The allied army was immediately put in motion; and, marching to its right, gained the roads leading to Portugal in compact and perfect order. These movements were seasonably masked by rain, which fell in torrents, and they were therefore completed without any loss. The French followed the line of retreat with a strong advanced guard, but they never pushed the allies with earnestness or vigor. They overtook and cannonaded the right column on the 17th, as it passed the Huerba; and the cavalry, on this and the preceding day, had some few skirmishes with their horse.

On the 17th, Sir Edward Paget, who commanded three divisions, was taken prisoner on the road, in an interval between two of them. A few Polish horse had been pushed forwards through the wood upon the scout; and, coming down upon the road suddenly, where he rode attended only by his orderly and one officer, they fell upon the unsupported group, and carried him off.

The sufferings of the army on this retreat were severe, and the loss considerable. It rained with little intermission: the roads were deep and miry, and some of the rivers to be forded were breast-high. The ground in the bivouacs was soaked; and such fires as the men contrived to make, were smoky and cheer-

less. Many of the divisions had neither bread, biscuit, nor flour; and the men had only a ration of lean, over-driven beef, heated upon smoking ashes, and devoured half raw.

On the 18th, head-quarters reached Ciudad Rodrigo; and on the 20th, the main body of the army crossed the frontier of Portugal, or halted in the villages on the Agueda, while the corps of Sir Rowland Hill was distributed in the mountain hamlets south of the Sierra de Francia.

As soon as it was ascertained that the French armies had retired from the Tormes, the corps of Hill marched by the Sierra de Gata to the province of Coria, placing a post in the pass of Bejar, and at Baños; while the divisions of the main army were thrown back into comfortable and convenient cantonments in Beira, the left resting at Lamego upon the Douro.

During this retreat from the neighborhood of Burgos on the one side, and from Madrid on the other, many irregularities were committed by the allied troops; although certainly those in the army retiring from Madrid bore no proportion to the excesses of the troops coming from Burgos, till they reached the Tormes: nor is this surprising. The troops under Hill had not sustained the same fatigues, or endured the same disappointments, as the soldiers returning from the north.

From the Tormes, however, to the Agueda, there was a great deal of misconduct in all divisions of the army, owing to the want of provisions, and the badness of the weather. The violence of those who found food, led to marauding, and the indifference and exhaustion of those who met with nothing which tempted them to exertion, to lagging behind. Large droves of swine are fed in the open and extensive woods which the army traversed: many of the men, quitting their lines after they were halted for the night, hunted and shot these animals for food. The more indolent and weak sunk passively from inanition on the line of march, and, as there were no means of transport to preserve them, fell into the hands of their pursuers.

Upon the arrival of the army in quarters, lord Wellington addressed a letter to the commanders of brigades and regiments, censuring them, their officers, and their men, with extreme severity. These bitter reproaches were hastily made, and they were received by the army in general with vexation, and by some of the oldest and best disciplined regiments with a momentary feeling of resentment; for there were many corps that maintained their discipline perfectly, and whose losses were trifling, and clearly accounted for. But when they considered all the difficulties, disappointments, and vexations of that leader who had so ably and so often guided them to victory, they forgot their mortification, and promised themselves the noble revenge

of achieving, under his auspicious guidance, yet brighter triumphs in the next campaign, than those already won.

One of the objects for which lord Wellington had advanced to Madrid had been attained most fully. The south of Spain was evacuated. The reasonable expectations of the British commander, as to other objects, were disappointed. How they were disappointed has been told; on no side did he find co-operation. The British ministry had been tardy with their support; nor, when it came, was it large or efficient. The military means of Spain were feeble; and where they presented the promise of good and important service, the inability or the obstinate jealousy of the individuals in command of them frustrated the designs, and forbade the confidence, of a general who had to contend with French armies, mustering, whenever they chose to combine, nearly double the strength of the British and Portuguese forces. Yet, in the face of all these disadvantages, lord Wellington, in one year, wrested from them two fortresses, won a pitched battle, penetrated to the capital, drove away the intrusive king for a season, liberated Andalusia from his power, and shook the throne on which he sate.

For these services he had been created Marquis by the prince regent, who estimated his achievements with a princely mind, and rewarded them with a princely hand. To enable the marquis of Wellington to support this dignity, parliament unanimously voted a grant of 100,000*l*. to purchase land. But the conqueror of July was, in November, compelled, by circumstances beyond his control, once more to seek the friendly and defensive positions of Portugal.

The failure before Burgos was no surprise to lord Wellington; he had ventured a siege, and that justifiably, with small means: and he attributed in part to that circumstance, and in part to the ability and gallantry of the governor and his garrison, the defeat of his attempt. When the extensive combinations of the French marshals caused him to break up from before Burgos and retire, the skill of his movements, the firmness of his countenance, his short marches, his frequent halts, evinced the course he was pursuing to be that which he knew was necessary, and to which he calmly and deliberately yielded from a conviction of its wisdom.

That party, however, in England, to which the successes of Wellington and the glory of the British arms gave no pleasure, hailed the retreat from Burgos as a help to their faction. The people of England, easily elated by good news, and soon depressed by bad—too sanguine and extravagant in their hopes, and too deeply dejected by whatever may disappoint them—listened eagerly to the noisy clamors, crude opinions, and base sentiments of the violent opponents of the war, and were, for a

time, abused into the belief that Wellington was rash and incapable; that the Spaniards were indifferent to their fate; that the name of Englishman was hateful to their ears; and that the final issue of the contest would assuredly be disastrous. Nevertheless, in parliament, those voices prevailed which, in the true English spirit, resolved to abide that issue; and when the people recovered from the delusion into which the language of the opposition betrayed them, they were not only satisfied but eager that England should put forth all her strength. Therefore reinforcements of every description, but especially of cavalry, of which there had been ever a deficiency, were now sent to the Peninsula. Lord Wellington most busily employed his winter season. He gave his best attention to the organization and equipment of his army. He directed that the large iron camp kettles should be no longer used; and that the mules which had hitherto carried them, should henceforth be appropriated to the conveyance of three tents a company. Thus the men off duty would always be provided with some cover in the field, which would save many casualties from sickness. Moreover, expedition in preparing their food, as well as real comfort, was gained, by issuing to the men small kettles, and dividing the companies into small messes. These changes were very great improvements, promoting comfort and health in a manner not before thought upon, and necessarily tending to keep the army efficient in the field. This winter, also, a pontoon train was prepared to accompany the line of march in the next campaign. While these arrangements were in progress, the marquis of Wellington went to Cadiz to communicate in person with the Spanish government. He was received with all that admiration and confidence which his character and exploits had already obtained for him. He was, in the first instance, waited upon by a deputation from the cortez: when, afterwards, he was solemnly introduced into the hall of the cortez in the Spanish uniform, the acclamations were loud and honest; and as he replied to the address made him in the Spanish language, their joy and satisfaction was again warmly manifested. His stay at Cadiz was short; but his visit had a most admirable effect in promoting the good understanding and cordial union between himself and the Spanish executive, so essential to the triumph of the great and common cause. They conferred on him the rank and authority of generalissimo of the Spanish forces, and they arranged that he should have the active co-operation of 50,000 Spanish troops in the next campaign.

Lord Wellington returned to the army by the way of Lisbon. His reception here was most honorable and distinguished. As he rode through the streets, expressions of enthusiasm, gratitude, and praise burst out from the applauding voices of the innumer-

able spectators who crowded upon his path. The city was illuminated for three nights. He was received by the lords and regent of the kingdom, in the palace of government, with the highest honors. He was feasted in the palace during his stay; and, when he appeared in the large theatre of San Carlos, which was crowded to the roof, the thunders of applause, and the rapturous acclamations of a delivered and exalted nation, knew no bounds. He had driven the invader from their gates: he had led the husbands and brothers and sons of Portugal to battle and to victory. It was about this period that the prince regent of Portugal conferred on him the rank of duke, with the title of Vittoria,—a remarkable coincidence; a prophetic announcement of that signal triumph which was yet to come.

It may here be noticed, that from the beginning of the war in the Peninsula, though the marquis of Wellington received from the governments of Portugal and Spain all honorary distinctions which they bestowed; with a becoming pride, yet with the disinterestedness of a noble nature, he declined the emoluments attached to those dignities; leaving thus untouched, incomes that would have arisen from various sources to the sum of 17,000 dollars a year.

Such was the conduct of a British general, whose pay as commander of the forces did not defray his expenses, who had a family to be maintained in England; and, until the parliament had voted him the income, and the grant to enable him to support the dignities of earl and marquis, was certainly not the richer for having served. At all times, lord Wellington spent large sums in charity; and during the invasion of Portugal, in 1810, especially in the winter of that year, he distributed a great deal of money from his private purse to relieve the distress and necessity around him.

It gave great pleasure to the army to see such a man appointed (as he was in January, 1813) colonel of the royal horse guards—the Blues—an honor well bestowed, and which added largely to his income.

This appointment gratified lord Wellington more than any dignity yet bestowed on him; and he did not expect it. He had no time to attend to his own affairs, and he made it a rule to ask for nothing; considering, with a due self-reverence, that while he was serving the country to the best of his ability, whatever it was expedient or proper he should receive, would be given freely. Nevertheless, so far was he from making a high and vain estimate of his services and claims, that, when he announced his appointment at his own table, he exclaimed with the liveliest joy—"I am the luckiest fellow in the world; I must have been born under some extraordinary planet."

CHAP. X.

ASPECT OF AFFAIRS IN THE SPRING OF 1813.—LORD WELLINGTON OPENS THE CAMPAIGN IN MAY—ADVANCES—TURNS THE LINE OF THE DOURO —TURNS THE LINE OF THE EBRO—BRINGS THE ENEMY TO BATTLE AT VITTORIA—DEFEATS THEM—DRIVES THEM OUT OF SPAIN—ENCAMPS UPON THE PYRENEES.

THE implacable hostility of Napoleon to England was the cause of his rupture with the emperor Alexander in 1812. It was to exclude the commerce of England from the whole continent of Europe, that this man, blinded by a spirit of tyranny and ambition, led 400,000 soldiers into the very heart of Russia. For this object he carried war and desolation 300 leagues beyond the Vistula, and planted his eagles on the towers of Moscow. But the stern and patriotic devotion of the Russ suffered him only to possess the ruins of that ancient capital. As he entered, flames, kindled by Russian hands, burst out on all sides; and he found himself the baffled master of a silent and abandoned city, amid the ruins of which he for a time sullenly reposed. He had won, indeed, a victory; but had grasped a shadow. He was without magazines; without reserves; unable to advance further; unwilling to retrace his steps. He lingered so long before he retired that winter broke in all its gloomy terrors upon his march, and his army was overtaken by a tremendous vengeance. The vast majority of his gallant troops perished miserably in the snow. Numbers were slain and many taken by their hardy pursuers. Napoleon himself, with a single attendant, fled in a sledge to Poland. A weak and wretched band of fugitives, the small wreck of one of the largest and finest armies ever arrayed for conquest, was the only body that reached the line of the Elbe. Here, supported by reserves drawn from every quarter hastily, they at last rallied, and the pursuit was stayed. Russia seized the opportunity to throw off the yoke of Buonaparte:—and all the strength he could yet collect was wanted for his struggle in Germany. Under these circumstances, Soult with a considerable body of troops had been summoned from Spain. Nevertheless 150,000 Frenchmen were still dispersed over her provinces; of which a force of no less than 70,000 men were disposable to take the field in the spring of 1813, and to maintain itself against the efforts of the allies. But the united strength of the Peninsula was now placed in the hands of lord Wellington. And the deliverance of Spain was near. While the allied army remained in cantonments, no hostile movement of importance occurred. The British post at Bejar, in the mountains of that name, was suddenly assailed in February, by a French column under general

Foy; but the garrison got notice of his approach, and he was immediately and vigorously repulsed. After this the tranquillity of the cantonments was never for one moment disturbed, till, in the month of May, the campaign of 1813 was opened by lord Wellington. The Anglo-Portuguese army now consisted of 65,000 infantry, and 6500 cavalry. A division of Spaniards under Murillo had lain in Estremadura. The army of Gallicia, under Giron, occupied the frontier of that province. A force was organized in Andalusia under O'Donnel, as an army of reserve. The duke del Parque commanded a corps of Spaniards in La Mancha; and general Elio observed the frontiers of Murcia and Valencia with another. The French armies of the centre and the south occupied Madrid and Toledo, and were distributed over Castile and the central provinces, for the convenience of subsisting them. The army of Portugal had its head-quarters at Valladolid; and the line of the Douro was strengthened and guarded with the utmost care. Two divisions of the army of the north were in the provinces of Aragon and Biscay; and Suchet held Catalonia and Valencia with an army of more than 35,000 men.

The troops which had accompanied Soult to Germany only amounted to 20,000; and the armies of Portugal, the centre, and the south, could still bring 70,000 men into the field. These corps were collected to oppose the allies; and they were placed under the immediate command of Joseph, with marshal Jourdan for his major-general. Lord Wellington opened the campaign with a grand movement. Having secretly prepared at different points, between Lamego and the frontier, the means of transport, he threw five divisions of infantry and two brigades of cavalry across the Douro; and directed Sir Thomas Graham to conduct them through the province of Tras os Montes upon Zamora. Lord Wellington himself led two divisions of infantry, a corps of Spaniards, and a body of cavalry, upon Salamanca; while Sir Rowland Hill brought his corps by the mountains from upper Estremadura, descended upon the Tormes above Alba, and advanced also to the same point. The centre and right of the army were here united on the 25th of May. The French detachment in Salamanca, consisting of 400 cavalry and 3000 infantry, retired before the allies; and, being cannonaded, and close pressed by the cavalry and horse-artillery, lost about 200 men in killed and wounded, and as many taken. The troops advanced about sixteen miles; and here the right wing of the army was halted between the Douro and the Tormes; while the left, under Graham, was gaining the enemy's right by Miranda and Carvajales. Tras os Montes is a wild mountainous country, most difficult for an army to traverse. The roads are bad and narrow; the ravines of great depth; and

the ascents from some of the rivers so steep, that, without the aid of drag-ropes, and strong fatigue parties, it is impossible to draw up the artillery.

By good arrangements, great exertions, and, above all, by hearty good-will, these difficulties were overcome. Sir Thomas Graham reached the frontier on the appointed day, and established his communication with the army of Gallicia. The French retired from the banks of the Esla as soon as Graham appeared in their front. He passed the Esla by a pontoon bridge on the 31st of May, and advanced towards Zamora. Thus was the formidable line of the Douro turned, and the defensive works of the enemy rendered at once useless. They immediately destroyed the bridges at Zamora and Toro, abandoned those posts in haste, and retired upon Morales. Near this place, the hussar brigade under colonel Grant overtook their rear-guard of cavalry, and immediately charged and overthrew it. The enemy had several slain; and being pursued, lost near 200 prisoners. The same evening a French piquet at Castronuño was surprised and taken by the Spaniards of don Julian, the guerilla. The bridge of Toro being restored, the corps of Hill crossed the river, and the whole of the allied army was united on the right bank of the Douro on the 3d of June.

These brilliant and rapid movements of lord Wellington astonished and alarmed the enemy. The passage of the Douro within the frontier of Portugal, and the flank march through Tras os Montes, were operations not deemed practicable, and never even suspected. The army at Madrid abandoned that capital instantly, and, marching swiftly, passed the river at Puente de Douro, and joined the army of Portugal.

On the 4th of June, lord Wellington, by marching to Ampuida, on the north of Valladolid, compelled the French to evacuate that city, and retire behind the Carrion. On the 7th, the allies crossed that river at Valencia, and the French withdrew behind the Hormaza. Lord Wellington still continued to manœuvre to his left; crossed the Pisuerga in force, and, menacing the enemy's line of communication, forced them to retire on Burgos, where they assembled all their forces, leaving a strong corps upon the heights above the village of Hormaza under count Reile. Upon the 12th of June, lord Wellington made a strong reconnoissance with the corps of Sir Rowland Hill and all the cavalry; and dislodging this body, drove it back upon the main body. At an early hour on the following morning, the castle of Burgos was destroyed by exploding the defences; and the French army, abandoning Burgos, was already in full march for Miranda, placing a garrison in the lofty and strong castle of Pancorbo, which commands and bars the great road to Navarre.

Thus, by a succession of the most able movements, the enemy

were driven behind the Ebro, without having been permitted to retain, for a day, one of the many fine and defensible positions which are to be found upon that long route; for so long a period their main and well secured communication with the north, and with Bayonne. While the French staff, on their part, were wondering that lord Wellington did not appear in pursuit on the great route, he was secretly and rapidly executing one of those brilliant manœuvres, by which this memorable march from the frontiers of Portugal to those of France was distinguished.

Aware of the difficulty of the Pancorbo pass, and of the strong and well-nigh impregnable positions on the Ebro, to which the enemy was retired, he declined the attempt of forcing the passage of that river in the face of so powerful an army. He now struck suddenly to his left, and conducted his whole force by a route very unfrequented, and thought hitherto impracticable for carriages, to the bridges of San Martin, Rocamude, and Puente de Arenas, near the sources of the Ebro. By these bridges the whole army, with its guns and wheel carriages, passed the river without seeing an enemy, on the 14th and 15th. Here, as in Tras os Montes, it was only by unequalled exertions that the march was effected; for the narrow roads wind through low and secluded valleys, and among steep and rugged mountains, where an army had never passed in the memory of the inhabitants.

On the 16th, the allies moved to their right through a strong and defensible country, without any opposition. It was not till the 18th that the light division came suddenly upon two French brigades on the march to Vittoria. These troops were immediately attacked by the British, and lost near 300 men. This same evening, for the first time, the French head-quarters were apprized that the allied army had passed the Ebro, and were in full march upon their flank. The French staff were confounded with astonishment; and the enemy made a forced march to their rear, by night, in great confusion and alarm.

On the day on which the light division was engaged near St. Millan, a French corps of observation, suddenly assembled at Espejo, attacked the first and fifth divisions, under Sir Thomas Graham, at Osma, but they were driven back to Espejo. From hence they marched instantly, and took up a strong position behind the river Bayas; having their right at Subijana, and their left on the heights in front of Pobes. Lord Wellington, attacking this position in front and on the left, with two divisions on the 19th, turned the enemy out of it, and drove them back upon the main body of their army. On the night of the 19th, Joseph concentrated all his forces at Vittoria, and placed them in a battle position. During the 20th, lord Wellington closed up his

rear, collected all his divisions, and reconnoitred the position of the enemy.

The French armies occupied a line nearly eight miles in extent. Their extreme left rested upon the lofty heights of La Puebla. Their right was posted upon high ground above the villages of Abechuco and Gamarra Mayor Their centre covered a range of strong hills on the left bank of the Zadorra, and commanded the valley through which it flows towards the south in front of Vittoria. Part of their left wing was drawn up, touching the left centre, on steep and commanding ridges above the village of Subijana de Alava. A strong reserve was posted in rear of the centre at the village of Gomecha. Their light troops lined the banks of the Zadorra in front of the centre, and the bridges over that river were fortified. A woody space between the centre and right was also occupied by light infantry; and some field works had been thrown up in front of Abechuco and Gamarra Mayor. Thus posted, the enemy covered the city of Vittoria, and held the three great roads, which, from Logrono, Madrid, and Bilboa, unite in that city, and thence pursue one line to Bayonne.

Here, therefore, it was absolutely necessary that the enemy should make a resolute stand to protect the main road to Bayonne, and to cover the evacuation of their grand depot at Vittoria, as well as the orderly and safe march of those immense convoys which had accompanied them from the heart of Spain. Joseph Buonaparte nominally commanded in person. The armies of Portugal and the south were in the first line, that of the centre and the cavalry in reserve. Thus they had near 70,000 combatants, and 100 pieces of cannon, arrayed in battle-order. The allies outnumbered them by 4000 or 5000. All the divisions of the Anglo-Portuguese were present, with the exception of the sixth, which was detained at Medina in observation; for there was a corps of 12,000 French in the direction of Bilboa, under general Foy; and general Clausel, with a body of 15,000 men, was at Logrono. But the French, actually present on the field of battle, could not have been short of 70,000; and in the number given for the allies are included three divisions of Spaniards, under Giron, Longa, and Murillo.

The sun of the 21st of June rose clear and cloudless. The allied columns stood to their arms, and marched from their bivouacs on the Bayas, in the assured hope of a day of glory. Lord Wellington disposed the army in three corps. The right under Sir Rowland Hill; the left under Sir Thomas Graham; while the centre, consisting of four divisions formed in two columns, received orders more immediately from himself. In the right corps was the allied division under Sir William Stewart, the Portuguese division under the conde de Amarante, and

a division of Spaniards under Murillo. In the centre were the divisions of Sir Lowry Cole and baron Alten, and those of lord Dalhousie and Sir Thomas Picton. On the left, with Sir Thomas Graham, were the first division and general Oswald's; also two brigades of cavalry, and the Spanish division of Longa. The centre of the enemy's position was so strong, and it was defended by such enormous batteries of field artillery, and so large a force, that any attempt to pierce it was not hopeful or prudent; though the immense extent of line from Abechuco to Puebla would, with a less formidable post for the centre, have favored such an attack. As it was, it became necessary to force back the enemy's flanks, and to delay any assault on the French centre till the right or left corps of the allies should have crossed the Zadorra, and be so well advanced as to give a powerful support in flank to a front attack. The Spaniards of Murillo commenced the action, supported by the light companies of the second division, and the 71st light infantry under the honorable colonel Cadogan. The Spaniards ascended the steep heights of Puebla with great spirit, and were soon engaged with the enemy, who kept up a very hot fire of musketry on their advance. Murillo behaved admirably; he was wounded, but kept the field, and continued the combat with good countenance, till the support under colonel Cadogan came to his aid. The enemy reinforced this point strongly, and a severe struggle ensued; but they were at length driven back, though not without having inflicted a heavy loss on the allies. The 71st regiment lost 400 men; and Cadogan, the heroic commander of that gallant corps, fell mortally wounded at its head: he died upon the field, with his eyes anxiously following its advance. The heights of Puebla thus won, Sir Rowland Hill directed two brigades of the second division to carry the village and heights of Subijana de Alava. The village was immediately seized by the brigade of colonel O'Callaghan, without loss; the defensive cannonade from the heights above, though heavy, being ill directed. The enemy, however, soon filled the ravines among the heights above, and a wood to the left of Subijana, with a swarm of tirailleurs, and made repeated efforts to recover the village; but they were stoutly opposed, and the ground was contested hotly. The regiments which skirmished opposite the wood suffered severely from the fire of the French voltiguers, and the combat was maintained here until the head of a column, directed by Sir Rowland Hill to advance along the lofty ridge running from the Puebla mountain, appeared upon the enemy's flank. About this time, the fourth and light divisions under general Cole passed the Zadorra; the former at the bridge of Nanclares, the latter at that of Tres Puentes. Almost as soon as these had crossed, the column under the earl of Dalhousie reached its

point of attack; and the third division under Sir Thomas Picton, followed by the seventh under the earl, crossed the bridge on the Mendoza road higher up. These four divisions formed rapidly on the left of the Zadorra, and advanced against the enemy's right centre; while their left centre was immediately exposed to a flank attack by the complete success of Sir Rowland Hill, who now followed up their retreat from Subijana de Alava with his wonted steadiness and vigor. The allied columns which advanced against the enemy's right centre were furiously engaged. They were received with a most destructive fire; but they moved on in admirable order, notwithstanding the difficulty of the ground. It was not possible for the movements of any troops to be conducted with more spirit and regularity. The advance was made by echellons of regiments in two or three lines, according to the nature of the ground. The brigade of general Colville, in Picton's division, being on the left, led up, and was first engaged, the enemy falling upon it hotly in very superior force; it not only stoutly held ground against this attack, but, assailing in turn, drove before it this body, and coming on its reserve lines well formed, overthrew them at the bayonet's point and captured their guns. In the village of Ariñez, the enemy fought for a time with better success; but it was at last carried by the bayonet. As the fourth and light divisions advanced, the French fell back upon Vittoria in good order. So long, however, as they did maintain themselves against these attacks of their centre,* the fire of their artillery was terrible: 80 guns were thundering from their position. While the right and centre of the allies were thus vigorously pursuing their success, the left column under Sir Thomas Graham, supported by a Spanish division under general Giron, attacked the French right on the heights above the village of Abechuco, and carried them. This done, Sir Thomas Graham directed general Oswald to assail the post of Gamarra Mayor, and formed the first division to attack Abechuco. Both these villages having bridges over the Zadorra were strongly occupied. Gamarra Mayor was stormed by a brigade of general Oswald's division, and carried at the bayonet's point without firing a shot. General Robinson, under a heavy fire of artillery and musketry, led up his troops to this gallant attack in columns of battalions, with the support of two guns of major Lawson's brigade of artillery. Sir Thomas Graham now placed two brigades of field artillery in battery against Abechuco; and, under cover of this fire, colonel Halket, with the German light battalions, supported

* The heights on which the French centre stood, are by tradition the same on which the English under Edward the Black Prince obtained a complete victory over the army of Henry the Bastard, and seated don Pedro, the rightful king, on the throne

by a brigade of Portuguese infantry under general Bradford, dislodged the enemy by so resolute an assault, that one of the German battalions took two guns and a howitzer on the bridge. While this combat took place at Abechuco, the enemy made the greatest efforts to retake Gamarra Mayor; but general Oswald defeated them with the same gallantry which had distinguished his first attack. Upon the heights on the left of the Zadorra the enemy still had two divisions of infantry in reserve, posted so strongly that it was not possible as yet for the troops of Sir Thomas Graham to pass the bridges which they had so bravely taken: but they waited eagerly for that moment when the perfected combinations of lord Wellington should loosen them to pursue; for already they could hear the advancing battle in the centre. No sooner had the allies passed Vittoria in pursuit of the enemy's centre and left, than Sir Thomas Graham, pushing across the river, took possession of the road to Bayonne. This line of retreat being intercepted, the road to Pampeluna was the only route by which these reserve divisions could retire, and upon this they instantly fell back in great haste and disorder. The entire army of the enemy was now not only beaten, but driven back upon one line of retreat; and in a state so disorganized and helpless, that they never rallied, but ran off in large confused masses, abandoning all their cannon, ammunition, and baggage to the victors. They moved so swiftly, that comparatively few prisoners were made. The infantry could not overtake them; and from the nature of the ground, which is much intersected by ditches, and otherwise inclosed, the cavalry of the allies could do but little. The French suffered, however, as they fled, some little loss from the bullets and shells of a battery of horse-artillery, which from a commanding eminence were poured upon them, as, crowding towards one point, the different corps were thrown upon each other; and, becoming one dense mob, were somewhat delayed under this fire by the pressure.

The pursuit was continued till dark; lord Wellington being in person with his advanced guard. The troops now, being greatly exhausted, were halted for the night. They had been sixteen hours under arms. They had fought and won a battle; and, independent of their manœuvres, they had marched three leagues since the morning. But the victory rewarded and astonished them. They had beaten the French often before—but thus never. One hundred and fifty pieces of artillery, 415 caissons, the military chest, and more than 3000 carriages, wagons, and cars, laden with stores, treasure, or plundèr, lay spread over the conquered field. Among the trophies of this complete victory were a stand of colors and the baton of marshal Jourdan. The loss of the allies did not much exceed

700 killed and 4000 wounded. Of the cannon taken, more than ninety were field-pieces, foul-mouthed with recent use. The ground for nearly a square league was covered with the wreck of chests and baggage. The soldiers who got among the carriages and cars ransacked them most thoroughly; and as there were more than 200 coaches belonging to the court, the generals, and private individuals in the French interest, the spoil was rich and curious. State robes, embroidered uniforms, court dresses, insignia, jewels, the wardrobes of females, plate, pictures, and costly curiosa of an endless variety, the accumulated plunder of invaded Spain, were here rejoicingly divided by the exulting soldiers. But the spoil which Wellington deserved, and which his admirable combinations, and the intrepid and successful attacks he directed, entitled him to expect, was a good solid column of prisoners.* A crowning result which must inevitably have been his sure reward, had the enemy made one single attempt at a rally or stand: had they even maintained a military formation But no army was ever seen to fly in more irregular and headlong confusion. Their loss did not exceed 7000 killed and wounded, and the prisoners amounted to 1000 more. Of all their material and equipment, they only carried off the field one gun and one howitzer. There is no record in history of so vast an army of so well-disciplined and veteran soldiers being thus broken, scattered, and hunted, like a rabble, from the field.

It had not entered into the calculations of the British general, for it could not; nor can it ever be said that it was the result of any order of the French generals; that a distant rallying point was deliberately named, and the *sauve qui peut* authoritatively permitted: it was a disaster never dreamed of,—a disgrace considered impossible to the French arms. Nor came ever upon men a more sudden reverse of fortune and security than that which overtook the chief officers of state, the courtiers, and those unhappy Spaniards of high rank, who, with their wives and children, alighted from their carriages in terror, and fled on foot. These wretched persons, with nothing but the clothes upon their backs, accompanied the broken columns on foot, and were mixed with the soldiery.

The French troops reached Pampeluna in such disorder that

* The British soldiers are unrivalled for fighting, yet in the hot haste of success, they are with great difficulty kept in the ranks Therefore it may be said with truth, that while an English general may count surely upon them to win a battle, it is doubtful whether they possess those less valuable but important qualities which enable a skilful commander to take full advantage of a victory No man, however, more truly and gratefully estimated the sterling worth of his soldiers than lord Wellington He felt pride and confidence in his veterans, and has been heard to say, that he would rather have one officer or soldier who had served with him one or two campaigns, than two or three who had not

it was necessary to close the gates, and forbid their entrance. The fortress, however, was promptly garrisoned, and the retreat continued.

The left corps of the army, under Sir Thomas Graham, marched from the field in the direction of Bilboa to intercept the French force under general Foy; but that officer hastily gained Tolosa, barricadoed the streets, and attempted to make a stand. Graham soon dislodged him, and, forcing into the town, drove him forwards,—compelled him to pass the frontier, and then destroyed the tête de pont at Irun. While two divisions under Sir Rowland Hill were pursuing the enemy on the road to Pampeluna, lord Wellington directed a force to march upon Logroño, and attack general Clausel, who, approaching Vittoria the day after the battle, and learning its result, had countermarched on that place. At the same time he pushed three divisions to Tudela, to cut off his retreat to France by that road. Alarmed for the safety of his corps, that general moved rapidly on Zaragossa and from thence marched to the pass of Jaca, by which route he entered France. This detour preserved his army; but he lost all his guns, and left behind him, in a redoubt which barred the road of Zaragossa, a small garrison, which in a few weeks surrendered to Mina: moreover he suffered a little on his way, from the active and harassing pursuit of that zealous chief.

Upon the first of July the strong castle of Pancorbo, between Burgos and Miranda de Ebro, surrendered to the Spanish army of reserve under O'Donnel: the garrison consisted of 700 good soldiers. Thus, on all sides, successes followed wherever the victory was made known. At Passages, a garrison of 150 men from the corps of Foy surrendered to the Spaniards under Longa; and a good harbor was here secured upon the left of the line of operations, by which the allies subsequently received all their supplies. The French also evacuated Castro and Gueteria, taking off their garrisons in boats. In every quarter south of the Ebro, their fortified posts were given up to the Spaniards. Upon the 6th of July, marshal Suchet broke up from Valencia. Upon the 7th of July, the last divisions of the army of Joseph, which had been driven from the fertile and defensible valley of San Estevan by a succession of brilliant manœuvres, passed the Pyrenees. Sir Rowland Hill had followed them from Pampeluna through the difficult defile of Lanz, and attacked every position on which they halted; while lord Dalhousie with the seventh division had moved towards San Estevan, and menaced their right. By these able and vigorous operations, lord Wellington became master of the passes of San Estevan, Donna Maria, Maya, and Roncesvalles, and his sentinels looked down from the rugged frontier of Spain upon the sunny plains of southern France. In five-and-forty days from the opening of this cam-

paign, he had conducted the allied army from the frontiers of Portugal to the confines of France; he had marched 400 miles without check; defeated the combined forces of his enemy in a general action, taking all their artillery; had driven them through a country abounding in strong positions; and compelled the intrusive king to abandon the very soil of Spain, in haste and consternation. This was glory: for this harvest, possessing his genius in all patience, and preparing all the elements of success with labor and prudence, he had anxiously and hopefully sown; and the joy came. He stood upon the frontier of another liberated land, a victor.

CHAP. XI.

MARSHAL SOULT IS SENT SUDDENLY FROM GERMANY TO TAKE COMMAND OF THE FRENCH ARMY ON THE FRONTIER, AND TO ATTACK THE ALLIES.—LORD WELLINGTON BLOCKADES PAMPELUNA CLOSELY, AND LAYS SIEGE TO ST. SEBASTIAN.—THE ADVANCE OF THE FRENCH ARMY.—THE BATTLES OF THE PYRENEES.—THE FRENCH ARE AGAIN DRIVEN INTO FRANCE.

The blow struck at Vittoria made itself felt in the camps of Germany. There, Napoleon, by an exertion which had astonished all Europe, had again appeared in arms; and in May of this year had obtained new successes in the fields of Lutzen and Bautzen. Profiting by this favorable posture of affairs, he had concluded an armistice with the hostile forces opposed to him, and a negotiation for peace was actually carrying on under the mediation of Austria, when intelligence of the defeat of the army of Spain was received.

The surprise and disappointment of Napoleon were expressed with bitter anger. The thought that "the hideous leopard" should be couching upon the mountains which look down upon the "sacred soil of France," was mortifying and intolerable. Moreover, the effect this would produce both in France and in Germany was at a glance discerned. Therefore he immediately dispatched Soult, with the high title and large powers of "lieutenant of the emperor," to take command of the defeated troops; and gave orders that they should be reinforced and equipped with all possible expedition, and led speedily against the enemy.

To push back the allies from the frontier, and, if possible, to re-establish his armies on the line of the Ebro, was an attempt now imperative upon him. The political state of parties in France, especially in the south, where all were tired of a military king, and longing for peace, made it dangerous to his throne that the peasants of those provinces should see the British

standard floating upon the confines of France, and the crimson uniforms of English soldiers as they watched upon the rocks above them. Lord Wellington knew that great efforts would be made against him soon; therefore he directed his earnest attention to the fortresses of St. Sebastian and Pampeluna, in which places the French had left strong garrisons. As early as the 25th of June, Sir Rowland Hill had closely shut up Pampeluna: it was at that time the intention of lord Wellington to besiege it; but when, returning from his movements against Clausel, he examined the defences in person, this design was abandoned. The works were found to be in excellent order, and were surmounted by 200 pieces of ordnance. The town was well covered by the citadel on one side, protected by the river upon the other, and garrisoned by 4000 effective men. To reduce it by a siege would have required large means, and have cost many lives; therefore it was decided to establish a close blockade. The duties of this service were at first confided to lord Dalhousie, with the sixth and seventh divisions. It was at the same time ordered that strong field-works should be thrown up on every side of the place, so that the investing force might easily command all the roads and communications. Therefore nine large redoubts were raised upon favorable heights, at distances of from 1200 to 1500 yards from the fortress, armed with the French guns captured at Vittoria, and garrisoned by detachments of the investing force. When the connected defences of the blockading line were completed, the duties of the blockade were transferred to the Spanish army of reserve under O'Donnel, and lord Dalhousie with his corps joined the army in the Pyrenees.

It was, however, fully determined to besiege the fortress of St. Sebastian; and Sir Thomas Graham with 10,000 men was appointed to conduct the operations.

This town is built on a low peninsula, running north and south; at the extremity is a rocky height called Monte Orgullo: the base of this rock is 400 yards by 600; it rises steeply to a point, which is crowned by a small citadel called La Mota. Monte Orgullo is cut off from the town by a defensive line near its foot; and its southern face is covered with batteries which plunge into the lower defences of the place.

The defences of the town are, upon the western side, washed by the sea, and upon the eastern side by the river Urumea. This river at high water covers four feet of the masonry of the scarp, but for two hours before and after is fordable and shallow. The works of the land front of St. Sebastian consist of a single front of fortification running across the sandy isthmus on which it stands.

On the right of the Urumea are considerable sand-hills, called

the Chofre range. From these the eastern wall of the city is seen to its base at low water; and at those hours troops can march along its foot to the extremity near the castle. About 700 yards from the land front upon the isthmus is the convent of St. Bartolomeo; this, and a small redoubt near it, and a circular field-work on the causeway, were occupied by the garrison as advanced posts.

It was determined to batter the eastern wall in breach from the sand-hills, and to storm the breaches as soon as practicable, by a bold advance along the left of the Urumea at low water; but, in the first instance, to dislodge the enemy from the fortified convent of St. Bartolomeo and the advanced works.

On the 11th of July the place was invested; on the 12th, the marquis of Wellington examined the defences, and the plan given was decided on. The besieging force consisted of the fifth division under general Oswald, and the Portuguese brigades of generals Bradford and Wilson. The guns, ammunition, and stores were landed at Passages; and, upon the morning of the 14th of July, batteries were opened against the convent of Bartolomeo. The south end of the church was beaten down the next day; the roof of the convent had been frequently set on fire, and a great part of the building was laid open. A battery of 9-pounders and howitzers was now placed on the opposite side of the Urumea, to fire upon the redoubt adjoining; and, upon the 17th of July, the convent and that work were assaulted and carried. The assailants, pushing on too far in pursuit, suffered from the fire of the place, and were driven back by a body of the garrison marching to support the defence of the convent. The besiegers, however, being established in that post, the batteries marked out in the sand-hills were completed, and armed with twenty heavy guns and twelve mortars and howitzers. On the 20th they opened; and on the 25th of July, two breaches being practicable, one thirty, the other ten yards wide, they were assaulted at the hour of low water. A mine had been formed under the glacis of the front line of works; this was to be fired as the signal for the assault. A little before dawn on the 25th, the columns being assembled for the storm, the mine was suddenly exploded; and the garrison was so startled and confused, that the advances ran to the breach without loss, and crowned the summit; but here they were immediately exposed to so terrible and destructive a fire of grape and musketry from within, and from the towers which flanked the breach, that the soldiers dropped very fast: the ascent of the breach, and the rocky sands below, were covered with killed and wounded, and the troops returned in confusion to the trenches having lost 500 killed and wounded, and 100 taken.

Lord Wellington, who had upon the 14th left Sir Thomas Graham to conduct the siege, no sooner received the report of the failure of this assault, than he came over from head-quarters at Lezaca; and finding his means of attack, especially in ammunition, much exhausted, resolved to suspend the siege for a time, and made arrangements accordingly.

In the night of this very day, after he returned from St. Sebastian, the report was brought to him that the enemy had overpowered his troops at two of the passes on the right of the army; had penetrated into the valleys of the Pyrenees in overwhelming force; and were pressing onwards to Pampeluna. "We must do the best we can to stop them," was his short and calm reply to the officer who brought him this bad and perplexing intelligence; and he immediately expressed his contentment with some arrangement of which Sir George Murray had taken the responsibility, by moving a brigade from Echalar to support the second division near Maya. But the difficult movements, and severe combats in the Pyrenees, which began on this day, and did not terminate till the 1st of August, must be related in order.

The line of the lower Pyrenees is most hazardous for a defending army, because, in many parts, there is no lateral communication whatever, and in others it is long and circuitous. Two points must be covered sixty miles asunder, and the intermediate passes must be defended. Nor does the nature of the country allow of the concentration of a strong force in any position in rear of the passes, from whence they may be supported in time, and in sufficient strength to insure their successful resistance at any one which may be attacked with very superior numbers. Hence, by the loss of any one pass, the defence of the rest is rendered impossible, as the safety of the corps stationed in them is immediately compromised.

With a line, therefore, of sixty miles to cover, and having to provide for the siege of San Sebastian, and the blockade of Pampeluna, the allied army was thus posted.

A brigade of British infantry under general Byng, and a division of Spanish foot under Murillo, were on the extreme right, and held the pass of Roncesvalles. Sir Lowry Cole's division was stationed at Biscaret to support these troops; and the division of Sir Thomas Picton was in reserve at Olaque.

Sir Rowland Hill occupied the valley of Bastan, having the brigade of general Walker and the piquets and light companies of general Pringle's brigade in the Puerto de Maya, and the regiments of the last brigade a short league in the immediate rear as a support. The remainder of the second division was in the valley in reserve; but the Portuguese division of the conde de Amarante, being a part of Hill's corps, was posted in the

passes eastward of Maya, about five leagues on the left of Roncesvalles. The Portuguese brigade of general Campbell was detached to Los Aldudes, a post within the French territory. The light and seventh divisions occupied the heights of Santa Barbara, and the town of Vera, and the Puerto de Echalar; and from this last point kept the communication with the valley of Bastan. The sixth division was in reserve at San Estevan.

The Spanish troops of Longa communicated from Vera, on their right, with the Spanish division of general Giron upon the great road on their left, and with the corps under Sir Thomas Graham.

Such were the general dispositions of the allied force. Nothing can be imagined more bold and grand than the mountain region thus occupied by the troops. The vale of San Estevan has, indeed, an aspect of fertility and beauty; but it narrows as it rises towards the north, and is soon lost in the gloom and loneliness of the frontier. Mountains are crowded together in all variety of form: here crested with gray and jagged rock; there rounded and green upon their summits, to which by long and toilsome paths a way is won. On all sides are found ravines and torrents, wild, rugged, and filled with fragments of rock. The roads are narrow and stony; the fastnesses into which they wind are black and shadowy; and he that passes them in solitude hears but the dash of waters and the scream of eagles. Such are the general features of the noble barrier placed by Providence between France and Spain; but a barrier which, notwithstanding these strong features, is not easy of defence against numerous, brave, and intelligent assailants, guided by the skill of an experienced and resolute general.

Such marshal Soult undoubtedly was. He had been expressly selected by his imperial master, for his high military talents, his stern disipline, and acknowledged boldness. He no sooner assumed the command of the armies on the frontier, than he issued a reproachful and rousing address to the troops, which he thus closed:—"The present situation of the army," he said, "is imputable to others; let the merit of repairing it be yours. I have borne testimony to the emperor of your bravery and zeal: his instructions are to drive the enemy from these heights, which enable them proudly to survey our fertile valleys, and to chase them beyond the Ebro. It is on the Spanish soil that your tents must next be pitched, and your resources drawn. Let the account of our successes be dated from Vittoria, and the birthday of his imperial majesty be celebrated in that city." In this spirit Soult proclaimed his intentions on the evening of July 24th. He had taken command of the army on the 13th of July, and organized it afresh in nine divisions of infantry, two divisions of dragoons, and one of light cavalry. He was strongly reinforced,

supplied with a considerable number of guns, and in ten days he was ready for a struggle. His first enterprise was an attempt to relieve Pampeluna. His plan was to attack on the same day the passes of Roncesvalles and Maya, the roads from which converge on Pampeluna. Upon the evening of the 24th of July he assembled a convoy of provisions and stores at St. Jean Pied de Port, and suddenly collected between 30,000 and 40,000 men at that point. These consisted of the right and left wings of his army, under count Reille and general Clausel, with one division of his centre, and two of cavalry. At the same time, two divisions of his centre, amounting to 13,000 men, were assembled not far from Espelette, under count d'Erlon.

On the morning of the 25th, count d'Erlon made some demonstrations against the small passes of Espegue, and Lareta, which are to the right of Maya, and were guarded by the Portuguese. Under cover of these manœuvres, he brought his main body by a pathway, which, leading from Espelette, enters the pass of Maya from the south-east. The entrance from the south-west ascends directly from the village of Urdax, where the enemy had a considerable post encamped, and crosses the lofty range where, upon open ground, the brigade of general Walker was in position, commanded by colonel Cameron, of the 92d. Near a remarkable rock, at the south-east entrance of the pass, was a piquet from general Pringle's brigade; one mile in rear of the piquet post lay the light companies of that brigade, the 34th regiment being two miles and a half below, and the other regiments yet more removed. The pathway from Espelette is screened by mountains, and especially by one, upon the right of the rock, and a little in advance of it, of large base and of a rounded summit.

General William Stewart had gone early in the morning to the passes on the right; feeling jealous for them, and apprehensive that the enemy would attack the Portuguese. His deputy assistant quarter-master-general was left at Maya, and visited the heights on reconnoissance early in the morning; and at a later hour, in consequence of the deserted appearance of the enemy's encampment at Urdax, he patroled a little way round the mountain on the Espelette* pathway. From that point he discerned a small column halted in one of the mountain vales, about three miles distant, and his suspicions were awakened. As he returned past the piquet post, he did not give his real opinion;† but as he passed down towards Maya, he ventured to

* The captain of the old piquet near the rock had seen a group of horses and a column of troops pass along the face of a distant hill at dawn, and disappear.

† This official reserve led to a very erroneous inference on the part of the captain commanding the piquet, and this circumstance has been related by

order up the light companies, and he reported to general Pringle that he thought the enemy meditated a serious attack on the pass. Nevertheless the general, in the absence of Stewart, was apprehensive of ordering his regiments to the heights till the very last moment, as it was yet doubtful what the enemy's positive design was, and general William Stewart had certainly looked for the real attack upon his right: thus some time was lost. Before noon, the enemy filed their columns round the mountain in front of the piquet post at the rock, while they poured a swarm of voltigeurs over the brow and the ridges.

The piquet and light companies were instantly and very hotly engaged, and disputed the advance of the enemy with great steadiness,—inflicting and sustaining a heavy loss: but they were at last forced back, by overpowering numbers, to the summit of the position, where they were hastily joined by the 34th regiment, under lieutenant-colonel Fenwick, who soon fell, severely wounded, his captain of grenadiers being already killed; subsequently the 50th came up to the support of the 34th. These gallant battalions were soon compelled to give way before the formidable numbers which pressed upon them; but, the brave and steady 92d coming to their support, the contest was continued. and with a stubborn courage: one wing of the 92d was nearly destroyed, in a most unequal struggle with a strong column of the enemy. As it was necessary to watch the road from Urdax, some battalions on this range of heights became separated from others. Meanwhile the enemy's numbers increased rapidly. They covered the mountain with an overwhelming force, and acted well together. Thus the defenders were at last obliged to fall back to a strong position on the mountain range communicating with Echalar; from which pass they were reinforced, about six o'clock in the evening, by a brigade of the 7th division, under general Barnes. The struggle was now renewed, and maintained with good success. In these operations general Stewart was slightly wounded, and that part of the post which was the key of the position was recovered by Sir Rowland Hill before nightfall. In this affair, the 82d regiment, which moved up with general Barnes's brigade, was greatly distinguished; and the whole of the troops engaged throughout the day fought their ground well. The allies lost in these combats 1600 men killed and wounded, 140 taken prisoners, and four pieces of cannon. The enemy suffered severely; nor did they attempt to advance the next day.

The attack of the pass at Roncesvalles was directed by mar-

him in another publication, under the natural impression caused by what passed at the time, and on the spot, and of all which he still has a most vivid recollection; but, from information lately afforded him, he cannot too fully express his regret that it should have been so related.

shal Soult in person, with 35,000 men. His march was known, and his approach seen. General Byng, aware that a road through Arbaicete, a few miles to his right, turned the pass, descended from its summit, and so posted his brigade as to cover that road; at the same time he detached the Spanish division of Murillo towards Arbaicete. Marshal Soult, making a demonstration on the front of general Byng, pushed a strong column along the ridge of Arola to the left of Roncesvalles. A part of general Cole's division was on this ridge, and being greatly overpowered by numbers, was forced back, with considerable loss, for a time: but the fusileer brigade coming to their support, a strong position was taken; and the enemy, whom from the first onset general Cole had opposed with the greatest spirit, was effectually checked.

Soult now attacked the brigade of Byng in great strength, and with much impetuosity; but he was most ably and obstinately resisted for a long time: at last, by the succession of fresh troops and the weight of numbers, he forced Byng up the mountain, uncovered the road to Arbaicete, and drove back the Spaniards of Murillo upon the division of general Cole.

Under these circumstances general Cole retired, as soon as it was dark, to Lizoain, in front of Zubiri.

The conduct of the brave troops at Roncesvalles was admirable. The 20th regiment behaved with great steadiness and courage; and the enemy's strong host was arrested for several hours with a countenance the most firm.

The day following, Sir Thomas Picton, with the third division, joined the fourth, and assumed the command of both. As Soult advanced, Sir Thomas retired before him leisurely, in the finest order, and halted on strong ground, from which he again fell back in the night. On the 27th he again retired, and took up a position in battle order to cover the blockade of Pampeluna. As soon as Sir Rowland Hill was apprized of the retrograde movement of Sir Lowry Cole, he withdrew to Irurita, as his advanced position could no longer be maintained.

Lord Wellington hastened to the contemplated scene of action, the very moment he received information of what was passing; and as he rode past the several corps on his way, which were all immediately put in motion, he gave clear orders for their guidance.

He had to think and dictate as he rode swiftly on. Upon the 27th, just before he reached the field, he alighted at a little village, which afterwards formed the enemy's right, to pencil a note of orders, and send it to a corps in the rear. Already the French were descending the mountain to take possession of it: he had barely time to write the memorandum. The enemy rushed into the village in the centre while he was riding out at

one end, and his aid-de-camp at the other. As soon as Wellington came upon the ground taken up by Sir Thomas Picton, in anticipation of the very order which reached him while making the disposition, the troops hailed him with loud cheers, the honest expression of their strong confidence in him, and the sure presage of their own triumph. The third division was drawn up on the right, in front of Huarte, and extended to the hills beyond Olaz. The left was occupied by the fourth division, the brigade of general Byng, and the Portuguese brigade of general Campbell. These troops were posted on the heights in front of Villalba, having their left at a chapel behind Sorauren, on the road from Ortiz to Pampeluna, and their right resting upon a height which commanded the road from Zubiri and Roncesvalles. The Spanish troops of Murillo and O'Donnel were in reserve, with the exception of two regiments, which occupied part of the hill on the right of the fourth division above the road from Zubiri.

The British cavalry, under Sir Stapylton Cotton, were placed near Huarte on the right, that being the only ground where they could act at all.

Marshal Soult formed his army on the ridge of a mountain opposite to the allies. He placed one division of his left beyond the Zubiri road; and occupied the village of Sorauren as a detached post on his right. The river Lanz flows past this village below the road leading to Ortiz.

On the evening of the 27th, the enemy attacked the hill, on the right of the fourth division, occupied by one Portuguese and one Spanish battalion. The French were bravely and steadily repulsed. This post was afterwards immediately reinforced with the 40th regiment British, and the Spanish regiment El Principe. The enemy covered their front with skirmishers; and there was a fire of musketry near Sorauren, and along the whole line, till dark.

Beyond the river Lanz there is another range of mountains connected with Lizasso and Marcalain. Early in the morning of the 28th, the sixth division arrived under general Pack. Lord Wellington immediately formed them across the valley of the Lanz, in rear of the left of the fourth division. Thus they rested their right on Oricain, and their left upon the mountain beyond the river, and made face against the village of Sorauren. The troops of general Pack had scarcely taken up their ground, when the enemy assembled in Sorauren advanced rapidly to attack them; but the French were soon exposed to a fire upon their front, and on both flanks, and they hastily fell back with immense loss.

At this moment a fresh body of the enemy attacked the left of the fourth division, near the chapel, and forced back the 7th

Portuguese caçadores; but the brigade of general Ross imme-diately advanced, and drove them down again with a great loss.

The French now again made an attempt upon the hill on the right of the fourth division, where the 40th regiment and the two regiments of Spaniards were posted. They won a footing upon the summit in spite of the Spanish regiments, who, never-theless, behaved with great spirit; but the 40th charged the enemy instantly, and they were again driven down.

Marshal Soult now made a general and furious assault on the whole front of those heights held by the fourth division. At one point they succeeded in overpowering a Portuguese battalion of general Campbell's, on the right of general Ross's brigade. By this success they established themselves on the allied position. General Ross was therefore forced to withdraw from his post in the line. Lord Wellington instantly directed the 27th and 48th regiments to charge the enemy's columns with the bayonet; and general Ross, having formed with the same object, fell upon them at once.

Never were the valor and superiority of British infantry more brilliantly displayed than in those resolute charges. The enemy broke and fled. The carnage was terrible. Pack's division now moved up the valley nearer to Cole's left. The battle upon this front was at an end, and only a faint firing was con-tinued on distant points of the line.

In the course of this severe and bloody conflict, the brunt of the battle was borne by the fourth division. Every regiment charged with the bayonet; the 40th, 7th, 20th, and 23d, four different times. Their officers set them the example; and general Ross had two horses shot under him. The Portuguese behaved admirably, and the Spanish regiments remarkably well.

In pursuance of lord Wellington's directions, Sir Rowland Hill had marched by Lanz upon Lizasso; and lord Dalhousie had marched from San Estevan upon the same place. They both reached their points on the 28th; and the seventh division came to Marcalain. Thus the lateral road on Pampeluna from Irantsuin and Berisplano was covered. Count d'Erlon followed Sir Rowland Hill, and reached Ortiz on the 29th.

The battle of the day before having satisfied Soult that no impression was to be made on the allied position in front, he determined to attempt the relief of Pampeluna now, by attack-ing Sir Rowland Hill, and thus turning the left of the allies.

The mountain on which the principal force of the enemy was formed was so strong and difficult of access, that Soult did not regard it as liable to attack; therefore he detached one division to reinforce the corps of count d'Erlon, and, on the night of the 29th and 30th, he passed a strong party across the Lanz, upon his right, and occupied in strength the crest of the mountain

opposite to the sixth and seventh divisions: at the same time he drew in upon his left the troops which had hitherto remained on the heights opposite the third division. Thus the left wing was closed upon the main position on the mountain immediately in front of the fourth division; while the corps of count d'Erlon, now strongly reinforced, was also connected, by the mountain line on the right of the Lanz, with the strong position occupied by the French left.

Lord Wellington no sooner saw these dispositions than he immediately penetrated the intentions of his antagonist, and resolved to dislodge the enemy from that main position, which, from its extreme importance, they still occupied in considerable force.

To this end he directed Sir Thomas Picton, with the third division, to cross the heights on which the enemy's left had stood, and to turn the left of the position by the road of Roncesvalles; and lord Dalhousie, with the seventh division, to establish himself on the mountain in his front, and turn the right. The movement of Sir Thomas Picton was made with admirable ability; and the attack of the seventh division, led by lord Dalhousie, with the brigade of general Inglis, was eminently gallant and successful. As soon as lord Dalhousie had driven the enemy from the mountain in his front, the sixth division under general Packenham, who after general Pack was wounded assumed the command of it, turned the village of Sorauren. The same division and general Byng's brigade, which had relieved the fourth division on the left of the original position on the road to Ortiz, attacked that village and drove out the enemy. As soon as the movements on the enemy's flanks took effect, general Cole, with two British and two Portuguese battalions of the fourth division, assailed the front of the position. The enemy now gave way, having been dislodged from a mountain position to all appearance impregnable, by the masterly manœuvres of their opponent, and the irresistible ardor of his brave soldiers. Lord Wellington pursued this corps of the enemy to Olaque, which place he reached at sunset; being thus already in rear of those forces with which Sir Rowland Hill had been engaged.

The enemy had appeared in front of Sir Rowland late in the morning, and had immediately commenced an extended manœuvre on his left flank. That general, therefore, directed general Pringle to gain the summit of the hill on the left of the road leading to La Zarza, and, as the French extended to their right, to watch and follow their movements on the ridge opposite. General Walker's brigade was also moved to the left of the road; the Portuguese troops remaining upon the heights to the right of it.

While the enemy thus manœuvred on the left of Hill's po-

sition, they repeatedly attacked it in front, but were always driven back with a heavy loss, and were often charged with the bayonet. In these combats the 92d and the 34th regiments were distinguished. Sir Rowland Hill effectually repulsed all the efforts to break his front; and as he was constantly reinforced from the right, as the success of lord Wellington's operations enabled him to spare troops for his support, he long maintained the position which he occupied behind Lizasso. At last, count d'Erlon having filed a large division round his left flank, he leisurely withdrew to another ridge of mountain about a mile in his rear, and maintained his ground throughout the day against every assault.

The enemy, thus foiled at all points, retired in the night. The allies pursued them the next morning, and came up to two divisions, posted in the pass of Donna Maria, on a very formidable position. These troops were immediately dislodged by the second and seventh divisions, under Sir Rowland Hill and lord Dalhousie. Nothing could exceed the ardor with which these divisions ascended the flanks of the mountain. The brigade of general Barnes drove more than double its numbers from one of the most difficult points.

Lord Wellington had marched in pursuit by the pass of Velate, on Irurita; thus turning the pass of Donna Maria.

A large convoy going to the enemy was taken by general Byng in the town of Elizondo.

The pursuit was still vigorously continued on the 1st of August, in the valley of the Bidassoa, and many prisoners and much baggage were captured. On the evening of this day the posts of the army were again established upon the frontier, in nearly the same positions which they had occupied on the 25th of July.

Thus terminated a series of severe combats and brilliant operations, in which the enemy put forth all his strength, and manifested all his skill and experience, in vain. They lost more than 8000 men. How great were Soult's expectations of success, may be gathered not merely from the confident tone of his address to his army, but from his advancing into the Pyrenees, accompanied by a large body of cavalry, and a great number of guns, which he did not and could not use in the battle that occurred. On the night of the 28th he sent back his guns to France, which were thus only preserved. On the 28th, the garrison of Pampeluna made a spirited sortie, and obtained possession of several batteries; but they were driven back again by the Spanish division under don Carlos d'España. Although Soult penetrated within one league of the place, and manœuvred near it for four days, no communication whatever passed between the army and the garrison: they heard the

very struggle for relief,—the firing ceased, and Pampeluna was abandoned to its fate. Never were the abilities of lord Wellington more severely tried, or more eminently displayed, than in these important actions; never was a general more devotedly supported by brave and attached soldiers, than he was by all the troops who fought on these memorable days. The loss of the allies amounted to 6000.

On the 28th of July, the only place where lord Wellington could command such a view of the field as he desired, was on the top of the hill so frequently assaulted. There he sat upon the ground during the whole of the hottest affairs, exposed repeatedly within close musket range: but here, as at Vittoria, where, in the heat of the battle, he rode through the fire of eighty guns, passing along the front of the tremendous battery in the French centre—here, as there, God covered his head in battle; not a hair of it was scathed, and he was preserved to his grateful and admiring country.

Lord Wellington transmitted his dispatches to England by the hands of the hereditary prince of Orange, who had a horse shot under him on this occasion, and who had now accompanied the head-quarters of the allied army for nearly two years, to learn that noble art, by which, if they know not to prevail, both princes and nations too often perish.

The intelligence of the triumph at Vittoria had been received in England with a feeling that did the nation honor. The rejoicings were spontaneous and general: every village had its bonfires,—all the towns were illuminated. Both houses of parliament voted their thanks to the victorious army; and lord Wellington was promoted to the rank of field marshal. This dignity was conferred on the illustrious general with very high and particular distinction. The marshal's staff of England was sent to lord Wellington, accompanied by a letter from the prince regent, written with his own hand. Among other expressions of admiration and gratitude, the prince, with a sentiment becoming his royal station, writes thus:—"I feel I have nothing left to say but devoutly to offer up my prayers of gratitude to Providence that it has in its omnipotent bounty blessed my country and myself with such a general. You have sent me among the trophies of your unrivalled fame the staff of a French marshal. I send you in return that of England. The British army will hail it with enthusiasm."

This they did: and proud they were to prove in the severe conflicts, which, occurring so soon after that victory, showed its unspeakable importance and value. that, under the same great commander, they were ready and able to defeat all those vast and sudden efforts to disturb their conquest, which the lieuten-

ant of the emperor had so resolutely made. The birthday of Napoleon was not celebrated in Vittoria, and the advanced sentinels of the British army were now planted upon "the sacred soil of France."

CHAP. XII.

THE OPERATIONS AGAINST ST. SEBASTIAN RENEWED.—THE CITY TAKEN BY STORM.—SOULT'S LAST EFFORT FOR ITS RELIEF.—ADMIRABLE CONDUCT OF THE SPANISH TROOPS AT SAN MARCIAL.—NOTICE OF THE MOVEMENTS ON THE EASTERN COAST OF SPAIN DURING THE SPRING AND SUMMER OF 1813.—LORD WELLINGTON CROSSES THE BIDASSOA, AND ADVANCES THE POSITION OF HIS LEFT WING.—THE SURRENDER OF PAMPELUNA.

THE siege of St. Sebastian, which, during these late operations, had of necessity been suspended, was now resumed. The guns, which had been removed, were again landed; and, as the trenches had been guarded by a small blockading force, the besiegers were enabled to reoccupy their posts, without the labor of breaking ground.

It was decided to renew the former attack with an increased power of artillery; to establish new batteries on the isthmus, and to continue the breach round the angle of the land front. Upon the 19th of August, transports arrived from England, with a good and sufficient number of heavy guns and mortars. The same transports brought out a company of Royal Sappers and Miners. In addition to this, Sir George Collier landed both men and guns from the squadron to assist in the operations. Some of the batteries were now enlarged, and the formation of others was commenced. At midnight on the 24th the garrison made a sally, and rushed into the advanced part of the trenches. Here they caused a momentary confusion, and took about a dozen prisoners; but they were almost immediately driven away. On the morning of the 26th the batteries opened, by signal, with a salvo from fifty-seven pieces of ordnance; forty-two of these on the right attack, and fifteen upon the left, on the isthmus.

On the night between the 26th and 27th the boats of the squadron, with a detachment of infantry, surprised and took possession of the island of Santa Clara, which is situate off the entrance of the harbor, and enfilades the defences of the castle. The enemy had a post of one officer and twenty-four men on this rocky island—they were taken. On the night of the 27th the garrison made a sortie upon the side of the isthmus: they were repulsed immediately with the bayonet, and driven away

without effecting the slightest mischief. On the 28th the besiegers maintained a direct fire on the place from eighty pieces of ordnance. On the 30th the breaches appeared good and practicable, and lord Wellington decided upon the assault for the day following. The operation was directed by Sir Thomas Graham in person. The troops engaged in the assault consisted of detachments of volunteers from the first, light, and fourth divisions, of the brigades of the fifth division, under generals Robinson, Hay, and Spry, and of the 5th Portuguese caçadores.

At eleven o'clock in the forenoon, when the tide had sufficiently ebbed, the columns advanced to the assault.

Sir James Leith commanded the division. The brigade of general Robinson led the storm.

The enemy, as they approached, exploded two mines, which blew down a large portion of the high retaining wall next the sea. Under this the assailants were passing; but not being in very close order, or very near the wall, not above thirty were buried by its ruins; and the soldiers gained the summit of the breach without a check. But here they were instantly swept down by a close and deadly fire of musketry from the ruined houses within, which had been intrenched and loop-holed. While at the foot of the breach, a flank fire of grape, round shot, and musketry showered death upon the rear of the column. Nevertheless, they bravely and repeatedly pushed to the summit; but beyond it they could not advance, and on it they could not remain and live.

To support these desperate attacks, fresh troops were poured out of the trenches; and, for nearly two hours, persevering attempts were continued; but in vain. A detachment of Portuguese, under major Snodgrass, forded the Urumea in gallant order, under the fire of St. Elmo and of the infantry on the walls, and assaulted the small breach to the right of the main one; but the struggle was still without success. Sir Thomas Graham having consulted with lieutenant-colonel Dickson, commanding the artillery, the batteries now commenced firing over the assailants at the foot and on the face of the breach; and the defenders were driven from the curtain and the traverse by the weight, fury, and admirable direction of the fire. At last, a quantity of combustibles, ranged along the works for the closer defence of them suddenly exploded. In the confusion which ensued, the assailants made a vigorous rush, and rendered themselves masters of the first traverse. Animated by this success, they soon, in spite of a fierce resistance, pushed up on the high curtain in great numbers;. and, assisting each other, lowered themselves into the town by the ruins. At the same time the Portuguese forced in at the small breach to the right. The enemy now attempted, in vain, to defend the numerous retrenchments in the streets. They

were, on all sides, impetuously assaulted, and immediately driven back. Seven hundred were made prisoners, and the rest of the garrison took refuge in the castle.

The horrors of this assault were fearfully increased by an awful storm of thunder, lightning, and rain. At the close, fires broke out in various quarters of the town, and, as the garrison of the castle was firing down the streets, and the dispersed soldiers of the allies were drinking and plundering in the houses, it was not possible to extinguish the flames. The scene was afflictive and appalling.

Two thousand men fell in this assault; and yet the mine (in the chamber of which was found twelve hundred weight of powder), by the breaking of a saucisson at the moment of assault, was, happily, never fired. Sir Richard Fletcher, the commanding engineer, an esteemed and able officer, was shot through the heart during the storm. Generals Leith, Oswald, and Robinson were wounded; and the officers suffered severely, both in killed and wounded.

Soult made an effort to relieve St. Sebastian on the 31st. The main strength of the covering army consisted of 8000 Spaniards, under general Freyre. These troops were posted on the heights of San Marcial, on the left of the Bidassoa, covering the high road from Bayonne. Their front and left flank were covered by the river; the mountain of Haya supported their right. The first division was in rear of Irun, and the guerrillas of Longa were on the mountains of Haya. Thus the position of the Spaniards was strong, and furnished with a good reserve on their left. The enemy were seen in force at Vera on the 30th; therefore the brigade of general Inglis was moved to the bridge of Lezaca; that of general Ross was posted on the left of the Haya mountain; and a Portuguese brigade was ordered to take post on the right of the same mountain, to prevent its being turned.

On the morning of the 31st, two divisions of the French forded the Bidassoa in front of the Spanish left, and ascended the strong heights with undaunted confidence. The Spaniards remained steady and firm till the enemy's column nearly reached the summit, when they suddenly charged bayonets. The French instantly broke, fled down the hill, and crossed the river with such heedless precipitation, that many who missed the fords were drowned. The French, however, under cover of the heights on their side of the river, were enabled at a favorable bend to lay down a pontoon bridge. This was completed early in the afternoon; and they passed over in number about 15,000, and made a general attack on the heights of San Marcial. As the enemy were coming on, lord Wellington rode down the Spanish line. The Spaniards hailed him with loud and repeated vivas. And as soon as the French columns were well up the ascent, they rushed

upon them with their bayonets; and the French, terrified at the ardor and fierceness of the charge, immediately turned, and ran for their lives. The Spaniards pursued closely; and the French recrossed the river in all the confusion of a panic. Some rushed into the stream where there was no ford, and sank immediately; others got safe over by the fords, and vast numbers crowded across the bridge. But at last the pressure upon the bridge became so heavy from the close-wedged fugitives who brought up the rear, that it sank; and most of those passing at the moment fell into the water, and rose no more. Lord Wellington was delighted with the conduct of the Spanish troops, and bestowed his praise on them in the strongest language. He spoke of it as equal to that of any troops he had ever seen engaged. They did nobly, and they had enough to animate them to do nobly.

During this attempt to force the direct road to St. Sebastian, a second corps of the enemy endeavored to pass to the right of the mountain of Haya, where another road leads upon St. Sebastian through Oyarzun. The heights between Lezaca and the Bidassoa not being judged tenable, the Portuguese brigade, supported by that of general Inglis, retired to a rough and lofty ridge near the Convent of St. Antonio: here more troops were soon assembled; and the enemy, baffled at all points, retreated. So much rain had fallen during the day, that the river was no longer fordable by the time half their force had recrossed; therefore they had to cross the bridge at Vera, which they could not do without engaging some of the light division. However, they had no alternative; and effected their passage at that point, exposed to so sharp a fire of musketry as caused them severe loss. Thus ended the last effort of the enemy for the relief of St. Sebastian. It cost them two generals of division killed, and a great number of men; as many, according to some accounts, as 2000 killed and wounded. It was a defeat very mortifying to the military pride of the French; for their main attempt was upon the Spanish line, and the Spaniards had the honor of bravely repulsing them with the bayonet.

It was not until the 8th of September that batteries could be raised and armed against the castle of St. Sebastian. This castle stands on a rocky promontory, and is built upon the cone which rises 200 feet above the level of the sea; but the whole of the rock had been formed into one strong post. The citadel, or Fort La Mota, has such high scarps, that it cannot be assaulted; and the masonry is very thick and solid. It is, however, small; and the garrison has but little shelter from bombs.

Lord Wellington, who had positively refused to expedite the reduction of the city by bombardment, on account of the inhabitants, gave immediate orders to bombard the castle; and should

he fail thus to induce a capitulation, he further resolved to breach the main points of the castle defences, and to assault the garrison. Accordingly from the 1st to the 8th of September a fire of mortars and howitzers had been maintained against Fort La Mota and the other defences, with great vigor, and such effect, that, as early as the 3d, general Rey proposed to surrender, upon terms, however, not admissible. On the 8th, all the batteries which had been erected upon the works of the town and on the flanks, opened at the same moment a fire of such weight and rapidity, and so admirably directed, that in two hours the governor beat the chamade, and surrendered. The garrison marched out the following morning with the honors of war, and laid down their arms. The prisoners amounted to more than 1800, including officers. Of this number more than 500 were found in hospital. Thus was St. Sebastian taken. It had been most ably and vigorously defended; and the besiegers lost nearly 4000 men in the attack.

A brief notice of those operations on the eastern coast of Spain, which were conducted during the spring and summer of 1813, by Sir John Murray, is here necessary to illustrate the position of the allies.

During the winter of 1812–13, large reinforcements arrived at Alicant from Sicily: thus the British force consisted of 10,400 infantry, and 700 horse. But of this force, not much more than 6000 could be confidently relied on. In this last number are included near 2000 of the German legion, troops as noble and faithful as any in the world. But the Italian levy had been raised principally from deserters; and the men passed back to the French in such numbers, that it became necessary to disarm the 2d Italian regiment and embark it: about 8000 Spaniards, in two divisions, under generals Whittingham and Roche, acted with the Anglo-Sicilian army: thus Sir John Murray commanded a force of more than 16,000 foot and 1500 horse.

Sums prodigally large had been expended on the equipment of the Spanish divisions of Whittingham and Roche, and they were in British pay: therefore the men were in good humor. General Whittingham was a most zealous and active officer, and succeeded most happily in the organization of his cavalry; but so heavy was the expense bestowed upon the two divisions, on that of Roche in particular, that double the number of men might have been clothed and equipped in a style suitable and efficient, for half the cost of their superfluities and finery. At the same time, all this lavish expenditure of the English nation, while it fattened contractors and distributors, and gratified the vanity of Spanish recruits, who strutted about in scarlet dress pantaloons, gave much umbrage to the less favored troops. Of this, the anonymous writers in the newspapers of Alicant took advantage;

and it aided them in their constant efforts to sow distrust and jealousy of the English in the bosom of their countrymen; and to generate dissensions between general Elio, who commanded a separate Spanish corps of 12,000 men in Murcia, and the British commander. But Elio had too good a spirit to regard these efforts with favor.

The two commanders, early in March, made a combined forward movement; Sir John Murray moved into the mountainous district of Castalla, drove the French from Alcoy, and placed his advanced posts at Ibi and Biar. Elio, meanwhile advanced to Yecla and Villena, on the plain country to the left of the allies.

In the beginning of April, Suchet collected his forces for the field; and on the 11th, general Harispe surprised the Spanish division at Yecla; and the French cavalry charging them on the plain as they attempted to retire, about 1500 were killed or taken. The day following, a Spanish regiment left in the castle of Villena, being without the means of defence, and separated by the French movements from all support, was compelled to capitulate. On this day, Suchet marched upon the pass of Biar, and attacked the advanced posts of the allies under colonel Adam. The colonel, in pursuance of his instructions, fell back upon Castalla in good order, contesting the ground handsomely for two hours; nevertheless, he was forced to abandon to the enemy two mountain guns which had been disabled.

The next day Suchet, having brought up three divisions of infantry and two brigades of horse, attacked the allies. The left of the allied position rested on some rocky heights in front of Castalla. The centre was near the old Moorish castle, and very difficult of access. The right was thrown back, and covered by a deep ravine.

Suchet so disposed his cavalry as to menace and hold in check the right, while he directed a heavy column of infantry to attack the left. This column, preceded by a swarm of light infantry in skirmishing order, slowly ascended the heights, opposed as they advanced by the musketry of the Spanish foot under Whittingham; but in about an hour they reached the upper slope of the mountain, and came full upon the front of the 27th regiment. This corps gave them a close, steady volley, charged bayonets, and drove them immediately down the face of the ascent. The Spaniards supported this charge, and joined in the repulse, which was so effectual that the enemy, having sustained considerable loss, did not make a second attempt.

With the defile of Biar in his rear, Suchet could not have risked a general attack without imprudence. He therefore led back his people through the pass of Biar, and retreated by Villena and Fuente la Higuera on St. Felipe. The day after this combat, Sir John Murray marched by the direct route of Alcoy

upon St. Felipe, hoping to reach the Xucar before Suchet, and to intercept him; but finding, after the first day's march, that he was too late to effect this object, he returned to the position of Castalla. The allies lost in this affair 650 men killed, wounded, and missing.

After these operations, marshal Suchet confined his attention to the strong line of the Xucar. As he could at any moment have occupied this position with a sufficient force both of infantry and horse, the allies could not venture to attack him. Moreover, 2000 British troops were just at this moment recalled to Sicily, so that the armies here remained inactive till May.

It was a part of lord Wellington's plan for the campaign of 1813, that Suchet should be compelled to evacuate the fine province of Valencia, if not the Lower Ebro as well, and that his attention and his troops should be fully occupied. Therefore he instructed Sir John Murray to embark his army, to convey it to the coast of Catalonia, possess himself if possible of some maritime fortress, and co-operate actively with the Catalan commanders.

In the event, however, of Suchet coming upon him in force before he had succeeded in capturing a strong-hold in Catalonia, he was to embark again with all possible expedition, return to Valencia, and fall upon the enemy's strong lines before they could bring back sufficient troops for their protection. The Spanish troops in Murcia and Granada under the duke del Parque were to approach the line of the Xucar in aid of such an attempt.

On the 31st of May, the fleet of transports, with Sir John Murray's troops on board, sailed from Alicant; and they came to anchor off Tarragona at dusk on the evening of the 2d of June.

The troops were landed the next morning. By the hearty exertions of admiral Hallowell, his officers, and the seamen, the whole force was on shore, and Tarragona was invested, by three in the afternoon of the 3d.

The garrison, which had been vigilantly observed by a body of Spaniards under general Copons, had received no reinforcements, and only mustered 700 men.

As the only road between Tortosa and Tarragona, practicable for carriages, is commanded by the Fort Balaguer, a place on the coast a few miles west of Tarragona, a brigade under colonel Prevost was appointed to attack this post. It is a small work, standing on the Col de Balaguer, about 1000 yards from the sea, and 400 above its level.

The attack of this fort had difficulties which good-will, hard labor, and the zealous assistance of the English seamen, soon overcame. Supplies even of water were brought from the fleet. Earth for the batteries was carried up to the rock from the plain

beneath. Guns were dragged up by hand. The fire opened on the 6th, and a number of shells were thrown into the work. The next day the fort capitulated, and the garrison, a detachment of eighty men, were made prisoners of war.

The outer line of Tarragona had been dismantled, and most of the works destroyed by the French as soon as ever they became masters of it. The defences, heretofore so extensive, and requiring so large a garrison, no longer existed. The interior line was alone left, and a few hundred troops were considered sufficient for its protection against any sudden or incomplete attack. The governor, however, on the appearance of the allies, hastily repaired and occupied the Fort Royal, and the bastion of San Carlos; the one a detached work, and both in the outer line.

On the 6th, general Murray opened two batteries against Fort Royal, and a third on the following day. Upon the 8th, it was practicably breached. It was not, however, deemed prudent to occupy it till the body of the place should be attacked; but the fire upon it was continued, to prevent the restoration of its defences. On the 11th, two heavy batteries were opened upon the body of the place, at the distance of 450 yards. But already Suchet was hastening from Valencia. He reached Tortosa on the 9th; and learning that Fort Balaguer was taken, he left his artillery there, and marched forward with a division of infantry across the mountains. At the same time a corps under general Maurice Mathieu advanced rapidly from Barcelona.

When general Murray was informed of the approach of these forces to relieve Tarragona, he raised the siege in haste, and in a manner so irregular and unmilitary, that he left nineteen pieces of artillery in the trenches. His infantry was embarked from the same point where they had landed. His cavalry and artillery were sent to the Col de Balaguer, that they might be put on board with greater convenience and security. To these strange proceedings, especially to the abandonment of the guns, admiral Hallowell angrily objected. But Sir John Murray, not considering himself strong enough, even with the aid of Copons, to resist the enemy on the field, would hear of no delay that might involve him in any combat for his artillery; the preservation of which he would not admit to be of such strong necessity, or so much a point of honor, as the admiral regarded it.

A party of French cavalry approached the out-piquets at Col de Balaguer as the enemy passed towards Tarragona; and on the 13th, Sir John Murray landed some infantry at that point, to cover the more slow and leisurely embarkation of the cavalry and field artillery. Upon the 14th he again put his whole force on shore, hoping to cut off a body of the enemy, and strike an offensive blow: but this was not done, and upon the 17th, lord

William Bentinck arrived from Sicily, and assumed the chief command of this army.

Fort Balaguer was now destroyed; the troops were embarked, and the expedition returned to Alicant, in pursuance of those instructions which had directed that an attempt should be made upon the enemy's line on the Xucar, in conjunction with the duke del Parque.

For disobedience to his instructions, and for abandoning his artillery and stores without necessity, lord Wellington preferred charges against general Murray. He was tried, at the close of the war, acquitted of all intentional disobedience, but found guilty of abandoning artillery and stores which he might have embarked in safety. His conduct was attributed by the court to an error in judgment. That Sir John Murray acted to the best of his judgment, no man will doubt; but in war the consequences of such errors are grievous. He was an officer of unquestionable spirit, and of considerable talents; but he wanted what, in the commander of an army, or, indeed, in any station, is better than abilities,—sound sense. He was not blamed for raising the siege, nor for embarking, but for leaving behind him his guns and stores; and upon some favorite and mistaken notions conceiving it as an act fully justifiable. It was subsequently ascertained, that the three generals, Suchet, Maurice Mathieu, and Murray, were all running from each other. Suchet knew not of the advance of Mathieu, and was afraid to engage without artillery; Mathieu feared to advance upon the English alone; and Murray, imagining some able and irresistible combinations of the other two, sought safety in his ships.

On reaching Alicant, lord William Bentinck immediately advanced and joined the duke del Parque; but as a consequence of the important battle of Vittoria, the French posts in Valencia were at once abandoned, and the province was evacuated early in July. Suchet passed into Catalonia, but he left twelve thousand men to garrison the fortresses of Denia, Murviedro, Peniscola, Tortosa, Lerida, Mequinenza, and Monzon; of these, some were to the south of the Ebro. Lord William Bentinck followed the corps of Suchet into Catalonia, crossed the Ebro by flying bridges at Amposta, and invested Tarragona on the 30th of July. Meanwhile the Spanish troops blockaded all the fortresses in his rear. As soon as lord William Bentinck was joined by the army of the duke del Parque, and the Catalan force under Sarsfield, he landed his ordnance and prepared to besiege Tarragona: this was on the 11th of August; but, before ground was broken, Suchet having formed a junction with general Decaen, and assembled every disposable soldier that Barcelona and the garrisons could spare, advanced, for its relief, at the head of more than twenty thousand men. A position was taken up in front of

Tarragona by the allies. As the enemy approached, lord William Bentinck, not considering his army equal to a battle with a force so strong, and composed of such excellent materials as the corps of Suchet, fell back upon Cambrils. The French marshal immediately destroyed the works of Tarragona, and, taking away the garrison, withdrew again behind Llobregat. He raised several redoubts on the right bank of this river, constructed a tête-de-pont at Molinos del Rey, and thus covered Barcelona and communicated with Lerida. The allies now returned to the desolate and ruined city of Tarragona, and, for the convenience of its bay, it became the rendezvous of the fleet and store-ships to the end of the war. In the beginning of September the British general moved forward to Villa Franca, and pushed on an advanced corps, consisting of one British, a Calabrian, and three Spanish battalions, to Ordal. This post, which is of considerable strength, commands the high road from Barcelona, and is about ten miles in advance of Villa Franca. The enemy's position on the Llobregat was about the same distance from Ordal; the advanced corps at Ordal was commanded by colonel Adam. In the night of the 12th and 13th of September his piquets were suddenly driven in, and the enemy came upon him in force. The allies, for a time, made a stout resistance; they had four guns on the road, which they fought well to the last; but they were overpowered by numbers, their guns were taken, a thousand men were killed, wounded, or taken prisoners, and the remainder made their way back in much confusion to the main body. On the day after this disaster, Suchet advanced upon Villa Franca, combining his movements with those of Decaen, who marched upon the left flank of the allied position from Martorell. Lord William Bentinck now retired; an affair of cavalry took place upon the retreat between a regiment of cuirassiers and the Brunswick Hussars, in which the Brunswickers behaved admirably. Suchet pursued the allies no farther, but returned to the line of the Llobregat, and the English general conducted the allied army by Altafulla on Tarragona.

Soon after these operations, lord William Bentinck returned to his duties in Sicily, and was succeeded in command by general Clinton.

About a month elapsed after the fall of St. Sebastian before any movement could be undertaken by lord Wellington on the frontier; nor, until Pampeluna should surrender, was it possible for him to assume the offensive. However, that he might be enabled to do this with better advantage when the proper season should arrive, he determined to dispossess the enemy of an advanced position on the right of the Bidassoa, the key of which was a strong mountain, called La Rhune, in front of the pass of Vera. At three o'clock on the morning of the 7th of October, the

troops appointed for this attack stood to their arms. As the object of this movement was to bring forward the left of the allies and to place it upon such vantage-ground that the descent of the whole army into France might be hereafter at any moment secured, the whole of the left wing was put in motion. The corps of Sir Thomas Graham forded the Bidassoa at low water, in four columns; and the Spanish troops of general Freyre crossed the river at the fords of San Marcial. The light division under baron C. Alten, supported by the Spaniards of Longa, was to assault the strong redoubts of the enemy on the position of Vera; and the Spanish corps of general Giron was to march upon the intrenchments on the mountain La Rhune. The troops moved to their points in silence. The morning was stormy and very dark; and the columns advanced to the fords without being heard or discovered. As soon as they passed the river, the French piquets opened on them briskly; and the French line formed hastily upon its ground. But all the enemy's works and intrenchments at these points were carried rapidly and well by the fifth and first divisions under Sir Thomas Graham, and by the Spanish foot under Freyre; and six pieces of artillery were taken on the field.

The position of Vera was assaulted by the light division with such ardor and resolution, that in a very short time they were masters of every redoubt upon the ascent; and had taken 400 prisoners, and three pieces of cannon.

The Spaniards of general Giron carried the intrenchments on the lower slopes of La Rhune; and their skirmishers advancing upon the flank of the Vera heights, facilitated the success of the attack of that post. The summit of La Rhune, which is almost inaccessible, was not attempted that evening; but that post surrendered to general Giron the next morning, after a very feeble resistance; and, pursuing his advantage, he captured another intrenchment beyond, which they immediately abandoned.

By the complete success of these attacks, so ably combined, and so bravely executed, lord Wellington gained ground on the French side of the Bidassoa, and placed his left wing in a commanding position. In these affairs the loss of the allies amounted to more than 1500 men.

On the 31st of October, the garrison of Pampeluna, 4000 in number, after a blockade of four months, surrrendered prisoners of war; and the place was given up to don Carlos d'España. But that officer took care to ascertain that the inhabitants had not been subjected to any violence or ill-treatment during the blockade, before he granted the usual terms.

The whole of this autumn, from the battles of the Pyrenees to the fall of Pampeluna, had been passed by the greater part of

the troops hutted, or under canvas, on the cold and cloudy summits of the western Pyrenees. They endured very great privations. Their piquet and night duties were incessant, and very harassing; the weather was severe and wet. The dullness of these camps and bivouacs, the wearisome duties of guard and fatigue, and the sufferings from frost and sleet, tired the patience, and shook the constancy, of the worst soldiers. Oftentimes as the chill mist upon the mountains was for a few hours dissipated by the sun or wind, the plains of France were seen spread below; and the eye of the longing sentinel, freezing at his post, could discern the smoke of towns and villages, and scattered homesteads, lying in pleasant and warm valleys, all green with verdure, or golden with corn. Thus many an idle rover, without principle to endure to the end, was tempted away, and deserted to the plain below. The crime became so frequent, that it was found necessary to check it by severe examples. As soon as Pampeluna fell, the expectations of the men were again raised. Their hopes awoke; content and cheerfulness returned. Upon all sides the busy preparations for some important service were seen and understood. Considerable forces were moved to the left. It was known that marshal Soult had prepared a defensive position on the Nivelle, covered with a most formidable line of works; and that the attack of this position would of necessity be the first blow of a campaign in France.

CHAP. XIII.

LORD WELLINGTON INVADES FRANCE.—DRIVES SOULT FROM HIS FIRST LINE OF DEFENCE.—TAKES A POSITION IN FRONT OF ST. JEAN DE LUZ—AND PLACES HIS ARMY IN CANTONMENTS.—TAKES THE FIELD IN THE MIDDLE OF DECEMBER, TO EXTEND HIS OWN POSITION, AND TO CIRCUMSCRIBE THAT OF MARSHAL SOULT.—SOULT'S POWERFUL ATTACKS ON THE LEFT AND RIGHT OF THE ALLIES—DEFEATED IN BOTH.—BRILLIANT VICTORY OF SIR ROWLAND HILL ON THE 13TH OF DECEMBER.—LORD WELLINGTON REMAINS IN CANTONMENTS TILL FEBRUARY.—PASSAGE OF THE ADOUR.

It was a bright honor and a rich reward to the army of England, and to its patient and persevering allies, after five years of severe warfare, to carry forward their triumphant standards into the territory of the common foe.

The spirit in which lord Wellington invaded France was calm and noble. He impressed forcibly on the troops his desire and resolve that the inhabitants should be well treated, and that private property should be respected. "Officers and soldiers must recollect," said his memorable order to the army, "that their

nations are at war with France, solely because the ruler of the French nation will not suffer them to be at peace, and is desirous of forcing them to submit to his yoke." And, after remarking upon the conduct of the French soldiers in Spain and Portugal, and the sufferings and evils resulting to themselves from their great irregularities and cruelties towards the unfortunate inhabitants of those countries, lord Wellington adds, "to avenge this conduct upon the peaceable inhabitants of France would be unmanly, and unworthy of the nations to whom the commander of the forces now addresses himself." With these honorable sentiments, our great commander, armed strong in honesty, led forth his victorious troops, and carried the war into France.

The enemy had for three months been fortifying their position with great labor and care. Their line covered the town of St. Jean de Luz; in front of which place their right rested upon the sea. From this point the line stretched twelve miles inland; crossed the river Nivelle, and terminated on a strong height behind the village of Ainhoue. Upon a mountain in front of that village, they had also erected works to protect the approach of their left. The centre was on the left of the Nivelle, as the river there winds far to the north, making a considerable bend in its course. The bridge at Ascain, and that a little below it, were covered by strong têtes-de-pont; and the space included in the bend of the stream was defended by several inclosed works, and strong lines of intrenchments. The main defence of the centre was on a range of heights behind Sarre, the approach to which was covered by two redoubts, and by the mountain called La Petite la Rhune, which had been retrenched and occupied as an advanced post. The whole of this position was strong by nature, and it had been fortified with skill. In many parts it was impregnable in front, especially on the right, which was covered by several formidable redoubts, and by a strong interior line. The plan of attack was to force the enemy's centre, and turn their right.

The left wing of the allies was directed by Sir John Hope, with two divisions under generals Howard and Hay, a brigade under lord Aylmer, and two of Portuguese infantry under generals Wilson and Bradford. The centre was divided into two columns. General Charles Alten commanded the left centre, which was formed by the light infantry (his own) division, and by Longa's corps of Spanish infantry. Marshal Beresford directed the right centre, which was composed of the 3d, 4th, and 7th divisions, under generals Colville, Cole, and the Portuguese general Le Cor. The right wing of the army consisted of the second division, under general Stewart; the sixth, under general Clinton; the Portuguese division of general Hamilton; and the Spanish division of Murillo. This wing was under the

conduct of Sir Rowland Hill. The Spanish army of general Giron was in reserve behind the centre; and the cavalry of the army appointed to support these operations was also formed in rear of the centre, under Sir Stapylton Cotton. Soon after midnight, on the morning of the 10th of November, the various columns upon the right wound down the gloomy passes of the Pyrenees in strict silence, lighted by the moon. Along the whole line of the meditated attacks, the columns advanced as close to the enemy's piquets as it was possible to do without discovery. These halted, and, preserving their formation, lay down upon the ground in stillness, waiting for the break of day. At earliest dawn the battle opened. The fourth division moved rapidly against a strong redoubt in front of the village of Sarre, and carried it with very little loss. The village, which had been barricaded for resistance, was immediately abandoned by the enemy, without one effort to save it. The attack on La Petite la Rhune was made at the same moment by the light division. These troops immediately rushed over the line of the retrenchments, forcing the enemy back, and driving them with such vigor from one defence to another, that the garrisons in the redoubts lost all confidence, abandoned them without a struggle, and the brow of La Petite la Rhune was soon crowned by a column of the assailants. The advanced posts of the enemy's line being thus vigorously seized, a general attack was made upon the fortified heights in rear of Sarre. The divisions of generals Colville and Le Cor marched steadily upon them, covered by their light infantry. The ascent was steep, and the whole face of it was covered with abatis, and lines of intrenchment. The enemy poured a heavy fire of musketry on the assaulting columns, but they would not be denied, and pressed onwards with such steady resolution that the enemy gave up their ground without further contest, and retired in haste and confusion to the bridge on the Nivelle. On this range of heights only one redoubt offered any serious resistance. Here the garrison, confiding in the strength of a post which formed part of a line of intrenchments on very difficult and strong ground opposite La Rhune, held their ground so long, that as the light division, having bravely forced their way over all obstacles, was forming for the assault, marshal Beresford led a column to intercept their retreat, and they were taken prisoners: a fine battalion of more than five hundred men. While these affairs were taking place in the centre, Sir Rowland Hill advanced against the heights of Ainhoue in echellons of divisions. That of general Clinton led. They marched directly on the right of the five redoubts, crossed the Nivelle by a ford, and steadily ascending the position, attacked the troops formed at that point. These were soon beaten, and the nearest redoubt abandoned by its garrison. The sixth division

pursued and supported general Hamilton's Portuguese in the attack of the other redoubts, which fell without resistance, the garrisons all retiring as they were approached. General Stewart's division drove the enemy from a parallel ridge in the rear, defended by a strong field-work. Sir Rowland Hill now led both divisions on Espelette, when the enemy abandoned the advanced works which they still held in front of Ainhoue, and retreated with all haste towards Cambo.

By these various and able movements, and by the intrepidity and success of the several attacks, the allies were established in rear of the enemy's original position, and had driven back their centre upon their right. The French now concentrated a large force on the heights above St. Pé and Ascain, and drew up in battle order. Against these troops immediate dispositions were made. The third, seventh, and sixth divisions were directed to advance upon this position, marching, two divisions on the left, and one on the right bank of the Nivelle. The enemy defended this ground for a short time with a heavy fire of artillery and musketry, but as soon as the allied columns closed upon them they retired from it in disorder. It was now sunset. By these successes the allies were established in the rear of the enemy's right, and with the approach of night the firing ceased.

Marshal Soult was thus manœuvred out of this long-prepared position, and his troops were at all points beaten. The French army had mustered near 70,000 combatants. They were placed in strong ground; they were covered by intrenchments, and supported by redoubts; they had all possible advantage which a thorough knowledge of all the roads and paths of communication could give; and they were contending with an enemy on their own frontier, to save their own country from invasion. Yet they suffered themselves to be dislodged from every point that was assailed, with an absence of spirit which astonished their opponents. The loss of the allies on this proud and memorable day did not exceed 2500 killed and wounded. Fifty guns and 1500 prisoners were taken upon the field.

Under cover of the night, marshal Soult withdrew from that impregnable part of his position which it was no longer possible for him to hold, and from which he could not have effected his retreat by daylight without loss and danger. Thus the allies were left masters of the whole line.

The French now concentrated in front of Bayonne, where an intrenched camp had been prepared to receive them. Lord Wellington immediately took up a position within two miles of the enemy, and strengthened it with a line of defensive outposts. His left rested upon the sea, his right extended to Cambo, and his troops were disposed in cantonments between the Nivelle and the coast. As the weather was cold and wet, and the heavy

rains had materially injured the roads, no further operations could be undertaken at this moment, and the army remained quiet and under cover for nearly a month. This was a welcome comfort and a necessary refreshment to the soldiers, who had endured for many weeks much hardship in their mountain bivouacs. During this period of repose, the space occupied by the allies between the sea and the Nive was very confined, while the enemy guarding the right bank of that river, and holding St. Jean Pied de Port with a strong detachment, patroled and foraged over a district which afforded large supplies. As soon, therefore, as the necessary preparations could be completed, lord Wellington suddenly broke up and crossed the Nive.

Three hours before daylight, on the morning of the 9th of December, the columns which had any ground to move over, preparatory to their formation for the advance, stood to their arms and marched to their respective points of assembly. At dawn, the whole army was put in motion.

The position of Soult was admirably chosen. Bayonne is situated at the junction of the Nive with the Adour, about four miles from the sea. The Adour is a broad navigable river, subject to the action of the tide: the Nive is a mountain stream of no breadth, but, as it approaches Bayonne, rapid, and so deep that it cannot there be forded The town is strongly fortified, and has bridges over both these rivers. On the left bank of the Adour, a strong bastioned line, of the trace of Vauban, extends in a curve, from the river above to the river below the town, and incloses a large suburb.

At some distance in front of this line, and nearly parallel to the ramparts, was the intrenched camp. The French right rested upon the Adour, and was covered in front by a morass. The centre extended from this morass or inundation, upon which it rested its right, to the river Nive. The enemy's left wing was posted between the Nive and the Adour; guarding the former river, and resting upon the latter. The citadel of Bayonne stands upon the right of the Adour, and commands the city and the anchorage. The town is only to be approached, on the Spanish side, by two good roads,—that from St. Jean de Luz on the coast, and that from St. Jean Pied de Port under the mountains. A division of the army of Catalonia was stationed at St. Jean Pied de Port, and with this corps Soult communicated by strong patroles of cavalry. St. Jean de Luz was the British headquarters, and the main depôt of the allies. All the cross roads leading to Bayonne are bad, and in winter impracticable for artillery. The immediate object of lord Wellington was to extend the cantonments of the allied army, to drive the enemy's advanced posts back upon their camp, and to seize some of the strong ground which they now occupied between the Nive and

the Adour. Accordingly, on the morning of the 9th of December, the left wing, under Sir John Hope, advanced by the great road leading from St. Jean de Luz, drove back the enemy's advanced posts, and, with very little opposition, gained the heights above their intrenched camp before noon, and reconnoitred it at leisure. Sir Rowland Hill, with the right of the army, passed the Nive by a deep ford above Cambo. At the same time general Clinton crossed that river by a bridge of boats at Ustariz; and the French, in front of Hill, fearing they should be cut off by Clinton, retired hastily upon Bayonne. They attempted a short stand at Ville Franche, but, being attacked by the light infantry of Clinton's division, continued their retreat. The day was now at its close. As soon as it was dark, the enemy drew all his posts into the position of Bayonne. Sir John Hope led back the left wing to their cantonments, and the 6th division recrossed to the left bank of the Nive, maintaining their communication with Sir Rowland Hill. That general established his corps, on the 10th, in a position the left of which rested on the heights of Ville Franche above the Nive, the centre at the village of St. Pierre on the great road to St. Jean Pied de Port, and the right on the Adour. The Spanish division of Murillo, and a brigade of cavalry, had been detached in observation; the former to Urcuray, the latter to Hasparren. The whole of the allied forces were now disposed on the arc of a half circle. Their communications were either by cross and bad roads, or by none other than they could make at need, and were intersected by a river. The position of the French was central, with short easy communications, and was supported by the guns of a fortress. Therefore Soult could attack the allies with superior forces at any point he chose, before they could assemble equal numbers; and, if he failed to make an impression, his retreat was secure, and he could not be molested under the walls of Bayonne. Availing himself of this advantage, Soult led out his main body on the morning of the 10th, and marched by the road of St. Jean de Luz upon the left wing of the army. Sir John Hope had placed the 5th division, under general Hay, on the strong ridge of Barouillet, with the Portuguese brigade of general Campbell on a narrower ridge in front. The light division was about two miles on the right of Barouillet at Arcangues, where the ground was high and difficult. No defensive connexion existed between the two divisions. The position of each was strong in itself, and any attempt to penetrate between was hazardous.

The French marched rapidly forwards. One column attacked the Portuguese brigade, and forced it to fall back on the 5th division: another made a vigorous assault upon the light division in such strength that the allies took post within their intrenchments. The enemy were now between the two divisions in

considerable force, and directed a weighty and violent attack on the right of the 5th division, but they were firmly met; and this brave division, attacked both in front and flank, and sustaining a heavy loss of men, resolutely kept its ground. Nevertheless the enemy did, at one period of the combat, force their way through a wood and orchard on the right of Barouillet, in such numbers as to overpower a body of the brave defenders, and to penetrate beyond the front of the position; but the success was momentary. The admirable conduct of a Portuguese battalion and of the gallant 9th British, who were skilfully directed upon their rear, compelled them to retreat with a severe loss in killed and prisoners. A fresh column advanced again, and the attacks upon the 5th division were renewed with spirit: but the 5th division, assisted by a brigade of guards, which now joined them, repulsed every assault; and, as night came on, the enemy withdrew.*

Their efforts against the defences of the light division were many and obstinate; but they suffered a severe loss, and made no impression upon the intrenchments of those steady soldiers.

The first division now relieved the fifth at Barouillet; and the fourth and seventh were so posted in reserve, as to be ready to support either point on the morrow.

On the 11th of December, Sir John Hope, judging from the appearance and movements of the enemy that a heavy attack was meditated against the light division at Arcangues, moved a part of his corps to the right, to support that position. Soult now suddenly changed the direction of his columns, and moved rapidly upon Barouillet; but the troops at that point stood readily to their arms; and Sir John Hope instantly brought back the detached column. The enemy molested the march of this body, and advanced towards the left wing: but their attack was feeble, and soon repulsed.

Upon the 12th they still showed themselves in great force on the ridge in the front of the left wing; and in the afternoon there was a hot skirmish between the light troops and piquets; but no serious movement of attack was made throughout the day.

As it was most important to the enemy, if possible, to penetrate to St. Jean de Luz, and as he had made such bold and persevering attacks upon the 10th, and still maintained himself in the same hostile attitude and force in front of the left wing, it was necessary to keep a great portion of the allied troops closed towards the left. But lord Wellington, apprehensive that he might suddenly change his attack, and throw the whole weight of his disposable force on the corps of Sir Rowland Hill, had

* Sir John Hope had a remarkable escape in this combat. His hat was struck by shot four times, his clothes were shot through in many places; two horses were wounded under him, and he was hit both on the shoulder and leg.

given that officer full discretion to order the sixth division across the Nive, whenever he might require their services, without any reference to the commander of the corps in the centre. Moreover, with a vigilant suspicion of his adversary's intentions, very early in the morning of the 13th, orders were given for the fourth division, and a part of the third, to be moved towards the right, and held in readiness to cross the Nive if required.

These precautions were not without reason; for, during the night of the 12th, Soult passed through Bayonne with his main force; and, at daylight on the 13th, he poured out of his intrenchments 30,000 men, and directed them in massive columns of attack upon the position of Sir Rowland Hill.

The corps of Sir Rowland mustered about 13,000 British and Portuguese. The brigade of general Byng was on the right, in front of the village of Vieux Monguerre. It was drawn up on high ground, with the Adour upon its right, and several mill-dams on its left. The brigade of general Pringle was posted upon the ridge of Ville Franche, on the left flank; the river Nive ran immediately below his left, and in the valley to his right were also several mill-dams.

The brigade of general Barnes, and the Portuguese brigade of general Ashworth, occupied a range of heights opposite to the village of St. Pierre. A reserve of two Portuguese brigades was formed in rear of Ville Franche.

Soult's plan of attack was soon developed. He marched in full strength upon the centre, counting, by the united assault of superior numbers, to win the ridge of St. Pierre, carry the great road to St. Jean Pied de Port, and break through the position.

The arrangements of Sir Rowland Hill to repulse this powerful attack were instantly and ably made. He directed general Byng to leave one battalion at Vieux Monguerre, and hasten with his brigade to the right of the centre. A Portuguese brigade from Ville Franche was ordered up on the left of the centre; and he sent an aid-de-camp to Sir Henry Clinton, desiring him to move the sixth division to his support. While these various movements were in progress, the French columns arrived upon the slopes which led up to the centre, and hastened up, at a bold rapid pace, in the firmest order. Disregarding the crushing bullets of a well-served artillery, the grape, and the musketry of the light troops, they pressed onwards in the spirit and with the bearing of their best days. They established themselves on the advance of the position, and were gaining ground on their brave opponents by the force and weight of numbers, when the brigades marching from the flanks arrived at the very moment they were needed, and joined battle. The combat was long, bloody, and stubborn. The attacks, often repulsed, were as often renewed with fury. The French fought with hope, with a

knowledge of their strength, and with a city of France looking on. They struggled hard for victory; but they were finally beaten, and driven back with a terrible slaughter. The regiments of general Barnes's brigade behaved nobly; and the Portuguese troops were brave and true.

Upon the right flank, the enemy at one time during the contest forced back the battalion and light companies from Vieux Monguerre; but Sir Rowland Hill ordered them to recover it; and the battalion (the Buffs) rushed instantly upon the village, and drove out the enemy. The left, under general Pringle, was no further engaged than by a lively fire of the French light infantry, and by cannonade; and the 6th division was not up till the day was already won.

Soult, having exhausted all his efforts against Sir Rowland in vain, now, upon all sides, drew off; but his conqueror pursued him on the open ground, and did considerable execution on his retiring columns. However, he attempted to make a stand, in great force, upon favorable ground in front of his intrenchments, and occupied a hill upon his left in great strength. This hill was most gallantly assaulted and carried by the brigade of general Byng, who led up in person, under a heavy fire of artillery and musketry. The French infantry were beaten from the position, and two guns were taken. They made a stout effort to retake this hill, but they were again driven down; and a brigade of Portuguese being ordered to reinforce Byng, they made no further attempt on the allies.

This glorious battle was fought and won by Sir Rowland Hill with his own corps, alone and unassisted. Lord Wellington could not reach the field till the victory was achieved, and as he rode up to his successful general he shook him heartily by the hand, with the frank remark, "Hill, the day's your own." He was exceedingly delighted with Sir Rowland's calm and beautiful conduct of this action, and with the intrepid and resolute behavior of the troops; and, as he examined the ground, he observed that he had never yet seen so many dead Frenchmen in so small a space; a fact which attests the stern severity of this unequalled contest.

The loss of the French, from the 9th to the 13th of December inclusive, was admitted, in their own returns, to exceed 1300 killed, and 4600 wounded. That of the allies was also heavy, and amounted to nearly 5000 killed and wounded.

Upon the 11th, the day after Sir John Hope's well-fought combat on the left, two battalions of Nassau light infantry came over to the allies, and stated their desire to be sent to their own country, which they knew was now freed from the domination of Buonaparte. Marshal Soult having in these operations made a fair trial of his strength in the field, and been decisively de-

feated in every attack upon the allies, withdrew the main body of his force from Bayonne and marched up the right bank of the Adour towards Dax, which he now made his principal depôt. The weather became very wet, inclement, and wintry; the low grounds were all flooded; the roads were deep and miry; no further offensive operations could then be undertaken, and lord Wellington placed his troops in cantonments and gave them rest. The British advanced posts were now close to those of the enemy; the right of the allied army rested upon the Adour, the left upon the sea: in this position they remained quiet till the beginning of February, plentifully supplied and little molested.

The state of affairs in France was now wonderfully changed from its proud attitude of superiority and defiance two years before. In every quarter of Europe the French armies had been beaten. The loss of the battle of Leipzig, and the utter destruction of their forces on that field; the defection of Saxony and Bavaria; and the decided course of Austria, had brought the armies of Russia, Prussia, and Austria, to the Rhine. Buonaparte, beset on every side by enemies and by dangers, was now calling upon the French nation for more sacrifices and for impossible exertions. A decree had passed his miserable senate to levy 300,000 men, and to double all the public contributions: but it could not, as he well knew, take effect to so vast an extent. However, some of the mothers of France had still sons to be offered up on the altar of his ambition, and some of her industrious citizens had yet money of which they could be robbed; therefore, much was done to recruit his ranks, and something to replenish his coffers. But the country groaned under his iron rule, and pined for deliverance and peace; while, therefore, lord Wellington wintered in the south of France, he found the inhabitants not only peaceable and unopposing, but grateful for the protection of his discipline, and for the strict honor with which all supplies and services were paid for and rewarded. They did not entertain any elevated or patriotic attachment to the ruler of France; they regarded the war as *his* and *not the war of the nation.* Hence, though they had been encouraged to take up arms against the troops under lord Wellington, and to harass his posts with a guerilla warfare, such hostility was only shown at first and in a very few instances: they were in general well disposed, and in good humor with the allies, leaving their own army, whom they at once feared and hated, to carry on the war.

At this time, while Buonaparte was busied in trying to arrest the progress of the allied nations in the north, by the crafty arts of diplomacy, he attempted to conclude a secret treaty with his prisoner Ferdinand VII. By this it was stipulated, that Spain should be evacuated by the troops of France, as well as of England and Portugal; and that all prisoners should be given up,

whether in the power of England or Spain. Thus he would have gained no small accession of strength by recovering all the troops left in garrison in Catalonia and Valencia, all the prisoners made during the war, and by obtaining the immediate service of marshal Suchet's corps, on the soil of France.

Ferdinand wrote to the Spanish government by the duke San Carlos, communicating this treaty, and desiring its immediate ratification.

In a reply, expressive of respect and attachment, the government inclosed a copy of the decree of the extraordinary general cortes of the 1st of January, 1811, which decided, that no act of his majesty, while under restraint, should be binding on the nation.

Ferdinand, consulting ill his dignity and honor, wrote again to Madrid by don Joseph Palafox, and again urged the government to ratify this treaty; but the regency evaded the request, and informed him, that an ambassador had been sent, in his majesty's name, to a congress of the great European powers then sitting, to treat for a general peace. These unworthy efforts on the part of Ferdinand, to induce his government to entertain the insidious proposal of Buonaparte, were made in the months of December and January. Meanwhile, on the 1st of this same January, the emperors of Austria and of Russia, and the king of Prussia, passed the Rhine at the head of very powerful armies, to compel Buonaparte to consent to the terms of a general peace, as by them proposed. They disclaimed, for themselves, all objects of conquest or aggrandizement; they pledged themselves not to interfere in the internal concerns of the French nation; but they insisted that France should be content with her old and natural boundaries, the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees. Maddened by these just demands, the plain consequences of those wars of aggression which he had waged hitherto with success, but which had now brought forth the bitter fruits of reverse and disgrace, Napoleon called upon the French to make his cause the cause of the nation. All classes, however, excepting the pensioned veterans, the military in the camps, and the employés of the imperial government, manifested an utter indifference to his appeal; nor, though hostile armies were upon the soil of France, could he arouse a spirit of national resistance. Moreover, those who, in their secret hearts, had long cherished an attachment to the exiled house of Bourbon, now lifted their voice and gave utterance to their hopes; while the republicans of the kingdom reminded the falling emperor that, as he had trampled on personal freedom, public rights, and private property, during a violent and warlike reign, he had no claim upon the exertions or even the allegiance of the people. Upon all sides he heard the language of a surly resentment, or he en-

countered the sluggishness of a sullen and immovable apathy; therefore he sent an ambassador to Châtillon to assist at the conferences for peace; and that he might negotiate with better grace, he prepared to take the field.

The last offensive effort of the French troops in Spain was made in December. During this movement the town of Martorelli was plundered by the corps of marshal Suchet. After this, ten thousand of the best troops quitted Catalonia, and they entered France about the close of January.

We turn again to consider the operations near Bayonne. When Soult had sustained his last defeat on the 13th of December, he disposed the centre of his army along the right bank of the Adour to Port de Lanne; distributed his left along the right of the Bidouse river to St. Palais; posted two divisions of cavalry on the left of that place, and occupied St. Jean Pied de Port with a weak division of regulars and a body of national guards. The right wing of the enemy still held the intrenchments under the guns of Bayonne. Count Reille commanded the French right, count d'Erlon the centre, general Clausel the left, and general Harispe the detached division at St. Jean Pied de Port. This last officer, who was a native of the province, and popular with the inhabitants, had been sent for from Catalonia, and quitted his charge there to take this command; but he found it impossible to organize any thing like a hearty resistance to the allies among the Basques. The army of Soult contained so large a proportion of veteran soldiers, that, at the end of January, Napoleon called away two divisions of infantry, and one of dragoons, to take the field under himself, supplying their place by levies of the latest organization; therefore, all the dispositions of Soult were defensive. The right of the Adour from Bayonne to Port Lanne, a distance of eighteen miles, was covered with redoubts, and armed with cannon; and a bridge was laid down at Port Lanne with a strong tête-de-pont. To defend the Pau he retrenched Hastingues, and formed a tête-de-pont at Peyrehorade. He caused the passages over the Bidouse, at Guiche, Bidache, and Came, to be secured by like defences. The works at St. Jean Pied de Port and Navarreins were also strengthened,—his principal depôts of provisions and stores were at Port de Lanne, and higher up at Dax, which last place was retrenched. These various labors and preparations had employed the French from the middle of December to the close of January. During this season, lord Wellington was busily engaged in maturing his preparations to resume the offensive. The best speculations concerning his plans had commonly proved mistaken; many idle surmises were, as usual, made, but, as heretofore, both in his own camp and that of the enemy, no suspicion existed of the bold conception which he was suddenly to carry into execution.

About the middle of February, as the weather cleared up, and the cross roads became practicable, lord Wellington commenced a series of manœuvres to draw Soult from his line of defence on the Adour. He began by driving the enemy from the vicinity of St. Palais. With this view, Sir Rowland Hill marched against Harispe. That general, leaving a garrison in St. Jean Pied de Port, retired with his division upon Hellete; but from this position Sir Rowland soon dislodged him. Harispe took up ground for the night on the hills above Meharin, and the next morning fell back to a very strong position to the right of Garris, where another body of the enemy was already posted.

As this position did not cover the road through Garris, by which their communication with the bridge of St. Palais might possibly be cut off, lord Wellington made instant dispositions to attack them. It was already evening, and he had only one division up, and a body of Spaniards, but the opportunity was too favorable to be lost; therefore he directed Murillo with his Spanish division to hasten on and occupy St. Palais, while he resolved to assault the enemy in front with the second division under Sir William Stewart. These troops carried the heights with their wonted intrepidity and ardor; but the enemy made many brave efforts to recover them. These attempts were gallantly continued after it was quite dark; and the fire was delivered face to face at close quarters, and many of the enemy were bayoneted on the ground. At last, finding they could make no impression upon the firmness of the defenders, they retired and passed the bridge at St. Palais before the Spaniards had occupied that important post.

The next day, Sir Rowland Hill pursued Harispe, and found him strongly reinforced and well posted behind the Gave de Mauleon. The bridge at Navarette was destroyed, but a regiment of the second division passed the stream by a ford, under cover of artillery, and quickly drove the enemy from that village. Their advanced post being thus forced, Harispe led off his main body to the rear, and in the night passed the Gave d'Oleron.

The centre of the army made a corresponding movement on the 15th to the Bidouse river; but the sixth and eighth divisions were left between the Nive and the Adour, to watch the enemy in Bayonne.

As soon as marshal Soult learned that the right of the allies was concentrated behind the Gave de Mauleon, and found their centre on the Bidouse, he destroyed the bridges on the Adour, collected the greater part of his forces in the neighborhood of Sauveterre, and left Bayonne to the protection of its garrison.

It was a part of lord Wellington's general plan that Bayonne should be invested on the 23d, according to the arrangements he had made with Sir John Hope and admiral Penrose. He had

selected the citadel for his point of attack; had determined to force the passage of the Adour; and, about two miles and a half below the town, to fix a bridge on the river.

At the point selected, the Adour is 300 yards broad, and a bend in its course conceals it, in part, from the view of the garrison of Bayonne. The current is rapid, the tide strong, and there is often a heavy swell from the sea, so that no ordinary bridge apparatus could be trusted. Lord Wellington, therefore, decided to substitute for pontoons or boats, decked vessels of from thirty to fifty tons burden. Of such vessels, called chasse marées, many were found in the ports of St. Jean de Luz, Passages, and Socoa. These were hired, and collected at Socoa. Materials were also procured for a good bridge, a portion of which each was to carry; and spars were obtained to form a flexible boom, which might protect the bridge from any vessels floated down the stream to destroy it.

On the evening of the 22d of February, the flotilla put to sea from Socoa, protected by admiral Penrose with the Porcupine frigate, Lyra brig, and five gun-boats.

Captain O'Reilly of the royal navy had the immediate command of the flotilla, and the superintendence of all the nautical arrangements necessary to the successful accomplishment of this difficult undertaking; the construction and fixing down the bridge apparatus was, of course, the duty of the engineer officers employed. To insure the safe entrance of the vessels into the Adour, and their unmolested anchorage across the stream, it was concerted that some troops should be passed over in the night by rafts made of the pontoons, and should establish a post on the right bank.

At one in the morning of the 23d, Sir John Hope marched from his cantonments, to direct and support this movement. General Stopford's brigade of guards reached their point upon the bank of the Adour at midnight, having moved at an earlier hour. The pontoons were unavoidably delayed by the depth and softness of the sandy road, therefore the design of sending a detachment across the river before daylight was defeated. However, the attention of the garrison was entirely occupied by the lively demonstrations upon their intrenched camp, and the late and actual operations of lord Wellington on the right had been so completely successful in concealing his intention of passing the Adour below Bayonne, that the enemy directed no thought or attention to that point. Therefore, Sir John Hope determined to commence passing the river as soon as ever a few boats and pontoons could be launched; for he ascertained that the enemy had only a small piquet of observation upon the right bank, and that no opposition was prepared. Owing to light and baffling winds, the bridge flotilla had not arrived off the bar. The pon-

toons from Bidart did not accomplish their march in the time expected; and at noon four jolly-boats, and five pontoons, which the men took on their shoulders and carried over the sand-hills, were the only means of passage at the disposal of the general. To protect the launch of these boats, some field-guns were moved forward. At sight of the troops the enemy's piquet retired without firing a shot, and walked leisurely away to the citadel. Fifty men were instantly rowed over to the right bank. A hawser was stretched across the river; the five pontoons were formed into rafts; and a detachment of the guards was ferried over. When about 600 men had been put across, the tide flowed so strong, that the rafts could no longer work; and, save a few sent over in the jolly-boats, the passage of troops ceased. At this time only six companies of the guards, two of the 60th rifles, and a small party of the rocket corps, had been passed to the right bank. All seemed quiet in their front; when, suddenly, about five o'clock in the evening, two columns issued from the citadel to attack this detachment. Colonel Stopford drew up his troops in a position that secured his flanks, and enabled him to avail himself of the support of the guns on the opposite bank. His right rested on the Adour, his left on a morass. The artillery could sweep his front with a defensive fire; and he judiciously placed his rocket-men on either flank. The French had nearly 1500 men, and advanced to the attack with some show of resolution; when the rockets opened on them. and being well directed, swept through their ranks with so rushing a sound, and so destructive an effect, that the novelty startled and appalled them.

They seemed paralyzed with astonishment, and a few quickly following discharges of these ground-rockets drove them back in haste and fear. More men were crossed over in the night at slack water; and on the following evening the first division, two guns, and a squadron of dragoons, were established on the right bank

The flotilla appeared off the Adour on the morning of the 25th, and at three in the afternoon, it being then high water, stood for the bar in single file. The wind was fair, and the weather clear and brilliant, but a heavy swell from the westward broke upon the bar, and the surf was high. The shores were crowded with troops, in breathless anxiety for the fate of the leading vessel, which most persons expected to perish; for, in the morning, two of the men-of-war's launches had been swamped and some lives lost. She passed safely however, though half filled with water, and was close followed by others with like success. As they shot up with the tide, the soldiers on either bank gave three loud and exulting cheers of welcome. Thirty-four of these chasse marées ran safely over the high surf,

keeping right before it, and dipping their bowsprits under water as they came in: but three or four of the vessels of this flotilla were driven on shore, swamped, or went to pieces. The chasse marées that entered were now anchored head and stern upon the line chosen, in a most masterly manner, by the naval officers and their brave seamen. The sappers worked hard all night, and by noon on the following day a solid strong bridge was laid down and reported passable. Troops and artillery now filed over it, and the citadel of Bayonne was closely invested. The garrison were found laboring at an advanced line of defence, and held strong posts in the villages in front of it. Sir John Hope drove them within their advanced line, and seized these villages.

The place was now closely blockaded, and the advanced posts of the investing corps were most carefully strengthened, for the garrison amounted to 10,000 men under general Thouvenot, with several gun-boats on the river under his defences. Therefore a boom was stretched across the Adour above the bridge just laid down; and the troops in reserve, as well as on the advanced posts, were held in constant readiness, both night and day, to stand to their arms.

CHAP. XIV.

THE BATTLE OF ORTHEZ.—THE RETREAT OF THE FRENCH.—THE COMBAT OF AIRE.—LORD WELLINGTON MARCHES HIS LEFT WING UPON BORDEAUX.—THE RECEPTION OF THE DUKE OF ANGOULEME IN THAT CITY.—STATE OF AFFAIRS IN FRANCE.—THE MOVEMENTS OF SOULT.—LORD WELLINGTON'S MANŒUVRES.—THE BATTLE OF TOULOUSE.—SOULT DEFEATED.—THE SORTIE FROM BAYONNE.—THE ABDICATION OF NAPOLEON.—FERDINAND'S RETURN TO SPAIN.—THE RESTORATION OF THE BOURBONS IN FRANCE.

By lord Wellington's earliest operations on the right, that flank of his army had been at once cleared, and the enemy had been driven from a country much intersected by rivers, and singularly difficult and defensible.

The position Soult now occupied at Sauveterre was covered by a broad river, and in other points very advantageous. Lord Wellington made so strong a demonstration upon the front of the line on which Soult now rested, that while the attention of the marshal was wholly engaged by the movements in his front, Sir Rowland Hill crossed the Gave d'Oleron at Villenave, without any opposition, on the 24th of February, and turned his left. Upon this Soult hastily abandoned his ground, transferred his head-quarters to Orthez, and took up a formidable position behind the Pau. The third and light divisions, under Sir Thomas Picton,

had followed the corps of Hill, and passed the Gave d'Oleron at the same spot; and the sixth division, under Sir Henry Clinton, had crossed also between Montfort and Laas, without meeting any resistance, while marshal Beresford, on the left, kept the enemy close within their tête-de-pont at Peyrehorade. Lord Wellington, now disposing his force in three columns, determined to attack the position of Orthez. The left, under marshal Beresford, forded the Pau about four miles above Peyrehorade, and marching up the right bank, joined the cavalry and general Picton's division, which had crossed by a ford below Berenx. Sir Rowland Hill, with his own corps, supported by the sixth and light divisions, marched to force the bridge of Orthez; but the approach was found so strongly guarded by defences and troops, that the attempt was countermanded.

About eight in the morning of the 27th of February, the sixth and light divisions were moved down the river (to the spot where Picton had forded on the afternoon of the preceding day), and crossed over by a bridge of boats, which lord Wellington had directed to be laid down for the artillery. The corps of Sir Rowland Hill remained upon the high road to Sauveterre, opposite the bridge and village of Orthez. The passage of the Pau, from the depth of the fords and the force of the current, proved very difficult; but the soldiers, by supporting each other steadily, surmounted the danger, and crossed without loss.

Lord Wellington, having carefully reconnoitred the enemy's position, decided to attack it.

Their left flank rested upon the town of Orthez, and their line was posted upon a range of heights extending about a mile in the direction of Dax. Their right stood on a bluff, abrupt point, and was covered in front by the village of St. Boes. The centre of their line, owing to the form of the hill, stood considerably retired; and, being thus sheltered by the advanced position of the flanks, was unassailable. A reserve of two divisions of infantry and a brigade of cavalry, was drawn up on a very elevated and commanding height upon the road to Sault de Navailles.

The dispositions of lord Wellington were soon made. Marshal Beresford, with the fourth and seventh divisions, and colonel Vivian's brigade of cavalry, were ordered to carry the village of St. Boes on the right, and to assault the hill above it. Sir Thomas Picton was ordered to march with the third and sixth divisions, and a brigade of cavalry under lord Edward Somerset, upon the centre and left of the enemy. The light division, under baron Alten, was directed to advance up a ravine between these two columns, and to give support where it might be wanted. Sir Rowland Hill was instructed to lead his corps across the river by a ford about two miles above Orthez, to gain a point in the enemy's rear, and cut off his communication with the town of Pau.

The left wing of the allies began the battle. Sir Lowry Cole, with the fourth division, after a sharp contest, carried the village of St. Boes with spirit. Marshal Beresford now moved forwards, with the division of general Cole still leading, to attack the right of the enemy on the bold hill above. The troops advanced in gallant order, but the approach was along a narrow ridge, with ravines on either side. Upon the summit of this, two lines of French infantry were drawn up to oppose them. It was not possible for the assailants to advance upon the enemy in a line of more than two battalions in front. The ground over which they marched was commanded by a heavy battery of field-artillery; and in the upper part of the ravines upon their flanks the French had posted strong bodies of light infantry. The troops behaved admirably well, and made brave efforts to reach the summit of the position, but in vain.

They were beaten back by a terrible fire both of artillery and infantry. A Portuguese brigade was so roughly handled, that it broke in confusion, and was only saved by the timely support of a brigade of the light division, which moved up on its flank and covered its retreat. Under these circumstances, lord Wellington executed one of those sudden changes of attack which exhibit the ready resource and firm resolve of a bold and able general.

He directed general Walker, with the seventh division, and colonel Barnard, with a brigade of the light division, to ascend the height by its left, and attack the enemy's right at that bend by which it was connected with the centre. At the same time, he ordered Sir Thomas Picton and Sir Henry Clinton to lead forward their divisions, which had hitherto been waiting the result of marshal Beresford's assault. Thus, suddenly, the face of the battle was changed; for these orders were executed with such rapidity and boldness, that the crest of the position was soon gained, and, after some fierce and desperate fighting on the heights, the enemy suddenly retired, moving off at first with good order, and disputing their ground as they retreated handsomely. A body of French cavalry, in particular, made a gallant charge upon two corps of the sixth division in an effort to seize the artillery of that division, but it failed, and they were repulsed steadily by the 42d foot. All the regiments of the third division fought hard, and were distinguished; and a brigade under general Inglis made a most gallant charge with the bayonet on the enemy's left flank; nor could any thing be finer than the advance of the 52d regiment under colonel Colborne, which, after the change of attack, led first up the hill.

Marshal Soult conducted his army to the rear in regular échelons of divisions, and they held the several positions taken up till the allies closed on their front and moved upon their flank;

but, as soon as he found that lord Wellington had sent a corps across the river, and that Sir Rowland was in full march to intercept his retreat, he hastened the pace of his columns, till, as Sir Rowland pressed onwards upon a parallel line of march to cut him off from Sault de Navailles, the French broke their formation, and ran for that point with such speed that the great body of them passed it in a crowd. However, nearly two thousand prisoners were taken in the pursuit; for, wherever any obstacle checked their hurry, they suffered greatly. Near Sault de Navailles lord Edward Somerset charged them with his cavalry, and captured a great number of prisoners; and they left several guns to the victors. The French loss in killed, wounded, and taken, exceeded 6000, and some hundreds afterwards deserted, or rather disbanded, and went to their homes.

In this battle lord Wellington was struck by a spent ball,—happily it did but graze his skin,—nor did he quit his saddle till the day was won; but he then found himself so lamed and stiff, that he could not ride in the pursuit.

The French army retired in the night to Hagetman, where it was joined by the garrison of Dax, and continued its retreat to St. Sever. At the same time Soult directed a considerable body of troops to march upon Aire, and to cover the removal of large magazines collected at that place.

As the allies advanced. the main body of the enemy at St. Sever fell back upon Agen. The left of the allied army, under marshal Beresford, was now directed on Mont de Marsan; while the right, under Sir Rowland Hill, pursued that corps of the enemy detached to Aire. Unfortunately, the rains set in again on the evening of the battle, and fell so heavily, that the rivers and streams were soon swollen; the march of the allies was thus greatly impeded, for the enemy destroyed all the bridges in their rear. However, Sir Rowland Hill came up to the enemy on the 2d of March, and found them in position before the town of Aire. They were drawn up on a ridge of hills, which extended across the main road leading to the town, and their right rested upon the Adour. Sir Rowland attacked them instantly; the second division advanced by the road, and a Portuguese brigade ascended the heights upon their left. The columns were commanded by Sir William Stewart, and the Portuguese were led by general de Costa. The second division, notwithstanding the strength of the position, carried the point, which they assailed with great steadiness and vigor; but the Portuguese brigade, although they gallantly won the height, were so stoutly resisted afterwards, that their formation was broken, and they would have been driven off in confusion had not general Barnes come promptly to their aid. The success of the second division enabled Sir William Stewart to detach the brigade of Barnes,

and thus, just as the French were about to fall upon the Portuguese with a column well formed and full of confidence, they themselves were charged by the British and beaten off the field. Nevertheless the enemy rallied, and made a strenuous effort to recover their ground; but the brigade of general Byng, which had been hitherto in reserve, was now brought forward, and the French soon gave up the contest; and, abandoning the position and the town, hastily crossed the Adour in so great disorder, that many were taken prisoners in the pursuit, and a small body, being separated from the main force, fled fast towards the town of Pau. In this affair the allies lost about 150 killed and wounded; and here the honorable lieutenant-colonel Hood, of the staff, was slain.

Marshal Soult now conducted his army up the right bank of the Adour, and upon the 3d of March he had again collected all his forces at Plaisance, Madiran, and Maubourget, in the full impression that his opponent would follow him; but lord Wellington, finding the road to Bordeaux open, instantly directed his left wing upon that important city, and thus, not only carried the war into the heart of France, but to a province where the memory of the house of Bourbon was yet cherished. The arrival of the duke d'Angoulême at St. Jean de Luz, two months before this period, had been a circumstance then of some little embarrassment to lord Wellington. The British government had, at that time, taken no ground on which he could venture to recognize that prince at head-quarters in any other character than that of a private individual, volunteering to serve in the common cause against the ruler of France and the enemy of all Europe. However, the course of events, the progress of the allied arms, and the ascertained dispositions of the citizens of Bordeaux, had now brought together many circumstances favorable to the hopes of the Bourbons, and to the restoration of that ancient and unhappy house.

The inhabitants of Bordeaux, with a garrison of Napoleon's controlling them, could not of course, as yet, give a free and open expression to their sentiments. Therefore, marshal Beresford was instructed to drive out the garrison and take possession of the city. But, before this movement was made, the Spanish reserve under general Freire was brought forward, and all the disposable troops except the three divisions under Beresford closed to the right. Upon the 8th, that general advanced towards the Garonne.

As early as the 1st of March, the duke d'Angoulême left St. Jean de Luz, and rode forwards by easy journeys to join this corps of the army. He was accompanied by the count Damas and a British officer, their grooms, and one orderly dragoon. The duke himself preserved a quiet and retired demeanor well

becoming his position; however, the old count Damas could not avoid telling the people as he passed who the duke was. For this purpose, he often fell behind the party, and conversed with such groups of Frenchmen as they passed upon the road. The intelligence was almost everywhere received with a decided expression of satisfaction and respect. There were no loud acclamations, but the good disposition was evident and general. One remarkable exception occurred worthy to be noticed. At Peyrehorade the postmaster recommended that the mayor only should be apprized, as he said, the inhabitants *having many of them been enriched by the plunder of the emigrants were bad spirits.* When indeed they discovered who their illustrious guest was, they ventured no insult, but gazed upon him with more curiosity than attachment. In many parts of the duke's route, the people, hearing beforehand of his approach, crowded to the road-side, were loud in their joy, and showed strong marks of good-will. The utmost cordiality was everywhere manifested by the clergy, and the farther he advanced, the more hearty and fearless was the reception given him by the people.

From the moment that the hopes of the exiled family had recovered; and before the duke d'Angoulême went to St. Jean de Luz, an agent of the Bourbons had visited Bordeaux, had seen M. de la Roche-Jacquelein, and communicated to him the wishes of Louis XVIII. That zealous and courageous royalist immediately exerted himself in the cause of the king, and a disposition was soon evinced among the inhabitants of Anjou and Touraine to renounce their allegiance to Napoleon and restore the ancient line of princes. Of the existence of this feeling, Buonaparte was soon apprized, and Savary received orders to arrest M. de la Roche-Jacquelein as the secret promoter of this dangerous conspiracy: but, being privately warned of this while in the country, by an express from M. Lynch of Bordeaux, he escaped thither on the instant, and from thence, with some difficulty and danger, to the British head-quarters. Here he made warm representations of the state of the public mind in Bordeaux, and expressed his desire to be intrusted with a few hundred men that he might land on the coast of Poitou and rouse the spirit of La Vendée. Lord Wellington listened to M. de la Roche-Jacquelein with interest and respect; but, considered it doubtful whether the attachment of the people to the Bourbons was so decided as the sanguine wishes of his loyal informant led him to represent it. Moreover, as the allies were then recognizing Buonaparte as the sovereign of France, he was not authorized to entertain any such proposition as was thus made to him. However, the correctness of the statement of this ardent royalist as regarded Bordeaux was now confirmed.

As soon as marshal Beresford approached the city, general

L'Huillier withdrew the garrison and retired to the right bank of the Garonne. Upon this the entire population of Bordeaux, headed by their civil authorities, came out to greet the allies; received them as deliverers, and hailed the duke d'Angoulême with the loudest enthusiasm. They all wore the white cockade, and, upon the entrance of this prince, they destroyed all the badges of the existing government, and proclaimed Louis XVIII. with unhesitating boldness. All this they did upon their own risk, without one pledge or promise of protection, or one stipulation in their favor; should the negotiations then pending at Châtillon so terminate as to leave Buonaparte their master by the voice of the allies. This early and decided declaration for the Bourbons lord Wellington had not expected or advised. On the contrary, while glad to have military occupation of a city with such dispositions, he had recommended patience as their prudent and their proper course till the congress of Châtillon had terminated its sittings, and closed their treaty.

While these things were passing in the south of France, Napoleon, at the head of as large a force as he could assemble, was defending the approaches to his capital with an ability and spirit never in his most fortunate and successful campaigns exceeded. All his efforts had only enabled him to collect an army numerically feeble, while upon all sides the allies were advancing from the Rhine in mighty and resistless strength. Yet this man of energy, by the skill of his combinations, and by the length and rapidity of his marches, was opposing alternately the head of every hostile column with superior numbers. Though they were thrusting him down from the pinnacle of his pride, he was plucking laurels as he fell. Already the allies had penetrated to Laon, and had, though for a time only, occupied Soissons: still fearless, still hopeful, he was making head in the field against the confederated armies of Europe, and struggling in the congress for such conditions as would have left him master of many important fortresses beyond the ancient limits of France; and, as a consequence, enabled him, after a convenient repose, again to march forth as the disturber of all Europe.

The march directed by lord Wellington upon Bordeaux at such a moment, and the popular movement, produced a remarkable effect all over the South of France, and it extended to the very heart of the country.

Marshal Soult instantly published an angry and stormy proclamation, full of impotent abuse against the English nation, and of mean invectives against the victorious leader of her gallant army. This document showed plainly the full value of that advantage which the allies had gained by the march upon Bordeaux. To counteract this movement, and if possible to bring back the allies from the Garonne, Soult suddenly advanced on

the 13th of March to Conchez and Viella on the right flank of the allies, drove in the piquets of Sir Rowland Hill, and menaced the corps of that general with the serious attack of his whole force. Sir Rowland immediately disposed his corps with their left at Aire, their right at Garlin, and the little river of Gros Lees in his front; and lord Wellington sent two divisions to support him.

Soult took post opposite the allies upon a ridge of very strong ground, and displaying great numbers, kept them in doubt as to his own intentions, and thus reckoned on compelling Wellington to evacuate Bordeaux. In this he was disappointed; for, though lord Wellington sent Beresford orders to lead back a part of his corps, he directed that one division should be left in that city. However, the corps of Sir Rowland Hill being already strengthened by two divisions, Soult did not attempt any thing further, but remained in presence of the allies the whole of the 14th, and judging from appearances that lord Wellington might attack him on the morrow, he drew off in the night. The allies followed him, and found his rear-guard strongly posted at Mascarras, with his main body in position at Burosse. On the approach of the advanced guard, the whole of the enemy retired upon Vic Bigorre. During the 16th and 17th, the allies halted. Upon the 18th, having been joined by some reserve artillery and cavalry, and by the Spanish corps from Irun, the whole army again advanced. Upon the 19th, they marched in two columns upon Vic Bigorre; the right moving by Lembege, and the left by Maubourget. At Vic the enemy's rear-guard being strongly posted among the vineyards in front of the town, held its ground until dislodged by the light companies of the third division, and a Portuguese brigade, after a brilliant skirmish.

The same evening Soult collected his whole army on the right bank of the Adour. Here he placed his troops in position on some favorable heights with his left resting on Tarbes, and his right extending in the direction of Rabastens.

Upon the 20th, lord Wellington directed the corps of Sir Rowland Hill, and the third division, to advance upon the enemy's front, while Sir Henry Clinton, with the sixth division, supported by two brigades of cavalry, should cross the Adour near Vic, and march to turn his right. These manœuvres were well executed and completely successful. Sir Rowland drove the enemy to the heights beyond Tarbes, his light troops charging them through the streets of the town; and, as soon as the French marshal discerned the column of Sir Henry Clinton upon his right, he fell back upon a strong ridge of heights in his rear nearly parallel to his former position, and upon which his reserve was already formed. The fresh dispositions necessary to attack this post could not be completed till it was already too late in

the evening to dislodge him. In the night, however, Soult retired by St. Gaudens on Toulouse. Being without encumbrances he marched rapidly, destroyed the bridges in his rear, and entered Toulouse on the 24th. The cavalry, under general Fane, came up with his rear-guard at St. Gaudens, and made some prisoners, but he was not further molested. The allies being encumbered with a pontoon train, followed by most of their supplies, and moving over bad roads under heavy rain, marched slowly, and did not arrive before Toulouse till the 27th, when they halted upon the left bank of the Garonne opposite the city.

Here Soult assembled every disposable soldier, and occupied a position, the local advantages of which he carefully improved by fortifying the approaches with skill, and constructing on the position itself redoubts of considerable strength.

The city of Toulouse covers a space of ground, about two miles in length from north to south; and the breadth from east to west is a mile and a quarter. The Fauxbourg St. Cyprien stands on the left bank of the Garonne, and is surrounded, like the city itself, by an ancient wall of brick, lofty, of considerable thickness, and flanked by towers. This fauxbourg is connected with the city by a good bridge of stone.

About two miles below the city the canal of Languedoc enters the Garonne. This canal and the river surround Toulouse on three sides. On the fourth, or to the south, an open space extends from the Garonne to the canal. To the east of the canal there is a range of heights, and beyond flows a river called the Ers. All the roads from the eastward pass over these heights.

Here was the field position of the enemy. Upon the left and centre five redoubts had been constructed of a very strong profile, and they were connected by lines of intrenchment; but the right of this line, being covered by the river Ers at the distance of half-gun-shot, had no such defences. The bridges on the canal were guarded by têtes-de-pont, and commanded by artillery from the old walls of the city. All the bridges over the Ers by which their right could be approached were broken down, except one at the village of Croix d'Orade, which they left standing for their convenience, with the intention of destroying it at the last moment. On the side of St. Cyprien, the enemy had thrown up strong field-works in front of the ancient walls, and formed an impregnable tête-de-pont. The south front of the city is not covered either by the river or the canal; but it cannot be directly approached, owing to the badness of the roads, which are not practicable for artillery, and to those heights upon the east which command them. The width and rapidity of the Garonne completed the security of the enemy's position, and increased the difficulties of the assailant.

On the 28th lord Wellington attempted to lay down a bridge

at Portet, a village above the town; but, when the sheer line was stretched across, the width proved more than the pontoons would cover. Upon the 31st, a passable point was found higher up. It was some time, however, before the spot was fixed on. When, after the difficulty of the 28th, some officer had expressed an apprehension that it might not be practicable to lay down a bridge till the river had fallen, lord Wellington observed instantly, with cheerful animation, but with strong decision, "If it will not do one way, we must try another; for I never in my life gave up any thing I once undertook."

As soon as the pontoons were laid down near Ropues, on the 31st, Sir Rowland Hill led his corps across the river; but, from the state of the roads, and the nature of the country, which had been soaked with the late rains, he found it impossible to march upon Toulouse from that point. The efforts were, for a time, persevered in; but the road proving quite impassable, he countermarched, and returned to the left bank. On the 4th of April, a bridge was laid down considerably below the city, at a bend in the river, about half a league above Grenade. Here, under the cover of flanking batteries, marshal Beresford, with the fourth and sixth divisions and some cavalry, crossed and established himself on the right bank. These troops were to have been followed by the Spanish corps under general Freire, and by the light division; but the river suddenly rose, and it became necessary to take up a part of the bridge instantly, and on the morrow to remove the whole. Thus marshal Beresford was left upon the right bank in a very anxious position, and might have been attacked by a very superior force. However, no attack was made. The river subsided, and, upon the 8th, the pontoons were again put down, and the Spaniards of Freire crossed to the right bank; a brilliant affair of cavalry, in which the 18th hussars, led by colonel Vivian, overthrew a body of the enemy's horse in front of the village of Croix d'Orade, enabled that officer to seize the bridge, and thus secure an approach to the enemy's position of great importance. In this skirmish the French were pursued so closely that they lost 100 prisoners. During this period the corps of Sir Rowland Hill remained in front of the fauxbourg St. Cyprien; and the attention of the enemy was thus diverted from marshal Beresford. On the night of the 8th, the bridge by which that marshal and the Spaniards had crossed the Garonne was removed and brought higher up the river, and put down near Ausonne. This could not be effected so as to admit of the light division passing, on the 9th, soon enough for a general engagement on that day: but, early on the 10th, the light and third divisions crossed the river, and the whole army was in motion, or under arms, to attack the enemy.

The corps of Sir Rowland Hill observed the Fauxbourg St.

Cyprien, and confined the enemy closely within his works. The third division was to make a heavy demonstration against the canal bridge and the town immediately to the right of the river; the light division was to act upon the left of the third, and to observe and shut up the road of Paris. Marshal Beresford was to lead the fourth and sixth divisions across the Ers, seize the village of Mont Blanc; and, moving along the left bank of the Ers, till he gained the right flank of the enemy's position, he was to form and attack it. The Spaniards under Freire were to ascend the left of the enemy's position at the same moment that Beresford assaulted the right, and push forward upon the heights till they should meet his column. Such were the dispositions for the attack.

The heights upon the left of the enemy's position, called La Pujade, were guarded by two divisions of infantry, having in their front a brigade of horse. Those of Mont Calvinet, on the right centre, were occupied by one division of infantry; and those of Montaudran, on the extreme right, were held by one brigade of infantry, with a strong body of cavalry in their front, on the road to Bordes. Heavy columns of reserve were posted in rear of the heights. The canal, from the rear of La Pujade to its junction with the Garonne, was guarded by strong bodies of infantry. The suburb of St. Cyprien was occupied by a division; and that of St. Etienne, upon the eastern side, by another; and various posts in the fauxbourg and on the walls were defended by reserve conscripts and national guards.

Marshal Beresford opened the battle, by crossing the bridge of Orade, and carrying the village of Mont Blanc. This done, he marched up the left bank of the Ers in three open columns over difficult ground in the finest order. As soon as he had reached a point opposite the extreme right of the enemy's position, he formed his lines of attack, and advanced steadily upon it. While Beresford was engaged in these preliminary movements, general Freire had formed the Spanish foot in front of Croix d'Orade in two lines of attack. A battery of Portuguese artillery was placed on a height near, to cover their movements; and general Ponsonby's brigade of cavalry was formed in their rear as a reserve.

The right and left of the heights occupied by the enemy were now assaulted at the same moment. The Spaniards advanced boldly, and drove in the first brigade of the French which they encountered; but, as they closed upon the enemy's works, the fire of grape became so deadly that they lost their formation, and went forward with great irregularity and confusion to a hollow road in front of the enemy's intrenchments, which was sheltered from the guns. The second line of the Spaniards advanced but slowly to their support. The French, seeing the difficulty and irresolution of the assailants, came upon them swiftly, and with

such vigor, that, with the exception of one regiment, the Spanish troops broke, and were driven back upon the Ers with a heavy loss. The general Freire and his best officers exerted themselves gallantly, and to the utmost, to check this disorder, and rally the fugitives. Lord Wellington, always present at the right place, and at the right moment, rallied a small body of them at an important point in person. The light division was brought up on the right of the Spaniards, and thus the enemy was checked in his hot pursuit; the bridge over the Ers was preserved; and general Freire was enabled to collect his discomfited battalions and form them anew.

The right of the enemy's position was already in the power of marshal Beresford. Nothing could exceed the steady gallantry with which general Clinton's division advanced up the steep height of Mont Calvinet, carried the redoubt which covered the right flank of that hill, and established themselves on the enemy's line. General Cole's division, in like order, but with a smaller loss, marched up the heights on the enemy's extreme right, and formed upon the summit: suffering little either from the brigade of infantry in their front, or the cavalry on their left flank.

At this period of the battle, 10,000 of the allies were drawn up on the same range of heights with the enemy, and marshal Beresford only awaited the arrival of his guns to follow up his success. Without artillery it was not possible to continue his movements against the enemy's centre; for they still occupied in strength a formidable line of intrenchments, two fortified houses, and four large redoubts.

Owing to this state of things, all further attacks upon the enemy were of necessity suspended. Meantime Soult strongly reinforced his cavalry on the heights of Montaudran, and drew from the fauxbourg St. Cyprien and the canal as many troops as could be spared to form reserves in the rear of Calvinet. By the repulse of the Spaniards, the French had obtained a considerable advantage; and, in another part of the field, they had given a severe and bloody check to the brave division of general Picton.

That officer had been directed to make a false attack on the canal bridge nearest to the Garonne. He exceeded these instructions, and thus committed his division in a real attack upon a formidable work which defended that bridge, and which, by the nature of its wide ditch, was found inassailable. General Picton was tempted to this effort by a quick perception of the advantage that would have been gained could he have pushed across the canal when the French drove the Spaniards from the heights of La Pujade, and advanced so far in pursuit of them. As soon as ever he discovered the impracticable nature of the tête-de-

pont, he drew off his division with haste; but they suffered very severely both from musketry and artillery.

Upon the left of the Garonne, Sir Rowland Hill confined the enemy within those works which they had erected in front of St. Cyprien, and made such demonstrations as kept them jealous and alarmed for that suburb.

About noon Beresford got up his guns, and the battle was renewed. He continued his movements along the ridge at the head of two divisions. The sixth, under Sir Henry Clinton, led; the fourth, under Sir Lowry Cole, followed; and both advanced upon the enemy's redoubts in line. Soult determined, instead of waiting for this attack in the line of his works, to anticipate it by a sudden and weighty assault on the sixth division, both in front and flank; counting, if successful, to overpower them before the fourth division could come into action. He therefore ordered the divisions of Clausel and Taupin to attack that of general Clinton in front; and the brigade of general Leseur, with a regiment of chasseurs and the cavalry of general Berton, to fall upon its flank. The French pushed resolutely out, and met the advancing line in ground where the fire of their redoubts could render them no support.

The struggle was fierce and bloody, but it did not last long; and was finally decided by the bayonets of the British. General Taupin was killed, and his division driven back in confusion upon their works. The two principal redoubts, and the fortified houses in the centre of their position, were instantly carried by a brigade of the sixth division under general Pack.

All these things might be seen from the walls and the roofs of Toulouse, which were crowded with anxious and agitated spectators. Animated by the consciousness of this, the French soldiers formed again, and, supported by the reserves on the canal, made a desperate effort to recover these redoubts; but it was vain. In vain did Soult renew the assault with a stubborn and determined spirit; in vain did he form his weakened divisions upon a new line, in the hope that he might yet hold the works of La Pujade on his left, and cover his right by those of the Pont de Demoiselles on the canal: marshal Beresford pursued his success with ability and vigor. The Spaniards, who had been reformed, advanced upon the left of La Pujade, and the gallant sixth division pushed towards the same point. The French, abandoning the redoubts upon those heights, now rapidly passed the canal; and the citizens of Toulouse saw the banners of England, Portugal, and Spain waving upon the conquered hill in triumph.

The victory of Toulouse cost the British and Portuguese more than 4500 killed and wounded, and the loss of the Spaniards exceeded 2000: the French had two generals killed, and three

wounded and taken. On the side of the allies many superior officers were wounded; and lieutenant-colonels Coghlan of the 61st, and Forbes of the 45th, were killed. Several of the British regiments, especially in the sixth division, lost more than half their numbers, and were distinguished by their valor.

The French had now but one road open for their retreat: they could not force across the Garonne by the suburb of St. Cyprien; for Sir Rowland Hill had, during the battle, possessed himself of their exterior works in front of that suburb, had shut them up within the ancient wall, and guarded that bank of the Garonne closely and in strength. The battle of Toulouse was fought on Easter Sunday; and, on the day following, the terrified inhabitants saw 30,000 troops within their walls, and busy preparations to defend the city. It is not probable that Soult ever seriously thought of such a measure; though he spoke of defending it to extremity, and burying himself beneath the ruins. He understood his military position too well, and knew perfectly the actual temper of the inhabitants; therefore, when he observed the dispositions of lord Wellington to complete the investment of Toulouse, he evacuated the city by night, on the 12th of April, taking the road of Ville-Franche, and retired the day following to Castelnaudry.

Toulouse now threw wide her gates to the conquerors, and welcomed them with loud expressions of joy and confidence. Nor is there any reason to suppose they were not sincere. All were suddenly released from very terrible anxieties and fears,—all were desirous of peace,—all hated the military yoke of Napoleon, and trembled at their own troops. The clergy, and most of those who respected the altar and the throne, still cherished the memory of the Bourbons: therefore they displayed the white flag; they mounted white cockades; they shouted "Vive le roi!" and they hailed Wellington as their deliverer.

One reflection connected with the victory of Toulouse is mournful: had the actual state of affairs at Paris been communicated with the least possible delay, the battle perhaps never would have been fought, and the life-blood of many gallant men might have been spared. It was not till the evening of the 13th that dispatches arrived from Paris with intelligence that Napoleon had abdicated, and that the Bourbons were restored. This information was brought by two officers, one of each nation, and immediately communicated to Soult; but that marshal demurred, and, refusing to send in his adhesion to the new government till he could ascertain the real state of public affairs, would only propose a suspension of hostilities. This lord Wellington refused, as a course unnecessary, and tending to keep up disquiet and alarm in the public mind, and instantly put his army in

motion to follow Soult. As soon as the allies advanced, the marshal formally recognized the provisional government of France; and on the following day, the 18th of April, hostilities ceased, and a line of demarcation was established between the army of Soult and that of the allies. The battle of Toulouse was not the closing scene of this memorable campaign in the south of France. Upon the morning of the 14th of April, the governor of Bayonne made a furious sortie upon the investing corps. The French sallied from the citadel in great strength, and, rushing upon the intrenched village of St. Etienne, dislodged the allies before they could effectually resist or be supported from the rear. Here general Hay, who commanded the outposts for the night, was slain. The allied piquets in the centre were also forced back, and general Stafford was wounded. Nor did the disasters end here. Sir John Hope hastened early to the scene of action; but he was soon wounded, and his horse shot under him, and before he could be extricated was made prisoner by the enemy. However, reinforcements were quickly brought up; and the French being driven into the citadel, all the posts were re-established as before. The fighting was very severe, and at close quarters; many bayonet wounds were given, on both sides; and the opponents only discerned each other's ranks by the flashing of their muskets. The loss of the allies amounted to 800 killed, wounded, and taken; that of the French was yet greater.

As the works of the siege had not commenced, as there were no guns or stores upon the ground, and as the state of affairs at Paris had been communicated to the governor the day before, it is difficult to excuse this action of general Thouvenot: it consisted not with the necessary or the honorable performance of his duty, and can only be attributed to an expectation that Buonaparte would yet retrieve his affairs, and to a belief that he should again see the star of Napoleon in the ascendant. Meanwhile, the fall of his master was at the moment irrecoverable, and had been greatly precipitated by a blind and superstitious confidence in his talents and his fortunes. He was beaten in a general engagement at Arcis on the 20th of March, and his numbers in the field were reduced to 70,000 men; yet, by a movement of unexampled boldness, he threw himself with the main body of his army in rear of the vast allied force then collected on the Marne, on the 22d. The congress at Châtillon had broken up on the 19th, and Napoleon's minister had returned with their just and firm decision upon the only terms admissible. Now, therefore, it was, that, in the hope he should astonish and confuse their generals, as he often had done by an audacity of manœuvre that would paralyze the confidence of their soldiers,

he marched on Vitry and St. Dizier, and exclaimed with a daring vaunt, "I shall be at Vienna before they will be in Paris." The allied commanders were not moved by this desperate act of folly. They only followed his march with cavalry; and rapidly concentrating their forces at Chalon, they marched on Paris. The weak corps of Marmont and Mortier upon the Marne were driven back into the capital; and, upon the 29th of March, Paris was invested on the northern side by the grand armies of the allied monarchs. Marmont had more than 15,000 regular troops in that city; the gensdarmerie, the national guard, and retired military, would have more than doubled that amount of armed combatants. However, upon the 30th, after a short combat, the allies established themselves on the heights of Belle-vue; and Joseph Buonaparte the regent having quitted his charge, Paris capitulated. The barriers were given over to the allies the same evening, and in the night the regular troops of the French retired. According to the stipulation, they marched out with their artillery. The day following the allied sovereigns entered the city, and were received by the inhabitants with cheers and contentment.

The march of the allies on Paris was discovered by Buonaparte on the 26th, owing to an affair of posts at St. Dizier with the troops that had followed his route. It exceedingly perplexed him. He decided to countermarch on Paris; but Vitry on his direct road was garrisoned by Prussians, and therefore he had to conduct his army by a circuitous route 150 miles. He travelled forwards himself by post, and arrived within ten miles of the capital on the 31st; and there he was informed that it was already in possession of the enemy. He hastened back to Fontainbleau, and collected at that point all the troops which he could muster. Upon the 3d of April he would have again advanced towards Paris; but a decree of the conservative senate, passed on the 2d of April, had already decided upon his position. That body, finding that the allied powers would no longer treat with Buonaparte, or recognize him politically as the ruler of France, formally pronounced his deposition. By this act the nation and the army were absolved from the oath of allegiance to their late emperor; and the confidence of those superior officers and civil functionaries, who had to this moment faithfully adhered to him, was at once destroyed.

Thus, upon all sides pressed to submit, and plainly deserted by all those whose interests must have been the inevitable sacrifice of any continued attachment to his fortunes, he sullenly acquiesced in the decree of the senate.

By a generous arrangement of the allied sovereigns, the island of Elba was secured to him as a place of retreat in inde-

pendent sovereignty; and he was accompanied to this little and secluded kingdom by a small body of veteran soldiers, whose passion for war, and whose renown and life, seemed only capable of being retained and enjoyed in the presence of their idol.

The position of all those powers who had thus punished the crimes and confined the ambition of the greatest military despot that ever trampled upon the rights of nations and the happiness of man, was at this moment a proud one: that of England preeminently so. The standards of northern Europe were planted in the squares of Paris. The British flag was waving in the market-places of Bordeaux and Toulouse; and the banners of Portugal and Spain were floating calmly on the plains of southern France.

Such were the brilliant results of England's long and honorable struggle with that stern and tyrannous power which overshadowed Europe, and by which Britain, as the strong and sacred asylum of *true* liberty, was hated with immitigable hatred.

To maintain the best interests of England and of the troubled world, the supreme Disposer of human events provided in mercy a mighty champion. With a trust in God and the good cause, Wellington stood early forth. He contemplated the giant height of the French military power with an unshrinking eye, with an undazzled mind, and with a fearless heart.

The defence of Portugal was the deliverance of all Europe: for when the nations beheld Wellington, with so small an army of Britons, and with allies regarded hitherto as so despicable, defy, resist, and beat back a host of disciplined and brave French troops, led on by three marshals of France, their hearts swelled, and their tongues were loosened, and they cried out to be led again to battle. With new heart, and with new hope, they seized their arms; and the good cause advanced and prospered till the capital of France was taken, and the tyrant was dethroned. From the moment that Wellington entered France (and his were the first colors planted upon this sacred territory), he had contrived with such wisdom and virtue to separate in the minds of his soldiers the hostility they might feel towards Napoleon from those sentiments with which they were bound as brave men and good soldiers to consider and treat the inhabitants of France, that he succeeded entirely in restraining by principle, or chaining up by discipline, those natural feelings of revenge, which, but for their noble and humane commander, the Spaniards and Portuguese might have been tempted to indulge. At Toulouse, therefore, and wherever indeed he moved, lord Wellington was approached by the people with affection, and considered with high honor.

The events in Catalonia and Valencia during the spring of this year were inconsequent. Suchet sent another reinforcement to the armies in France early in March, and was therefore compelled to evacuate or destroy several strong holds; but he still maintained a position behind Figueras with the troops which yet remained to him. The Spaniards had recovered the fortresses of Lerida, Mequinenza, and Monzon by stratagem, which their possession of a French cipher, communicated by an officer that deserted to them, enabled them to effect, with little difficulty, in the middle of February. But the governor of Tortosa escaped their artifice by a wary test, and thus preserved his own fortress and that of Murviedro. However, in the middle of March, Buonaparte, finding he could not detach Spain from her alliance with England through the medium of his royal prisoner and dupe Ferdinand, determined to restore him to his people without any conditions. Ferdinand entered Spain by Catalonia; and travelled slowly by Gerona to Zaragossa, where he made a short sojourn, and thence to Valencia, where he abode for some weeks before he passed on to his capital. Everywhere his devoted subjects crowded upon his path, and flocked to his presence with loud and loyal acclamations. His name had been a watchword and a battle-word for many trying and miserable years. The king of Spain was now placed in a difficult position. The sceptre swayed by the caprice of a multitude proves always an iron rod, with which the best and wisest are oppressed. Injustice and oppression are the sure fruits of popular clamor and popular prejudice, whenever they can speak and act by the voice and hand of power.

The constitution, and its provisions as proclaimed and advocated by the cortez, were obnoxious to the great body of the Spanish people. They were not able to value aright the privileges conferred upon them; and they clamored for the dissolution of the cortez, and for the punishment of its most worthy members. Evil counsellors gathered fast around the restored monarch, and by flatteries and falsehoods they cheated his understanding, roused his prejudices, and hardened him to persecutions which were cruel and most unmerited by the unhappy objects of them. However we may condemn this conduct, however much it is to be deplored, yet the plain truth was this; the speculative men who had framed and advocated all the enactments of the new constitution had, by many and sweeping changes, disturbed the habits and offended the prejudices of the common people. Those improvements in their political condition which, brought forward gradually, would have elevated and blessed them, they naturally rejected then; because they could not, as yet, understand the value of these proffered boons,

for which they had never asked, and which they never therefore had desired. They were not prepared for a government *truly* free; and the theorists who would have bestowed it had outrun their spirit and their wishes, and would have made them turbulent and miserable. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the king and his advisers dissolved the cortez, and that the old despotism of the Spanish crown was fully restored, without one single amelioration for the people, or one softening restraint upon its exercise.

It will remain, however, to the end of time, an indelible disgrace upon the government of Ferdinand, that, instead of at once according an amnesty for all acts and opinions done and uttered by those who had so faithfully labored in the cause of Spain, the members of the regency, and many distinguished patriots of the late cortez, were banished, cast into dungeons, or in other modes punished and oppressed.

A happy and an honorable contrast to this wretched conduct was exhibited by that branch of the Bourbons whom late events had suddenly recalled to the throne of France. The circumstances and spirit of the two countries were in truth widely different; but never, perhaps, was a better or more conciliatory disposition manifested by any man upon ascending the throne of his fathers, than that of Louis XVIII.

CHAP. XV.

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON VISITS PARIS AND MADRID.—TAKES LEAVE OF THE ARMY AND RETURNS TO ENGLAND.—HIS RECEPTION.—REPAIRS AGAIN TO PARIS AS AMBASSADOR.—PROCEEDS TO THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA AS PLENIPOTENTIARY.—THE STATE OF FRANCE.—THE RETURN OF BUONAPARTE.—THE RENEWAL OF HOSTILITIES.—THE CAMPAIGN IN FLANDERS.—THE VICTORY OF WATERLOO.

The severe labors of his high command being now brought to a glorious conclusion, lord Wellington left Toulouse, on the night of the 30th of April, for Paris.

He reached the French capital on the 4th of May, and was received by the sovereigns, statesmen, and generals then at the court of Louis XVIII. with great consideration and regard.

The fame of his generous conduct in the south of France had preceded him, and the citizens of Paris, wherever he was recognized, paid him great honor and respect.

His elevation to the dignity of an English dukedom was here made known; and it may be remarked, that he had already received the insignia of every distinguished order in Europe.

The duke quitted Paris on the 10th of May, and, passing four days at Toulouse, repaired to Madrid, where Ferdinand confirmed all the honors which the cortez had conferred upon him, and created him captain-general of Spain. He left Madrid on the 5th of June, reached Bordeaux upon the 10th, reviewed the troops, and made arrangements for their embarkation. Upon the 14th of June, the duke of Wellington finally took leave of the army at Bordeaux. His order of thanks is remarkable for the contrast which it presents to those inflated addresses by which the vanity and the passions of Buonaparte's soldiers were flattered and nourished. We transcribe it—

"Adjutant-General's Office,
"G. O. Bordeaux, 14th of June, 1814.

"The commander of the forces, being upon the point of returning to England, takes this opportunity of congratulating the army upon the recent events which have restored peace to their country, and to the world.

"The share which the British army has had in producing those events, and the high character with which the army will quit this country, must be equally satisfactory to every individual belonging to it, as they are to the commander of the forces; and he trusts that the troops will continue the same good conduct to the last.

"The commander of the forces once more requests the army to accept his thanks.

"Although circumstances may alter the relations in which he has stood towards them for some years, so much to his satisfaction, he assures them he will never cease to feel the warmest interest in their welfare and honor; and that he will be at all times happy to be of any service to those to whose conduct, discipline, and gallantry, their country is so much indebted.

(Signed) "E. M. Pakenham, A. G."

The Duke landed at Dover on the 23d of June, under a salute from the batteries, and proceeded instantly to London.

As his carriage passed up Parliament Street, he was recognized, and the people ran upon his path with shouts of admiration and welcome.

After a short interview with his family, he hastened to Portsmouth. Here the prince regent received him with every mark of true respect and cordial affection which a prince could bestow.

These distinctions gave him honor not only before England, but in the face of Europe; for the emperor of Russia and the king of Prussia were at that period the guests of the English court.

Upon the 28th of June, the duke of Wellington, for the first time, took his seat in the House of Lords. The peers assembled in great numbers to do honor to his introduction. Upon this memorable occasion the duke appeared in a field-marshal's uniform, with the insignia of the garter, and was introduced to the house by the dukes of Beaufort and of Richmond.

He had left his native country, five years before, a commoner; those years he had passed in camps; and now, at his first appearance in the house of lords, his various patents of viscount, earl, marquis, and duke, were read upon the same day.

The lady Mornington, his mother, was present; the duchess of Wellington was also present.

He was addressed by the lord chancellor, and received the thanks and congratulations of the house "on his return [illegible] command on the continent, and for the great, signal, and eminent services which he had so repeatedly rendered therein to his majesty and to the public."

The duke was sensibly affected, and replied under an embarrassment of feeling he could with difficulty control. Nothing could be more dignified and modest than his reply; nor did he fail to point attention to the valor and exertions of that army which he had the honor to command.

The House of Commons also appointed a deputation to wait upon the duke of Wellington with like congratulations; and he attended the house in person to return thanks to that assembly. The 1st of July was fixed for this noble ceremony. When it was stated to the house, that in consequence of their intimation, the duke of Wellington was in attendance, and when the speaker put the question, "Is it the pleasure of the house that his grace be called in?" a loud and universal "ay!" rung through the hall. On his entrance all the members uncovered, rose, and enthusiastically cheered him. In his address, as in his reply to the lords, he dwelt forcibly on the zealous co-operation and assistance of his gallant friends, the general officers,* and the bravery of the officers and troops of the armies. This speech was received with the loudest cheers, and followed by an admirable address from the speaker, of which the following extracts merit very particular attention.

"It is not," said the speaker, "the grandeur of military success which has alone fixed our admiration, or commanded our applause; it has been that generous and lofty spirit which inspired your troops with unbounded confidence, and taught them to know that the day of battle was always a day of victory; that

* Upon all these, honors and rewards which they had well earned were gratefully bestowed.

moral courage and enduring fortitude, which, in perilous times, when gloom and doubt had beset ordinary minds, stood nevertheless unshaken; and that ascendency of character, which, uniting the energies of jealous and rival nations, enabled you to wield at will the fate and fortunes of mighty empires.

"It now only remains that we congratulate your grace on the high and important mission on which you are about to proceed; and we doubt not that the same splendid talents, so conspicuous in war, will maintain with equal authority, firmness, and temper our national honor and interests in peace."

When the duke retired, all the members again rose, uncovered, and warmly cheered him.

On Saturday the 9th of July, the corporation of London entertained the duke at a grand banquet, prepared with great cost and magnificence, and presented him with the freedom of the city in a gold box, and with a splendid sword. Here, as *upon all other occasions*, he made grateful allusions to the support of his officers, and the valor and discipline of the troops. When he received the sword, he declared with particular energy his readiness to employ it in the service of his king and country, should it unfortunately happen that the general wish of the nations of Europe for a permanent peace should be disappointed. This faithful pledge he was soon and seriously called upon to redeem.

His stay in England was short; but it was marked by every expression of hearty admiration, and true attachment, which a people could show. Wherever he went, the streets were thronged; the windows were full of animated and smiling faces; boys clustered upon the house-tops, and mothers lifted up their infant sons, that they might look at the man whom the whole country honored.

He had already been appointed ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to the court of France: and upon the 8th of August he left town for the continent. In his way to Paris he visited the Netherlands, and carefully examined the frontier fortresses upon that line, in company with the prince of Orange. On the 24th of August he was presented to Louis XVIII., delivered his credentials as ambassador, and took up his residence in Paris.

The principles and feelings of revolutionized France were of twenty years' growth. The youth of France, it is true, knew little of the revolution or of the republic, but of the Bourbons they knew nothing. They had been for the most part educated in military schools; had lived under a martial autocracy, and had imbibed a military spirit.

There were now scattered over the country numbers of dis-

banded and retired officers and soldiers, who had marched and fought under the imperial eagles. These men, who had been, for the most part, engaged in wars of aggression, amid changes of scene and chances of plunder, were miserable under their new and narrow circumstances. Their habits were roving and reckless, and they could not endure a stationary dwelling and peaceful occupations. With all such of the old army as had been retained under the new government, it was as bad or worse. They looked back upon their stern and warlike emperor as the soldier's friend, and they despised the unambitious and peaceful Louis. They hated the inactivity and the discipline of garrisons and barracks, and they panted for the field and the bivouac. They thought only of the excitement and the rewards of warfare, not upon its sufferings or its horrors—of victory, not of defeat—of glory, not of the grave.

It is little to be wondered at, that as a longing for the return of the emperor was cherished by so many, an expectation of it should be widely entertained, and that conspiracies to prepare it should be secretly engendered. At first the initiated affected a sort of mystery, established signals and words whereby the faithful Napoleonist might know each other, and wore secret emblems of brotherhood: but, after a time, they grew so carelessly or intentionally bold, that they openly spoke and jested about the return of spring and of the emperor. He came. He knew that war, terrible and unrelenting, would be the immediate and melancholy consequence of his return, to France herself, while he as an individual would be the solitary mark and sole object of the general armament and undivided hostility of all Europe. He knew, too, that civil war would be another result of his return; but with all this knowledge, he said, *he loved France*, and that France was dear to him: therefore he welcomed the proposals of those conspirators who paved the way for his reappearance, broke the convention which established him in the sovereignty of Elba, and escaped from that island.

He landed near Cannes, on the 1st of March, with a detachment of his guard, which had accompanied him to Elba, and immediately commenced his march to the capital. An address to the army had been prepared, and was distributed wherever he came. It was a loud clear war-denouncing trumpet, and everywhere the excited soldiers, whether old or young, answered the violent and welcome sound, with the well-known war-cry of "Vive l'Empereur!"

The defection of the army was almost universal, the exceptions being confined principally to officers of strict and honorable feeling, who would not violate their oath of allegiance to the king. We speak of superior officers, and men of influence and

in authority. The captains and subalterns of the regiments, who had the same conscientious feeling, could only manifest their fidelity by quitting their corps. That few among them entertained such a sentiment and made this sacrifice of their interest, is notorious.

In three short weeks, Napoleon was again seated on the imperial throne; was again coming forth to review troops, and talk of glory; and those fickle people who had crowded on his path as he quitted France, that they might insult him with imprecations, and who had just suffered him to retrace the same route, not only without resistance, but with noisy encouragement, were again his abject and his willing slaves. It is not surprising that a man, who had so many reasons for despising mankind as Napoleon, should have trampled upon their rights and their happiness with an indifference at once contemptuous and selfish.

While this sudden, magical, and bloodless change of sovereigns was effected in France, the powers who signed the treaty of Paris were assembled at the congress at Vienna. The duke of Wellington was there as the plenipotentiary for Great Britain, having quitted Paris for that capital, on the 24th of January, 1815 The very moment the ministers of the high allied powers there assembled, obtained information that Buonaparte had escaped from Elba, and appeared in France, and before the success of his enterprise was known, they made a solemn declaration of their sentiments and intentions. In this document they set forth, that Buonaparte had manifested to the universe, that there could be neither peace nor truce with him, and that he had placed himself without the pale of civil and social relations, as an enemy and disturber of the tranquillity of the world. They declared, therefore, that they were firmly resolved to maintain entire the treaty of Paris, of May 30th, 1814, and that they would employ all their means, and unite all their efforts, that the general peace, the object of the wishes of Europe, and the constant purpose of their labors, might not again be troubled.

The allies supported this declaration by a million of men in arms.

Buonaparte was in a palace, and upon a throne; but he felt himself regarded by the kings and courts of Europe as an adventurer and an outlaw; and he knew that, by all the better portion of the French people, he was rather tolerated than chosen. His only hope, and all his hope, was in the courage of a devoted soldiery; the power of his great genius for war; and that fortune of his star, in which he confided with a superstition that always imparted a remarkable energy to actions, which he seems often to have performed rather from secret and sudden impulse than from any deliberate exercise of judgment.

He was now again in possession of all the military resources of France; but there was a French court, and a king of France, at Ghent in the Netherlands, and the insecurity of his position was plain. He saw Europe hastening to arms for the avowed purpose of deposing him. Every thing, therefore, which it was possible for him to say, do, or promise, by which he could recover popularity with those various factions in France which hated his old system, and that great body of the nation which manifested a tired indifference to his rule, was at once thought upon and acted out. He assembled a legislative body, composed of men of all parties, and gave the country a new constitution. It was never designed to last long, but it answered in some feeble manner the purpose of the moment. It was something for the people to talk about, something new; and to make it amusing to the Parisians, it was to be declared, accepted, and sworn to, in solemn assembly, with ceremonies of great splendor. For this purpose, a temporary amphitheatre was erected in the Champ de Mars, capable of containing about 15,000 persons: here a throne was to be raised and an altar. The plain was to be filled with cavalry, troops of the line, and national guards; eagles were to be distributed, and from the sloping banks around, the people were to be diverted with the spectacle. This great convocation was to be called the "Champ de Mai."

While the preparations for this pageant were in progress, the undivided attention of Napoleon was constantly directed to the organization of the army. The fortresses were garrisoned; the arsenals were filled with stores; and the clothing, equipment, and arming of the new levies were carried on with a prodigious activity. By the first of June, he had 375,000 men under arms, exclusive of a national guard composed of 200 battalions; and he had remounted a large and admirable force of cavalry with incredible expedition.

At the grand ceremony of the Champ de Mai, which took place on the 31st of May, Napoleon, when he reviewed the troops, promised to have half a million of men under arms in a few weeks, exclusive of the national guards; and pledged himself that if the allies brought 600,000 men against him, he would oppose them with two millions.

Meantime the allies made great and prompt exertions. From the Vistula, from the Danube, and from Italy, the troops of Russia and of Austria were directed upon the frontiers of France. The advanced corps of Prussia had already entered Flanders; and an army of English, Belgian, and Hanoverian soldiers was assembled in the Netherlands, under the immediate command of the duke of Wellington. But the army of native English was not large; neither was it to be compared in its composition

with that which invaded France in the preceding year. Many of the finest, most effective, and most experienced infantry regiments of that army had been sent to America; and a large portion of the English force now sent to Flanders consisted of young second battalions. However, they were English in heart and spirit; and were supported by a numerous and noble cavalry, and an artillery not to be surpassed.

The duke of Wellington had arrived at Brussels from Vienna early in April, and immediately concerted his plan of operations with the Prussian general. The Prussian troops were collected on the Sambre and Meuse, and occupied Charleroi, Namur, and Liege. The line of the Prussian cantonments communicated by its right with the left of the army commanded by the duke of Wellington. Thus they were ready to act in concert, whilst, at the same time, each commander had to provide for a separate line of operations connecting him on one side with England, on the other by the lower Rhine with Prussia.

To cover Brussels was a great object; it was also necessary to guard the approaches from France by Tournay and Mons, and to prevent any attack upon Ghent from Lisle. All these roads were carefully examined, and the army of the duke was so disposed that any offensive movement might be immediately encountered. Whether it would be possible for the troops in advance to keep the enemy in check if he came on at any point with suddenness and force, till the allied armies were concentrated in a position covering Brussels, was the great difficulty.

France, on the Belgian frontier, was covered with fortresses; Belgium was naked and defenceless; thus Napoleon had vast facilities for concealing the assembly and disposition of his force, of which he availed himself with great ability. In the second week in June, troops began to collect in and behind these fortresses in considerable numbers. By forced marches Buonaparte suddenly concentrated his army in three large divisions, close to the frontier, on the night of the 14th of June. Of this army Soult was the major-general. It consisted of five corps of infantry; of the imperial guard; of four corps of cavalry; it marched with a field artillery of 350 pieces, and it numbered 130,000 fighting men. The infantry corps were commanded by generals d'Erlon, Reille, Vandamme, Girard, and Lobau; the cavalry corps by generals Pajol, Excelmans, Kellerman, and Milhaud. Marshal Ney commanded in the centre; Jerome Buonaparte on the left; marshal Grouchy on the right.

The Prussian army consisted of four corps, under generals Ziethen, Bulow, Borstel, and Thielman, commanded in chief by marshal Blucher, and was estimated at 100,000 men. The head-quarters of Blucher were at Namur.

The army of the duke of Wellington consisted of Dutch, Belgians, troops of Nassau, Brunswickers, Hanoverians, German legion, and British, and was computed under 80,000. Of this force only 33,000 were English. This army was organized in two large corps of five divisions each; the first was commanded by the prince of Orange; the second by lord Hill. The cavalry was under the orders of the earl of Uxbridge. The head-quarters of the duke of Wellington were at Brussels. The quarters of the prince of Orange were at Braine le Compte; those of lord Hill, at Grammont; the cavalry, under lord Uxbridge, was cantoned in small towns and villages on the right; and the artillery was cantoned principally near Ghent. Quatre Bras was the position chosen by the duke of Wellington as the point at which, should the enemy advance on that side, he was to be held in check till the concentration of the allies. The junction, be it remembered, was most ably and certainly accomplished. Nevertheless, all that could be done to prevent it, by rapidity of movement, skill of manœuvre, and boldness on the field of battle, was effected by Buonaparte.

According to his custom, he did not quit Paris till every preparation for opening the campaign was complete. "I go," said *this child and champion of democracy*, as he threw himself into his carriage, "I go to measure myself against Wellington." It was upon the 14th that he joined his guard; and dated from the imperial head-quarters at Beaumont one of those addresses of which he was so vainly fond, and which were certainly well suited to inflame the ardor of an army composed of Frenchmen. It was dated upon the anniversary of the battles of Marengo, and of Friedland; and it reminded them of the victories of Austerlitz and Jena. Of the English, as it could allude to no triumph over their arms, it spoke thus:—"Let those among you, who have been prisoners of the English, detail to you the hulks, and the frightful miseries which they suffered." Thus mortifying their vanity by bringing to their recollection how often they had been vanquished by Englishmen, and darkly insinuating the horrors of captivity in England, he appealed at once to the highest feeling of the soldier, and to the worst passion of the man. As the prisoners restored to France at the close of the war had been very numerous, and as they were all old soldiers, the ranks of the army now assembled contained many of these old campaigners; and this sentence of his address was admirably contrived to call forth all their courage, and kindle all their revenge.

At sunset, on the 14th of June, all was quiet upon the frontier; and nothing had been observed at the Prussian outposts. At three o'clock in the morning of the 15th of June, the French

columns were put in motion; and the Prussian posts at Thuin and Lobez, on the Sambre, were attacked at daylight.

A report of this event reached the duke of Wellington in the evening of the same day, and he immediately ordered the troops to hold themselves in readiness for the march. As soon as intelligence from other quarters proved to him that the enemy's movement upon Charleroi was the real attack, he put his army in motion to its left.

The orders for this memorable march were decided upon in a ball-room at Brussels, where the duke of Wellington was present, and where, towards midnight, the dispatches confirmatory of the enemy's true line of operation reached him. The general officers were quietly warned, and quietly disappeared from that assembly, and among them the brave duke of Brunswick. Soon after the younger officers were summoned from the dance. The troops were already mustering; and before the day broke all were marching to the field of honor, and many to an early grave.

The enemy drove the Prussian outposts from the Sambre on the 15th; and general Ziethen, who commanded the corps at Charleroi, retired slowly and in good order upon Fleurus. Marshal Blucher concentrated the Prussian army upon Sombref with all possible activity, and occupied the villages of St. Amand and Ligny, in front of that position. The head-quarters of Buonaparte were at Charleroi on the 15th. But the French troops under Ney continued their march along the road to Brussels, and on the same evening his advanced guard attacked a brigade of the army of the Netherlands under the Prince de Weimar, posted at Frasnes, and forced it back to the farm-house on the same road, called Les Quatre Bras. At this point the roads from Charleroi to Brussels, and from Nivelles to Namur, intersect each other.

The prince of Orange immediately reinforced the brigade of the prince of Weimar with that of general Perponcher; and early in the morning of the 16th recovered part of the ground which had been lost. Thus the communications leading from Nivelles and Brussels to Blucher's position were again cleared. In the mean time the whole army of the duke of Wellington was marching upon Les Quatre Bras. The fifth division, under Sir Thomas Picton, reached this point at about half-past two in the day, followed by the corps of the duke of Brunswick, and afterwards by the contingent of Nassau.

The duke of Wellington was in personal communication with Blucher, at Bry, about five miles to the left of Quatre Bras, early on the 16th. At that time the enemy was not in strength in the immediate front of Quatre Bras; but they were in force

between Frasnes and Gosselies, and an attack upon that post was to be expected. The activity, the skilful combinations, and admirable concert of the allied commanders, are thus evident; but, in war, the value of a few hours is immense,—and this advantage he who originates offensive movements can almost always command. Accordingly, Buonaparte was collecting heavy masses in front of the Prussian position, and was prepared to assail it with a great superiority of force before the fourth corps of the Prussian army under general Bulow had joined, and before the duke of Wellington could by any possibility afford marshal Blucher the support which he was desirous to give him. Many of the duke's troops, his cavalry in particular, had a long distance to march, and had not arrived; while such as were up, had to maintain their position at Quatre Bras, where the duke was present, against the violent attack of a large force assembled at Frasnes under marshal Ney. The enemy advanced to the attack, about three o'clock, with two heavy columns of infantry, a large body of horse, and a numerous and powerful artillery. The scene of action, at Quatre Bras, was among little dales and dips of ground and gentle slopes, covered with wheat and rye, which grows very tall.—It was a fine summer afternoon and a fine evening! At the commencement of this contest, there were not more than 19,000 of the allies in the field, and of these only 4500 British infantry. These last, and the troops of the Brunswick corps, were long and severely engaged, and fought nobly. The enemy repeatedly charged the British infantry with strong and weighty bodies of cavalry, but was repulsed with the most steady valor. The duke of Brunswick fell gallantly fighting at the head of his own troops. The conduct of the enemy was daring and resolute, and they at first obtained some success over the foreign cavalry; and their own coming fast upon the infantry before they had time to form squares, a part was forced to retire into an adjoining wood; but the French were repulsed.

Soon after this period, the third division, under general Alten, arrived, and were scarce posted before they were fiercely attacked. The 69th regiment being in square, was, by some mistake, ordered to deploy just as the French horse were coming on. Their approach, owing to the position of the ground and the tall rye, was not discerned till the dragoons were upon them, and they lost one color and many killed and wounded; but the enemy was driven off without making any prisoners, and, soon afterwards, from all those advanced points upon the left which he had before gained. Being repulsed on the left, Ney advanced from the wood of Bossu against the right of the position of Quatre Bras; but, at this moment, the guards under general

Cooke came up, and joined battle just as the Belgians were giving way; and this attack was also repelled. Under the direction of the duke, general Maitland led his brigade into the wood in the finest and most ardent manner, and the enemy was driven back upon Frasnes in confusion. The fighting on both sides had been desperate, and the loss was severe.

The 28th, 42d, 79th, and 92d regiments, and the battalion of Hanoverians, were mentioned in the dispatch, as very highly distinguished by their conduct on this day. The enemy were very superior in artillery, and had a most powerful cavalry; and it was only by great exertions that the duke was enabled to maintain, as he resolutely did, this important position. Had the French driven the British from Quatre Bras, the Prussian right would have been turned, and the armies of the duke and of Blucher separated; but, in this memorable campaign, the line of concerted operations was early occupied by the allied commanders, and maintained throughout.

Nevertheless, the attack upon Blucher was so weighty and fierce, and made with a force so superior, that, after a most bloody and obstinate battle, in which the Prussians behaved nobly, their centre was forced, the village of Ligny was taken, and a considerable body of French cavalry, with a strong corps of infantry, had penetrated to the very heart of the Prussian position. Here Blucher, in person, at the head of his cavalry, made a most heroic effort to re-establish the battle, but it failed, and the French remained masters of Ligny. As the fourth corps, under Bulow, was not up, and as he had been much weakened by heavy losses, Blucher retired from Sombref in the course of the night, and determined to concentrate his army upon Wavre; the enemy had suffered severely, and did not pursue him. In fact, the retreat was not known to Buonaparte, for it was dark when the battle ceased. He was still ignorant of the route which they had taken at twelve o'clock on the 17th, and then ordered Grouchy to pursue them with 32,000 men. That general could not get his corps in motion before three in the afternoon, only reached Gembloux that night, and did not arrive before Wavre till noon on the 18th, where he found and attacked the Prussian corps of general Thielman. The loss of the Prussians at Ligny amounted to 14,000 men and 15 pieces of artillery.

The retreat of the Prussians and the direction of it were not known to the duke of Wellington until seven o'clock on the morning of the 17th. Marshal Blucher had sent an aid-de-camp to him with that information, but he was unfortunately killed. These things were ascertained by a patrol, which the duke sent out to Sombref at daylight; and which, advancing beyond that place, and finding all quiet, discovered how little of the

Prussian position had ever been carried by the French. They had fallen back most leisurely, and their rear-guard had not evacuated Bry till three o'clock in the morning. The duke of Wellington had, by this time, collected his own army at Quatre Bras, and was prepared to have maintained that position; but this movement of the Prussians made a corresponding one necessary on his part.

He accordingly retired by Genappe upon Waterloo, about ten o'clock in the morning of the 17th. This march was executed in so leisurely a manner, and in such firm order, that the enemy did not attempt to molest it; but he followed the rear cavalry, under lord Uxbridge, with a large body of horse. As the advanced squadrons of the French debouched from the bridge and village of Genappe, an affair of cavalry occurred, in which a corps of French imperial lancers, having repelled an attack of the 7th hussars, was vigorously checked and severely handled by the first regiment of life-guards, with which corps lord Uxbridge executed a very decisive charge. It was late when the troops reached their ground. The weather was stormy, with heavy rain, thunder, lightning, and violent gusts of wind. The bivouac was dreary. The men lay upon the wet earth or amid the dripping corn, and longed impatiently for day. It came at last, and broke heavily through clouds. The rain ceased, but there was no sun: no "sun of Austerlitz" for Napoleon to allude to. However, the calm sunshine of good hope, of a good cause, and of high resolve, made it light in the breast of Wellington. The troops were already in position, and had taken up the ground they were to maintain. The whole French army, with the exception of the force under Grouchy, had followed them, and was now in front, and Buonaparte was commanding it in person.

The position of the allied troops, under the duke, was about half a league in advance of Waterloo and of the forest of Soignies. The right was thrown back to a long ravine near Merke Braine, a small hamlet, separated by an extended plateau from Braine la Leud. This village was also occupied, and a communication thus maintained with a cross road which leads to Brussels by Braine le Château. Upon this were stationed two brigades in observation, the one British, the other Belgian.

The left of the allies extended to a height above the hamlet of Ter la Haye, and was protected by a ravine which descends on that side towards Ohain, through which place lay the line of communication with the Prussians at Wavre. From thence Blucher had promised to support the duke with as many troops as might be necessary, if he should be attacked.

In rear of the British centre was the farm of Mont St. Jean, and farther behind, the village of that name. In rear of the

French centre was the farm of La Belle Alliance. The centre of the allied position crossed the two roads which, from Nivelles and from Charleroi, conduct to Brussels. These roads unite at the village of Mont St. Jean, and thence pursue the same chaussée to that capital.

Upon the left of the Nivelles road, in front of the right centre, was a Flemish mansion, with a walled garden, having a small wood and a paddock attached to it. This post being at the angle, from which the right wing stretched "en potence" to Merke Braine, covered the return of that flank, and was the great key of the position.

Upon the right of the Charleroi road, immediately in front of the left centre, was a farm-house and yard, which covered the approach to that part of the line.

The division of guards, under general Cooke, occupied the mansion of Hougoumont, in front of the right centre, with a detachment of three companies, and was drawn up on the rising ground behind and above that post, leaning with its right on the road of Nivelles. The division of general Alten stood with its left flank upon the road of Charleroi, and held the farm of La Haye Sainte, in front of the left centre, with a strong detachment of one of the light battalions of the German legion. With this division were the Nassau regiments, some in the front line, and one of light infantry detached in the wood of Hougoumont. The Brunswick troops were disposed, a part in the first line, and the main force in reserve with the division of guards under general Cooke. The whole corps was commanded by the prince of Orange.

The right wing was composed of the British divisions of generals Clinton and Colville; of two of Hanoverians; and one of the Netherlanders, under general Chaussé. This force occupied the right front en potence, and was commanded by lord Hill.

The left wing consisted of the division of general Picton, some Hanoverian troops and Netherlanders, and one British brigade under general Lambert. This wing extended from the Charleroi road along a hedge and lane upon the rising ground which terminates above Ter la Haye. That hamlet, as also Smohain and the farm of Papillotte, which lay on the extreme left, a little advanced in the direction of the wood of Fritschermont, were occupied by Nassau troops, under the prince of Weimar.

The whole of the allied cavalry was disposed in reserve, or second line, under lord Uxbridge.

The army of the duke of Wellington mustered about 74,000 men; but of these 5000 were in observation on the cross road near Braine le Château, and not in the line. The force of Napoleon then in presence counted upwards of 76,000 combatants.

The array on both sides was magnificent. The infantry of the allies was formed upon the first line, in close columns of battalions. The different batteries of field artillery were distributed between the intervals, or disposed along the front, according to the nature of the ground. The cavalry was drawn up in columns of regiments, by half squadrons, at quarter distance, upon the second line; and they were so skilfully disposed upon the reverse slope of the position, that their distribution was concealed from the enemy.

At the distance of about a mile in front of the allied position, and nearly parallel with it, the French occupied a range of eminences rather less elevated, and more undulating. Their right was in advance of Planchenois, and their line crossed the Charleroi road at the farm of La Belle Alliance, rested its left on the Genappe road, and occupied Mont Plaisir beyond with a detachment. But on neither side did the ground anywhere present a strong profile: it was commanding, but open; good for defensive fire, and the declivities in front so gentle as to be easily ascended by all arms. In truth, it was a noble field: behind the allied position stood the dark forest of Soignies, while beyond that of the French the ground rose considerably, and was skirted by thick woods. Here, in the grand arena of this solemn amphitheatre, upon slopes of waving corn, in the garden of the retired gentleman, and in the yard of the quiet husbandman, was to be fought the great battle of Europe against the great enemy of the happiness and the peace of nations.

Soon after ten o'clock, a great stir was observed in the French lines. From one particular point, where there was a heavy column of infantry under arms, mounted officers were observed galloping in various directions as with orders, and others were seen riding up to it with reports. This it was soon ascertained was the post of Napoleon, and that column was his famous guard. It was a fine plateau, on the side of the chaussée, near the solitary farm of Rossome.

The principal post of the duke of Wellington at this moment, and throughout the battle indeed, was near a remarkable tree in the centre of his position. For there were some weak points in his centre, the defence of which it was necessary to watch and provide for with all vigilance, and with a close superintendence in person.

The enemy's masses now rapidly formed in columns of attack. About half an hour before noon a considerable corps made a furious attack upon Hougoumont. They came on, preceded by a cloud of voltigeurs, with loud shouts and hot impetuosity. The Nassau soldiers were unable to defend the wood against this violent attack. The intrepid assailants fought their way into the

grounds, surrounded the house on three sides, and made desperate efforts to force it: but it was resolutely defended by the guards, who, from the loopholed walls of the building, and the garden, poured so steady, rapid, and destructive a fire upon the enemy, that all the space about was covered with their killed and wounded, and they were compelled to desist from their brave attempt. Meantime, the duke of Wellington sent fresh troops to recover the wood and garden: and, after a severe combat, and at a great cost of lives, the Coldstream and third Guards drove out the enemy, and re-established that post. The point was yet again and repeatedly assailed by fresh attacks. Nothing could be more stubborn than the defence of this château; the gate of the yard was at one time half forced in, but the French were bayoneted back again, and afterwards the roof and the upper walls were set on fire by shells from the French batteries; still, amid the flames, the building itself was heroically defended. The whole of one brigade of guards was employed in relief at Hougoumont in the course of the battle.

Simultaneously with the attack of Hougoumont, the whole of the enemy's artillery had opened upon the line of the allies, and a skirmish of light troops commenced on the extreme left at Papillotte. Of this farm, of Smoham, and of the hamlet of Ter la Haye, they soon got possession. This terrible cannonade was principally directed against the right and centre of the allies, and it was well replied to by the British guns. The advanced batteries of the centre, in particular, made fast and fatal practice with case-shot upon the columns which fed the attack of Hougoumont. Napoleon, seeing that the assault of Hougoumont had quite failed, continued his tremendous artillery fire, and, under cover of it, he directed a weighty and formidable attack upon the left centre, with infantry and cavalry in such numbers, that it required all the readiness and skill of the duke so to post his troops, that they might meet it with the best advantage; and demanded on their part discipline the most firm, and bravery undaunted.

A strong column of the enemy, in two divisions, covered by the fire of eighty pieces of artillery, now advanced, and, ascending at that part where a Belgian brigade was posted along a hedge, penetrated at that point, drove back the Belgian soldiers, and pushed to the crest of the position. But they were not suffered to establish themselves. General Kempt advanced rapidly upon this massive column with three weak British regiments in line, poured in his fire, and heroically charged it. This brigade had lost 800 men at Quatre Bras, and it performed this valiant action without support, and sustaining a heavy loss. At the same time the brigade of general Pack from the extreme left of the position

advanced upon the right division of this column with fire and with the bayonet. Appalled at finding themselves thus boldly met, these strong bodies of the enemy, after delivering their fire, turned and fled down the declivity. It was in this combat that the zealous and gallant Picton was slain: a musket-ball struck his right temple, and passed through his brain, and he fell dead.

At the moment of this repulse, general Ponsonby, with his brigade of heavy dragoons, made so vigorous a charge, that they took two eagles, and made two or three thousand prisoners.

A strong column of French cavalry led by cuirassiers now rushed forward to cover their routed and flying infantry on one flank, while some lancers charged upon the other. The dragoons of Ponsonby's brigade being far on, for they had charged up to the very guns which had covered the infantry, and sabred the cannoneers, were thus immediately engaged in a fierce and unequal mêlée; but they fought with such spirit and ardor, that it was before they retired the Royals took one of the eagles in the conflict.

In this affair the brave general Ponsonby was come upon at a disadvantage by a party of Polish lancers, as he was crossing some stiff ground, where his horse stuck, with nobody but his aid-de-camp, and they, never giving quarter, immediately took his life.

Notwithstanding the repulse which the enemy's right corps had received, he persisted in a most obstinate attack of the farm of La Haye Sainte, and supported his infantry columns with a division of cuirassiers. Against these last the earl of Uxbridge led on lord E. Somerset's noble brigade of life-guards. The cuirassiers met them sword to sword: the mêlée was most bloody; but the weighty cut and strong point of the English troopers carried all before them; and the cuirassiers, in spite of their defensive armor, were fairly beaten in those contests.

The enemy's infantry, however, did at last carry the farm-house of La Haye Sainte, for the Germans had expended all their ammunition, had nothing but their bayonets left, and were therefore overpowered; and the enemy getting in gave them no quarter. He was now enabled to assemble the masses of his cavalry close under the allied position, and more sheltered from their guns.

From this period of the battle to the close, Napoleon exhausted all his means of destruction in attacks, frequently and fiercely repeated, by horse and foot, and supported them by the fire of all his batteries. More than 200 guns roared and thundered upon the allied position. The fire was so deadly, that the duke of Wellington directed his columns to retire beyond the exposed

ridge, and lie upon the ground, till, upon the close advance of the enemy's masses of cavalry, they got the caution to stand up in squares, advance, and receive the charge. Repeatedly did the enemy's cavalry dash up on the very centre of the position, with vain intrepidity and useless devotion. By the steady volleys of the British squares, the flower of the French cavalry was destroyed. Nothing could shake the steadiness of these squares, nothing could daunt the valor of their assailants. In vain the French horse sent skirmishers to fire their carbines and pistols at this infantry; in vain did gallant men ride close up, and round the squares, tempting them to throw away their fire. They heeded nothing but the actual charge, and waiting for the word till the squadrons were close up, always repulsed them by their musketry. More than once the French cavalry had possession of the British guns on the brow of the position. They were never withdrawn. The horses only were taken to the rear; and the gunners, having fired them to the latest moment, took refuge in the squares, and were out again and pursuing the enemy with case-shot or bullets, as soon as ever they had been repulsed. Never on any field was an artillery more admirably served throughout the day than the British. Numbering little more than half the guns embattled by Napoleon, they answered that heavy fire with a force and rapidity, and a terrible execution, that the havoc in the French columns most truly declared. The incessant roar of cannon on both sides for so many hours gave to this battle a stern and awful peculiarity, and suited well with the deadly severity of all those combats where the hostile soldiers came in contact.

The farm of La Haye Sainte had been taken, about three o'clock, and it was after this period that the enemy made those repeated attacks on the British position between the two roads. While the contest was still continued at the château of Hougoumont, the battle raged upon the plateau above and behind that post, where the guards under general Maitland sustained repeated charges of cavalry, were exposed to a heavy cannonade, and, pushing forward their squares as the French horse drew off, were engaged with the columns of infantry that supported these attacks. All along that plateau to the Charleroi road, the ground was stubbornly contested in the same manner; the infantry now retiring a short distance, and lying down to avoid the terrible fire of the artillery,—now springing up and advancing in échellons of squares to repulse the cavalry, and occasionally pushing so far down the slope as to engage the infantry. The cavalry, who had executed brilliant charges during the earlier part of the day, were, during these combats, kept for the most part in reserve; but, as opportunity offered, they charged all such of the

enemy's horse as forced through the intervals of the squares; and the earl of Uxbridge, who led almost every attack of the British cavalry, kept an eager look-out. In the midst of this terrible conflict, the duke of Wellington, from his principal post near the tree, commanded every movement, formation, and advance of the enemy, piercing through the smoke of battle with an eagle's eye. From hence he flew wherever a difficulty demanded him. When the enemy concentrated their artillery in front of *La Belle Alliance*, and poured so terrible a fire upon our centre, he disposed the squares behind the ridge in shelter, and he, exposing himself to that hot storm, was the first to warn them as the attacking bodies advanced.

When the cavalry of the enemy took some guns on the brow of our position, he, advancing with a brigade of English and Brunswickers, instantly drove them off, and compelled them to abandon their capture.

As yet, however, the battle was undecided and doubtful; not a point of the position, indeed, had been lost,—not a square broken. The enemy had been constantly repulsed, and had suffered great losses: but the loss on our part had been horrid,—the ranks were thinned,—for superior numbers and superior artillery had been brought to bear upon the British for many hours. Hitherto the Prussians had not appeared, and it was five in the evening. Accounts had been received, indeed, that the corps of Bulow had arrived at St. Lambert, and that Blucher was moving up from Wavre with another; but their march had been delayed by the state of the roads and by the number of their guns, therefore the only diversion they had caused as yet, was by a few weak patrols of horse, which had appeared in the wood of Fritschermont on the right of the French army, and occupied the attention of a brigade of light cavalry detached to observe them. However, a little after five, the fire of Prussian artillery in that quarter was discerned from the British position; but it soon appeared to retire and cease. It seems that Bulow, who had only two brigades and a corps of cavalry up, had advanced at that time, but was compelled to retire again; and that a corps of French, under count Lobau, had been directed upon the rear of the French right to hold Bulow in check.

Between five and six, as a renewal of the attack on the weak part of the position near La Haye Sainte appeared certain, two brigades were brought forward from lord Hill's corps to the centre front. There was on both sides an anxious pause. The artillery still thundered; but the last struggle,—the crisis of the battle, was to come.

When, at three o'clock, Napoleon had carried the small post of La Haye Sainte, and had placed a mass of troops well under

the English position, he considered a victory certain, and sent a courier to Paris to announce his success. But when he now found that in five hours' fighting he had not made the slightest impression on the main position, and that Hougoumont, the key of it, was not carried;—that he had prodigally expended a noble cavalry, and had lost 15,000 fine soldiers of all arms;—that the Prussians were hurrying to the scene of action, and some were actually already engaging on his flank; the serenity which he had hitherto preserved forsook him. A fine and orderly retreat was no longer possible. Neither did it belong to the desperate state of things at that moment to entertain such an idea. One last hope remained to him. The guard had as yet made no attack. This noble reserve (of which it used to be his pride in the days of his victorious wars in Germany, when he announced his successes, to say, "La Garde n'a pas donné") he now led forward in person to the foot of the allied position. He here rode a few paces aside under a sheltering swell of ground; and the resolute and stern column passed on, turning their eyes upon him (for the last time) with something of severity and regret. This was about seven o'clock. They advanced in two columns, leaving four battalions of the old guard in reserve: they were led by Ney. The advance of these intrepid veterans was supported by a heavy cannonade; and at the same time some light troops were pushed on against La Haye upon their right. General Maitland's brigade of guards, and general Adam's brigade from the right corps, were immediately moved forward over the brow of the position to meet this attack by the duke in person. By his express order they were formed four deep, and their line was flanked by artillery. Steady and cool they stood; and the imperial guard ascended the slope, under the destructive fire of the guns, in gallant order, with supported arms. The fire of the British infantry now opened with great effect; and was sustained fast, and without the intermission of one second. Within about fifty yards of the English line the guard paused, and attempted to deploy; but under such a fire it was not possible. Beyond that point they never planted one footstep. The extremities of the line opposed to them were enveloping their flanks; they got mixed together in a crowded mass; their formation was broken; and giving way, they hurried down the face of the position in utter confusion. During this last effort, at a point very near, a body of Brunswickers was driven back by a column of the enemy from the ground where they were posted. The duke was instantly at their head; rallied them, and restored the combat.

However, by the defeat of the imperial guard in their attack on the British, the battle was already decided; and the duke of Wellington, now seeing the Prussians well up and engaged on

the enemy's right, and their columns sweeping down into the plain from the forest upon the British left, ordered a general advance of the whole line.

He led and directed this movement in person, with his hat off, at the head of the British guards. The four battalions of the old guard in reserve had formed squares, flanked by guns and supported by some lancers of the guard and attempted a regular retreat; but already the whole army was in confusion. "*Sauve qui peut*" was on all sides the cry; entire columns broke, threw down their arms, and ran for their lives; and as our line advanced, this old guard, the only body still preserving a formation, gave way, and the rout, confusion, and terror were complete. Disordered, broke, and trampled down, they fled or fell before their pursuers, who, with the wild hurrah of conquest, were hurrying at their heels.

The British army having crowned the position which the enemy had occupied all day, halted upon the field of battle. The Prussians, being fresh, pursued the French all night, with such vigor that they never rallied a single battalion. As soon as ever Buonaparte saw the repulse of the last attack which he had directed, he rode off the field, and consulted his safety by flight. It was already the last faint light of evening, and clouds of smoke were obscuring all objects when he fled.

Here the sun of that false glory, by the brightness of whose meridian rays he had dazzled the nations of Europe, set suddenly and for ever in darkness and blood.

The duke of Wellington and Blucher met at the farm of La Belle Alliance soon after nightfall; and the Prussian veteran embraced him with most hearty congratulations, which were warmly returned. Blucher had rendered great service, and his movements, though retarded by circumstances he could not control, were made with masterly decision. Disregarding Grouchy on his rear, he had pressed on with skilful judgment and hearty good-will to the field of Waterloo. It was now late, and as Blucher undertook to send his last horse and last man in pursuit, the duke of Wellington returned to his head-quarters at Waterloo. He passed back over the waste field of mud and gore where the dead lay in their mournful honor by the light of the moon. Of the British and German Legion alone more than 11,000 men and 700 officers had fallen killed or wounded. Most of the duke's personal staff had been struck down. Lord Fitzroy Somerset was severely wounded; the honorable Sir Alexander Gordon was killed; Picton, so valued in Spain, was dead; Ponsonby, after doing great things, had fallen cruelly; the duke of Brunswick slain (at Quatre Bras); the prince of Orange and the earl of Uxbridge had been wounded, the latter severely. The corps of

Lord Hill was not generally engaged, but he had rendered good service in person with such of his people as were brought into action, and was vigilant for opportunity. After Picton's death, General Kempt commanded on the left for hours with great firmness and skill.

The loss of the enemy cannot be known: it was enormous, and they abandoned all their artillery; in fact, the whole field was desolate as a shore after a hurricane covered with many wrecks. With this triumph we close the military memoir of the honored and illustrious duke of Wellington.

The consequences of the victory may be soon told. In one day the strong army of the warlike and ambitious Buonaparte was overthrown, and utterly destroyed; and his power, always employed upon the work of blood and conquest, was laid prostrate for ever. Peace, the true end of all rightful wars, was restored to England and to all Europe. The allies again marched to Paris; Buonaparte, after attempting a delusive and conditional abdication in favor of his son, fled; and finding escape to America impossible, surrendered himself to the English. Thus Louis once more ascended the throne of his ancestors.

Upon the night of the memorable battle, of which these were the early fruits, the words and emotions of the conqueror will long be remembered by those who sate with him at supper, after the anxious and awful day had closed. The fountain of a great heart lies deep, and the self-government of a calm mind permits no tears. But this night, Wellington repeatedly leaned back upon his chair, and rubbing his hands convulsively, exclaimed aloud, "Thank God, I have met him." "Thank God, I have met him." And, ever as he spoke, the smile that lighted up his eye was immediately dimmed by those few and big tears that gush warm from a grateful heart.

Those many and deep anxieties, to which all his late heavy responsibility of necessity gave birth: his noble desire as a patriot to defeat the most powerful and most implacable enemy of his native country; his rational doubts of success against a general of experience so great, genius so acknowledged (and by none so truly estimated as by himself), and fortune so singular; all that cannot be known to any one of the fears and hopes which had been pent up in his own bosom;—*all these* were now resolved, and dissipated by a result sudden, full, and glorious beyond any expectation he could possibly have formed, or any hope he could have admitted. The foe of England and of liberty was again a fugitive, his power prostrate, his brave and devoted legions destroyed. England, which he had served so faithfully, and loved so well, was placed upon the very pinnacle of glory; and her valiant army, which he had disciplined to conquest on

the battle-fields of Spain, and which upon this day he had commanded with a moral firmness never surpassed, was the honored instrument of her elevation. Long acknowledged as queen of the sea, she now stood foremost in military fame. This work under the blessing of God was his: he could look around and say, "It is my work."

The hidden fire of his heart had long been a prayer, and the tears which he now shed were—A THANKSGIVING. We do not mean such prayer or such thanksgiving as would have flowed from the informed conscience and the impressed affections of Gustavus Adolphus; but, we do mean, a secret and silent trust in Providence, and a sincere though brief recognition of its aid. Gustavus, looking above this world, died early, and was ripe for death. The life of the duke of Wellington has been long preserved, and has been passed upon the exposed summit of human honors. May God long be his "shield," and so teach him, that, in that land, where the ducal crown and the conqueror's laurels cannot enter, he may, find, and enjoy, the true and "EXCEEDING GREAT REWARD!"

THE END

IC10

